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LEITER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR 
Volume XVI of Res Publica has arrived! For that we can thank the hard work of its student 
editors, especially co-editors Amy U den and Michael Burgess. They have chosen capitols from 
here and abroad and from ancient times to the present to grace the cover: an appropriate choice 
given their conscious effort to produce a journal offering analysis on classical and contemporary 
themes and featuring international and American locales. 
The impressive quality and variety of papers contained in this volume reflects the students' 
efforts, but it also reflects the culture of academic excellence the department as a whole has 
developed over the years. The culture is maintained by the faculty's commitment to a particular 
institution, the two-course sequence beginning with research methods and ending with the 
senior seminar. It is in these classes that students learn to channel their intellectual curiosity 
about the world into researchable questions, normative frameworks, and empirical models. The 
department is subject to the same forces we study: institutions shape our culture and culture 
anchors our institutions. 
A short inventory indicates the amazing array of interests our culture of intellectual curiosity 
has created. From the national arena to the local venue in the US, and from international 
institutions to values among world nations, the range and variety of the topics studied is 
stunning. IWU political science students in this volume explore many unexpected places from 
Sub-Saharan Africa to Australia - even the "dark continent" of their own backyard, e.g., the 
McLean County Board. In reading this journal, you will move from the influence of the public 
mood on the US Supreme Court, to the impact of postmaterialist values on "hung" parliaments 
in Northern Europe and Canada, to an understanding of what will be required for Iran to 
transition to democracy. 
Intellectual curiosity is indeed alive and well in our department. It ranges far and wide. Please 
let your own curiosity do the same as you peruse these pages. 
J ames Simeone 
April 2011 
Bloomington 
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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION 
In assembling Res Publica XVI, we have had the honor of engaging a span of scholarly work that 
is broad in both method and substance. Perhaps more than any other edition, this year's journal 
represents many of the unique research threads that make up the discipline of political science. 
The concept of "res publica" itself also suggests the dynamic and diverse character of political 
science. The phrase itself has been used in incredibly diverse contexts, from the title of the early 
Roman political writings of Cicero, to the name of a contemporary Estonian populist party. The 
world has been witness to much of the power and volatility of politics in the year 2011, making 
it all the more evident that political scholarship requires continued commitment to intellectual 
inquiry, in order to further our understanding of this dynamic field. 
Res Publica, as one of the few undergraduate scholarly journals in existence, provides a unique 
venue for nascent scholars to contribute to the intellectual dialogue. Our contributing authors 
have used the skills they have developed during their undergraduate careers to create original 
research, tackling issues from the international realm to the local level of government. We offer 
our thanks and congratulations to these contributing authors for their willingness to engage the 
scholarly dialogue, building upon their already excellent academic accomplishments. 
Furthermore, we express our appreciation to Kim McDonald and Jillian Schmitz for their 
dedication and patience in assisting us with the creation of Res Publica. We also thank the 
Illinois Wesleyan political science faculty for entrusting us with the task of assembling a journal 
that is not only a representation of the diversity of our department, but also of our larger 
university. This product, created by the hard work of Wesleyan students, represents the 
outgrowth of the faculty's investment in our intellectual development and of their continued 
support throughout the editorial process. 
Michael Burgess & Amy Uden 
iv RES PUBLICA 
AUTHORS' BIOGRAPHIES 
Michael Browning is a senior Political Science major. He currently works for the City of 
Bloomington Legal Department and enjoys the public service aspect of his job. His research interests 
focus on the Supreme Court of the United States, especially in relation to public opinion. His work is 
fueled by his belief that in a constitutional democracy, it is vital to question if the law truly is 
anonymous and above the people, or if it is subject to the times and popular sentiment. Michael is 
also an avid St. Louis Cardinals fan, and enjoys spending time pursuing his interests in music and 
politics. In the near future, Michael plans to attend law school to pursue his strong interest in 
constitutional law and human rights. 
Jennifer Biess is a senior at Illinois Wesleyan University, and will graduate in May of 2011 with a 
double major in Political Science and Sociology. She interned in the Scottish Parliament researching 
affordable housing issues in the Highlands, and participated in the summer internship program at 
the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). She is a member of various groups on campus, 
including Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Kappa Phi. After graduation, Jennifer plans to pursue a career 
and further her education in policy research. 
Sara Ghadiri graduated in December 2010 with a double major in Political Science and Philosophy 
and a minor in Music. A member of Phi Beta Kappa, she served on the Executive Board for Sigma 
Alpha Iota Music Fraternity, as Vice President for Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society, and was a former 
Editor of Res Publica. Sara spent the summer of 2009 in Iran collecting data for the project published 
in this journal, and it was accepted and presented at the 2011 Illinois Political Science Association 
Conference. Sara will be attending University of Iowa College of Law this fall where she hopes to 
pursue a JD with a concentration in International Law. 
Amy Uden is a senior Political Science major and History minor, and works as a Political Science 
Lab Assistant. She has been involved in several campus organizations, including Pi Sigma Alpha, 
Phi Beta Kappa, and other honors societies, as well as music groups, College Republicans, and 
especially DRL campus Christian ministry. Amy also studied abroad in 2009 with the IWU Madrid 
Program. Her research interests include political theory, religion and politics, and redistricting. She 
has worked with the McLean County Administrator's office as a Budget Analysis Intern, and hopes 
to continue to work in state or local government following graduation, along with possibly pursuing 
a graduate degree. 
RES PUBLICA v 
Megan Weinstein is a senior at Illinois Wesleyan University, and will graduate in May of 2011 with 
a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science. Her interests include inter-governmental 
organizations and peace and conflict reconciliation. Megan participated in the Technos International 
Week in Tokyo, Japan during the summer of 2009, studied abroad with the European Union 
program based out of Freiburg, Germany the spring of 2010, and will be traveling to France for May 
Term of 2011 to study French political culture. Megan also worked with the Lamu Center of 
Preventative Health as part of an Action Research internship the spring of 2011. After graduation, 
she plans to return to Europe to pursue her Master's Degree in Global Studies. 
Michael Burgess is a senior Political Science major with a focus on international and 
comparative politics. On campus, he participates in Pi Sigma Alpha and is a member of the 
track team. He studied abroad during the fall of 2009 in Nagoya, Japan. After graduation, he 
plans to pursue a Master's Degree in International Affairs. 
Chris Schaeffer is a junior Poltiical Science major from Arlington Heights, IL. Chris has been 
involved on campus in actitivies such as club volleyball, and has been the president of his 
fraternity. He interned this past summer at the U.S. District Court in Chicago. Within political 
science, his research interests focus primarily on political theory. After graduation, he 
anticipates either attending law school or graduate school in political theory. 
RES PUBLICA 1 
SUPREME COURT RESPONSIVENESS: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE 
VOTING BEHAVIOR AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
Michael Browning 
Abstract: This study attempts to explain why the Supreme Court responds to public mood by analyzing 
individual justice liberalism and comparing it to public liberalism between the years of1970 and 2001. 
Three theories suggesting why the Court may respond to public opinion are discussed, including the 
replacement, political adjustment, and the attitude change hypotheses. The method of using Court 
reversals to determine the ideology of the Court is presented and implemented. Along with ideology and 
the public mood, the overall Court mood is used as an independent variable to explain the driving force 
behind changes in individual justices' voting behavior. The study concludes that the Court mood is the 
strongest and most significant factor in changes in judicial voting behavior, while public opinion and 
ideology explain little to none of the variance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's role in American society is one of the essential parts of the checks 
and balances of the United States government. The lifetime tenure of justices frees them from 
the tyranny of public mood during election seasons and allows them to decide cases on the 
basis of the law rather than public preferences. In Federalist Paper No.7S, Alexander Hamilton 
argued that if periodic instead of lifetime appointments were made, the temptation would be 
too great to consult popularity rather than the Constitution and the laws. In Federalist Paper 
No.76, Hamilton also described the Court as lithe least dangerous branch" because of its 
inability to make laws and policies of its own. It is also arguably the least democratic branch, 
because it is the most independent branch. However, despite the Court's immunity from public 
opinion due to the process of appointments, as opposed to elections, evidence suggests the 
Court still regularly decides in line with public opinion. William Mishler, Reginald Sheehan1, 
Kevin McGuire, and James Stimson2 analyze the relationship between public opinion and the 
Supreme Court using Stimson's index of public mood from 1992 and 1999, respectively. In their 
analyses, Mishler and Sheehan find that the Supreme Court responds to public opinion at a lag 
of five years with an R-squared of .66, significant at the .01 level. McGuire and Stimson find a 
relationship at a lag of one year with an R squared of .71, significant at the .05 level. Given these 
data, public opinion has an influence on the Court, but because lifetime appointments separate 
the justices from direct accountability to public opinion, there must be other explanations as to 
why public opinion affects the Court. 
THEORIES OF RESPONSIVENESS 
To best explain how the Supreme Court might be affected by public opinion, three 
theories are generally used. The Dahl-Funston hypothesis, also known as "replacement 
hypothesis," articulates that because the president and senators' beliefs and positions are in line 
1 Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 1994; 1996. 
2 Stimson and McGuire 2004. 
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with the public mood when elected, their choices for justices are also likely to reflect that mood. 
Dahl argues that a president generally gets to appoint two justices for every four years spent in 
office, which can effectively "tip the balance on the normally divided Court."3 Mishler and 
Sheehan note that this theory is consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision 
making which states that justices assume the bench with ideologies and beliefs that typically 
remain constant throughout their tenure. 4 
The political adjustment hypothesis is much more direct, as it states that justices might 
purposefully change or tweak their positions in order to bring their decisions in line with the 
public mood. Political adjustment suggests that justices are concerned with the enforcement of 
their decisions. This hypothesis is best summed up by Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr. 
Frankfurter wrote "The Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword -
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."s 
The " attitude change hypothesis" is the final of the standard three theories on court­
public relations. It conflicts with the attitudinal model in that it specifically theorizes that a 
justice's personal ideology might change in time to fit with broad and enduring changes in 
public opinion. Judges, like other members of society, are affected by societal norms, even if 
they are unaware of society's effects on them. Mishler and Sheehan acknowledge that the 
attitude change hypothesis cannot reliably be tested because there are no independent measures 
of social change, and McGuire and Stimson do not even theorize on the matter, preferring to 
test the replacement and political adjustment hypotheses instead.6 
THEORIES OF MEASURES 
McGuire and Stimson set up their empirical analysis by using Stimson's 1999 index of 
public mood as the independent variable and the Supreme Court's liberalism as the dependent 
variable? However, they identify a unique problem with analyzing all of the Court's cases as 
an indicator of the Court's ideology, citing McGuire, Smith and Caldeira8 in their theory 
explaining why reversals provide better indicators of the Court's ideology. 
The reversal hypothesis relies on the idea that lower courts' decisions " center around the 
Supreme Court's ideal." This idea states that because lower courts are restricted by stare decisis, 
they make decisions that attempt to reflect policy outlined in Supreme Court precedents.9 This 
"vertical stare decisis" causes lower court decisions to cluster around the moderate center of the 
Court's known preferences. Potential litigants estimate their chances of winning given these 
known preferences, and decide to seek certiorari based on those chances. If the Supreme Court 
is perceived as conservative, more liberal lower court decisions will be considered too liberal for 
3 Dahl 1957, quoted in Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 171 .  
4 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
S Baker v. Carr 1962, quoted in Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 173. 
6 Mishler and Sheehan 1996; McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
7 McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
8 McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira 2004. 
9 Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994. 
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the Court. In other words, there would be more conservative petitioners making accurate (and 
inaccurate) estimates as to their likelihood of winning at the Supreme Court level. These 
accurate estimates become reversals, while the inaccurate estimates become affirmances. 
McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera write that " as the Court becomes more conservative, there are 
more liberal policies that will be reversed by the justices and fewer conservative lower court 
decisions that they will reject."lO Thus the reversals, or the accurate estimates, reflect where the 
Court lies ideologically, while the inaccurate estimates portray an incorrect image. Tests of the 
reversal hypothesis reveal that when using only reversals, the Court appears to be liberal 
through the Warren Court and then more conservative through the Burger and Rehnquist 
courts, until Clinton's appointments brought the Court back towards a moderate center. Using 
only affirmances showed close to the opposite, suggesting that the Warren years were very 
conservative years for the Court, something widely known to be untrue. The reversal model 
also explains 82 % of the variance in the ideological composition of decisions, where the 
standard model using both reversals and affirmances only accounted for 70% .11 
McGuire and Stimson also test the reversal hypothesis. Their data support their 
hypothesis, showing affirmances with an R squared of .03, reversals with .60 and all cases with 
.57.12 The most compelling results of their research show significantly strengthened 
relationships between Court composition/public opinion and the liberalism of Court outcomes 
when using reversals as opposed to all the cases. Given the reversal hypothesis, there is a 
strong argument that using both affirmances and reversals contaminates models attempting to 
illustrate the liberalism of Supreme Court decisions, and that previous studies of the Court may 
have underestimated the effect of public opinion.l3 
Another research issue concerns the response time of the Court to public opinion. 
Mishler and Sheehan predict a lag in the evidence of a response to public opinion in the Court's 
decisions because replacing justices takes time, as does political adjustment.l4 According to 
their theory, justices would only logically respond to enduring shifts of public opinion. 
Norpoth and Segal criticize the lag theory, stating that "if the Court only acts on change that has 
endured, their decisions should be influenced by contemporaneous as well as lagged public 
opinion. illS The time lag concern is worth discussing because Mishler and Sheehan show that 
public opinion is "significantly and positively correlated with trends in the Court's decisions at 
a lag of five years; and the relationship approaches significance at t+3 as well."l6 The absence of 
evidence of a lag at one year, two years, and four years may be attributed to the short length of 
the time series used. In reply to Norpoth and Segars concern that justices should be affected by 
contemporaneous opinion, Mishler and Sheehan respond that justices may only respond to 
10 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004, 7. 
11 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004. 
12 McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
13 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004, 16-17. 
14 Mishler and Sheehan 1993. 
15 Norpoth and Segal 1994, 712. 
16 Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 92. 
4 RES PUBLICA 
durable shifts in public opinion, something that contemporaneous opinion has not yet had time 
to prove. They expand their theory to explain a small impact of public opinion in the first year 
that will "gradually increase over time before ending or leveling off at some impossible-to­
predict future point."17 Their results support this theory. 
THEORIES REGARDING INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES 
Mishler and Sheehan also examine the issue at an individual level. They look at 
Supreme Court justices in a psychological manner, reasoning that attitudes are affected by 
personally held beliefs, the strength of those beliefs, how they are expected to behave, and 
societal norms.18 Their hypothesis states that justices with more extreme ideologies will be less 
likely to move to the center (public opinion), while justices who are already moderate will be 
more likely to move one way or the other. They use yearly data from the Supreme Court Data 
Base from 1953 - 1992, analyzing only justices who served for 12 years or longer .. Evaluating the 
percentage of liberal votes cast by each justice each year, they compare it to Stimson's public 
mood index from 1991. Their analysis supports their hypothesis, showing "that moderate 
justices are more consistently responsive to fluctuations in the public mood than either liberal or 
conservative justices."19 
All three analyses by Mishler and Sheehan20 and the analysis by McGuire and Stimson 
show that decisions of the Court diverge from public opinion around 1980. 21 This could be 
caused by a sharp increase in liberal public mood coupled with several increasingly moderate to 
conservative appointments to the Supreme Court that began in the Reagan years and continued 
through Bush Sr., thus affecting the balance of the Court.22 This would be consistent with the 
replacement hypothesis as well as Mishler and Sheehan's theory that moderate justices are the 
swing votes that cause the Court to follow public opinion.23 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
In approaching my analysis of individual Supreme Court justices, I start by questioning 
if Supreme Court decisions between the years of 1970 and 2001 reflect long-term public opinion 
trends. Given that they do, are moderate justices providing swing votes that cause Supreme 
Court decisions to follow public opinion? 
The hypothesis stating that the Supreme Court follows public opinion due to moderate 
justices is based on the theories of Mishler and Sheehan that state that moderate justices are 
more likely to be affected and swayed by public mood than more ideologically extreme justices. 
17 Mishler and Sheehan 1994, 718. 
18 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
19 Ibid., 189. 
20 Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 1994; 1996. 
21 McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
22 Mishler and Sheehan 1993. 
23 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
RES PUBLICA 5 
As a result, a balanced Court will appear to follow public opinion rather closely in its decisions, 
because the moderate justices swing the decision in the direction of the public mood.24 I expect 
the empirical evidence between 1970 and 2001 to support the hypothesis that as the Court 
becomes ideologically imbalanced, its decisions will stray from public opinion. 
MEASURES 
Mishler and Sheehan observe the relationship between public opinion and Supreme 
Court decisions by individually examining each of the nine seats on the Supreme Court 
between 1953 and 1992. They measure each justice's ideology by doing a content analysis on 
newspaper editorials at the time of the justice's nomination to the Supreme Court. They code 
each justice as either extremely conservative (-1), moderate (0), or extremely liberal (1) and sum 
the scores to determine the ideological balance of the Supreme Court for each year. This 
method of coding efficiently identifies the ideology of the Court, but it makes a critical error by 
assuming that a justice's ideology stays the same throughout their tenure. Two justices within 
the scope of my study, Justices Blackmun and White, disprove that theory altogether. In the 
model, ideology scores for each justice were calculated by using a moving average of their 
liberalism scores from their previous three years on the Court. 
Mishler and Sheehan also limit their study to justices who served a minimum of twelve 
years, presumably because twelve years provides a sufficient amount of time to see how the 
justice's ideology reflected in his or her decisions. Because of the already limited number of 
cases, I decided to use all justices who served between 1970 and 2001. Where multiple 
regression models turned up insignificant results, bivariate correlation was used as an alternate 
attempt at observing the relationship. 
To determine the ideology of Supreme Court decisions, Mishler and Sheehan use the 
Supreme Court Database and calculate the percentage of liberal votes cast by the justice in 
question for each year.25 They exclude per curium opinions, memoranda, and judicial power 
decisions because of the difficulty in coding the ideological direction of a decision or the routine 
nature of these types of decisions. I will be using the Supreme Court Database, which provides 
the data for each justice's vote as well as the vote's ideological identification. I will also include 
all decisions that could be coded, as some per curium opinions do have a discernable 
ideological direction. The database codes votes and decisions as liberal if, in criminal 
procedure, First Amendment, civil rights or due process cases, the vote is pro-individual, pro­
affirmative action, pro-female in abortion, or pro-civil liberties, to name a few. In economics or 
union cases, liberal votes and decisions are pro-union, pro-debtor, anti-business, or pro­
consumer, etc. Conservative votes and decisions are coded as the opposites of the liberal votes. 
Exact lists of coding criteria are found in the Supreme Court Database codebook. 
To create a liberalism score for each justice, the votes were tallied for each year of their 
tenure. The total liberal votes were then divided by the total number of cases in which an 
24 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
25 Ibid. 
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ideological direction was discernable, producing a justice liberalism score for that year. The 
restrictions on this model were that the votes were only tallied from reversals, as they are a 
better indicator of a justice's ideology.26 
In addition to concerns about Court ideology, another measurement issue deals with the 
independent variable of public mood, which has proved a challenge to measure accurately 
throughout much of the literature. James Stimson solves this seemingly daunting task with his 
public mood index. His index is available on his website, and many scholars, including those 
cited in this study, rely on it as a dependable indicator of the liberalism of public opinion on a 
yearly basis. 
With the variables of individual justices' ideologies, the overall Court's ideology, and 
the public's overall political mood affecting the ideological direction of Supreme Court 
decisions between 1970 and 2001, the model will attempt to establish a nuanced analysis of how 
individual justices make their decisions. It should be noted that 2001 provides a good stopping 
point because Stimson's standard error on his public policy mood index gets exponentially 
larger in more recent years. The independent variables for each individual justice are the 
Court's mood, the individual justice's ideology, and the public's mood. The dependent variable 
is the justice's liberalism score for each year he or she served on the Court. 
Table 1 below represents the overall model strength for each of the time lags considered 
in the study. Figure 1 graphically depicts the relationship between the Court mood and public 
opinion over time. 
Table 1: Overall Model Strength for Time-Lagged Models 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
N 
R I' I Time +1 I ea time 
Y ears 
.550 .510 
.001 .003 
32 32 
26 McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira 2004. 
Time+2 
Years 
.504 
.003 
32 
I Time +3 I Time+4 I Time+5 Years Years Years 
.552 .370 .322 
.001 .037 .072 
32 32 32 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
In order to find the point at which justices can be expected to respond to public mood, 
models for the current year and five time lags were run for the entire Court mood. Bivariate 
correlation models show that the Court responds to public mood immediately (realtime) and 
also at time lags of one, two, and three years. While the four year lag was also significant, it was 
less so, and the five year lag did not return any significant results. 
This is not surprising, as justices may be responding both to immediate public trends as 
well as prolonged public changes in mood, which fits with the argument of Norpoth and Segal. 
The study continued by focusing on realtime as well as the three year lag because they were the 
most statistically significant with the strongest correlations to public mood. 
Models were run testing the justices' liberalism scores against public mood in realtime 
and at a lag of three years. The justices' ideology and the Court's overall mood were used as 
controls. As mentioned before, ideology was calculated using a moving average from the votes 
of the previous three years. This measure of ideology accounts for the theory being tested here: 
that justices do not make decisions based off of a solid, unchanging ideology. Instead, my 
ideology measure allows for a changing judicial attitude. By using an average of the previous 
three years, the ideology score balances out what might be considered outlier years when the 
docket contained uncommon numbers of certain types of cases. In the years examined, 1970 
through 2001, eighty percent of cases concerned either criminal procedure, civil rights, first 
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amendment, economic activity, or judicial power. Of these, 22% were criminal procedure, 19% 
were civil rights, 9% were First Amendment, 18% were economic activity, and 13% were judicial 
power. This balance of law issues allows the study to accurately examine the ideology of each 
justiceP 
The purpose of the model was to find out which justices responded to public opinion, 
and thus affected the outcome of the Court's decisions, causing the overall Court mood to 
follow public opinion. The results, however, did not follow that line of logic. Very few of the 
justices showed any significant correlation with public opinion at all. Those who did, Justice 
Souter in realtime, and Justices Blackmun and Burger at a three year lag, reacted by moving 
away from public opinion, rather than parallel to it. In the cases of Blackmun and Burger, 
ideology turned out to be a strong driving force, with Betas of .758 and .395 respectively. When 
it comes to the moderate justice thesis, this model failed to show a strong correlation with 
public opinion. 
Findings concerning ideology were also surprising, as this is not typically a dominant 
factor in justices' votes. The attitudinal model of judicial decision making states that justices 
make decisions based off of attitudes or ideologies that remain the same throughout their 
tenure. However, the results of this model tell quite a different story. After observing changes 
in justices' liberalism scores from year to year, the model was designed to assume that the 
attitudinal model was partially incorrect, instead asserting that justices' ideologies actually do 
change throughout their tenure. Room was made for this hypothesis by calculating the justice 
ideology independent variable as a moving average of previous years' votes. Even with this 
moving ideology variable, ideology only appeared to significantly affect Justice Blackmun's 
votes in realtime and T+3 (with strong Betas of .818 and .758 respectively), and Chief Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist in T+3 (with weaker Betas of .395 and .304, respectively) . Because Justice 
Blackmun started his tenure conservatively in the 1970s and ended quite liberally during the 
1980s, the resulting ideological shift logically accounts for the change in his voting behavior 
better than public mood, even though public liberalism declined during the 70s and increased 
during the 80s. In addition, though his voting record correlated with public mood at T+3, it did 
so in a negative direction (Beta of -.430) . This negative correlation might exist because his shift 
in liberalism is actually quite a bit more dramatic than the public's, which usually tends to be 
slow and even. Justices Burger and Rehnquist's ideologies, on the other hand, correlate 
positively with their voting records. It may be possible that their role as Chief Justice has 
something to do with their ideologies playing into their decisions more than the other justices, 
but that hypothesis could only be addressed in another study. 
The results show that the strongest variable affecting justice's votes was the Court's 
overall mood. Aside from Breyer and Souter's bivariate correlation exceptions (most likely due 
to their small sample sizes of years on the Court), Court mood came in as the strongest 
27 Further study has shown this statement to be incorrect. Data shows that justices vote with different 
ideologies depending on the law issue at hand. By aggregating all of the issues, this study has produced 
an inaccurate measure of the justices' ideologies. See 2011 research by Michael Browning for a resolution 
of this issue. 
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significant independent variables affecting each justices' votes. This is to be partly expected, as 
Court decisions are composed of justice's votes, but given that there are nine justices, it is 
noteworthy that overall Court mood is such a strong force on an individual justice's vote 
regardless of ideology. A likely explanation for the importance of Court mood is that as the 
overall mood of the Court shifts to accommodate public opinion, justices adjust their vote in 
order to stay relevant. This can especially be seen in the results for some of the moderate 
justices (who are potential swing votes) at a three year lag, namely O'Conner, Kennedy, and 
Powell. Burger is even surprisingly affected by the overall Court mood, suggesting that even 
ideologically extreme justices care about their relevance to the Court. 
While the results of the model do not point to individual justices as the reason behind 
the Court's correlation with public opinion, they do suggest that the composition of the Court is 
important. However, the variance in individual justices' voting behavior contradicts parts of 
the attitudinal model by suggesting that justices change their votes to be in line with the overall 
mood of the Court. This casts some doubt on the replacement hypothesis as the sole 
explanation for why the Supreme Court tends to correlate with public opinion. If the 
replacement hypothesis affected Supreme Court voting in any significant way, we would not 
see much of a change in voting behavior during the 11 year period between 1994 and 2005 when 
the composition of the Court did not change at all. The results of this model (from 1994-2001) 
do not show a static Court, but instead show an almost random pattern during those years. The 
small sample size restricts the conclusions that can be made from this observation, but it does 
suggest that there is more to be explained concerning how the Supreme Court behaves as an 
institution. The results of this model suggest a combination of rational choices made by 
individual justices, while the overall Court follows the theory of political adjustment with 
occasional shifts that occur when justices are sometimes replaced by their ideological opposites. 
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Model and 
Independent N 
Variables 
Individual 
Justice 
Marshallt 21 
Stevens 27 
Brennan 23 
Breyert 8 
Soutert 12 
Ginsburg 9 
Blackmun 24 
White 23 
O'Conner 21 
Kennedy 15 
Burger 16 
Powell 16 
Stewart 11 
Rehnquist 30 
Scalia 16 
Thomast 11 
Table 2: Realtime Multiple Regression Model 
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices' Voting Patterns 
Adjusted. Overall Court Ct Md. Ideology Id. Std. Model Mood Std. R- Square Sig. (Sig.):j: Error:j: 
(Sig.) Error 
.000 
.502* .162 
(.02) (.451) 
.546* .014 
.544** 
.216 
.270 
(.086) .153 (.002) 
.375 
.489* 
(.040) 
.155 
-.200 
(.423) .315 
.518 -.047 
.033 
(.188) (.911) 
.513* .010 
.899** 
.320 
.067 
(.818) 
.476 
(.009) 
.807*** .000 
.906* -.285 
(.045) 
.407 
(.165) .308 
.000 
.534*** 
.772*** 
(000) 
.172 
.818*** 
(.000) 
.149 
.660*** .000 
.914*** 
.155 
.083 
(.539) 
.170 
(.000) 
.723** .003 
.853*** 
(.000) 
.152 
-.002 
(.988) .171 
.636*** .000 
.842*** .076 
(.000) 
.172 
(.667) .370 
.000 
.993*** 
. 776*** 
(.000) 
.167 
.183 
(.313) 
.268 
.881** .007 
.945*** 
(.000) 
.125 
.247 
(.142) .158 
.717*** .000 
.912** 
(.007) 
.225 
-.539 
(.130) 
.404 
.550** .001 
.617*** 
.170 
.219 
(.110) 
.176 
(.000) 
.036 
.832*** 
.698* 
(.000) 
.160 
.251 
(.112) .300 
.548 
.705* -.279 
(.021) 
.481 
(.298) 
.499 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.OOl 
Public 
Mood 
(Sig.) 
.437* 
(.033) 
.135 
(.357) 
.399 
(.160) 
.509 
(.197) 
-.849* 
(.026) 
-.014 
(.970) 
-.221 
(.141) 
-.203 
(.207) 
.056 
(.664) 
.058 
(.741) 
-.228 
(.355) 
-.221 
(.235) 
.387 
(.303) 
.115 
(.422) 
.210 
(.171) 
.281 
(.338) 
tMultiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation, 
:j: Variable Betas measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test. 
PM 
Std. 
Error 
.479 
.494 
.984 
2.337 
.528 
.388 
.352 
.449 
.608 
.507 
.926 
.423 
.389 
1 .408 
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Model and 
Independent N 
Variables 
Individual 
Justice 
Marshallt 21 
Stevens 27 
Brennan 23 
Breyert 8 
Soutert 12 
Ginsburg 9 
Blackmun 24 
White 23 
O'Conner 21 
Kennedy 15 
Burger 16 
Powell 16 
Stewart 11 
Rehnquist 30 
Scalia 16 
Thomast 11 
Table 3: Time +3 Years Multiple Regression Model 
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices' Voting Patterns 
Adjusted. Overall Court Ct Md. Ideology Id. Std. Model Mood Std. R- Square Sig. (Sig.):j: Error:j: 
(Sig.) Error 
.502* .162 
(.020) (.451) 
.542** .258 .563*** .000 (.001) .208 (.094) .151 
.594* -.062 .293* .036 (.032) .179 (.865) .464 
.518 -.047 
(.188) (.911) 
.364 .209 
(.245) (.515) 
.943** -.177 .836** .007 (.002) .179 (.387) .326 
.690*** .758*** .868*** .000 (.000) .135 (.000) .097 
.662** -.122 .668*** .000 (.001) .156 (.510) .231 
.844*** -.062 .724*** .000 (.000) .157 (.724) .236 
.792** .016 .652** .002 (.001) .183 (.925) .363 
1.08*** .395* .855*** .000 (.000) .117 (.026) .240 
.867*** .070 .867*** .000 (.000) .119 (.732) .199 
1.02** -.299 .668* .013 (.005) .236 (.335) .371 
.721*** .304* .562*** .000 (.000) .165 (.039) .186 
.853** .242 .645** .001 (.001) .203 (.241) .402 
.783** -.026 
(.004) (.940) 
*p<.05, **p<.Ol, ***p<.OOl 
Public 
Mood 
(Sig.) 
.092 
(.692) 
.185 
(.193) 
.105 
(.804) 
-.324 
(.434) 
-.464 
(.129) 
-.179 
(.391) 
-.430*** 
(.000) 
.325 
(.153) 
.096 
(.620) 
.143 
(.440) 
-.523** 
(.016) 
.051 
(.797) 
.021 
(.946) 
-.177 
(.247) 
.036 
(.864) 
.031 
(.927) 
tMultiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation, 
:j: Variable Betas measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test. 
11 
PM 
Std. 
Error 
.433 
.679 
.524 
.330 
.501 
.450 
.489 
.380 
.449 
.953 
.408 
.556 
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CONCLUSIONS 
While this study failed to explain the reason that the Supreme Court follows public 
mood, it did bring to light a reason why it does not. Given the results of this study, it can be 
asserted that moderate justices are no more likely to heed public mood than extreme ideological 
justices, or that extreme ideological justices may pay attention to public opinion in a negative 
way (see Burger, T+3). What remains to be seen is how the Supreme Court follows public 
opinion overall without any of the individual justices being significantly affected by the public 
mood. Several explanations exist, including the possibility that while none of the justices are 
significantly affected, there is enough variation in the group that the seemingly random back 
and forth movements of the justices actually amount to an adherence to public mood. Yet 
another possibility is that the cases and votes in this study were not broken down by issue.28 
Some justices' ideologies can change significantly depending on the issue, and a more careful 
study may show that some individual justices actually do follow public opinion on certain 
issues that are important to the American public. Finally, this study was restricted by a small 
number of cases, and while the liberalism scores for each justice are seemingly accurate, the 
number of years for some justices on the bench were simply too few to study. Despite these 
limitations, this study achieved significant results and was able to verify that the overall mood 
of the Court is a powerful factor in judicial decision making. Further research into voting 
blocks, as well as Court leadership and swing voting, may reveal why the Supreme Court 
correlates strongly with the overall public mood and whether or not it falls in line with the 
political adjustment hypothesis. 
28 See author's 2011 work for testing of this hypothesis. 
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WHAT'S THE HANG UP?: 
EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF POSTMATERIALISM ON HUNG PARLIAMENTS 
Jennifer Biess 
Abstract: Elections in majoritarian states are supposed to produce single-party majority governments. 
However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial majoritarian parliamentary 
democracies - the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia - failed to produce majority governments. No 
single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in any of these three elections, a condition 
commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the literature's tendency to dismiss hung 
parliaments as electoral abnormalities, this recent wave of hung parliaments among such similarly 
situated states suggests the presence of an underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes. 
The current study analyzes the role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in advanced industrial 
societies in the occurrence of hung parliaments through multiple least squares regression. While the study 
is not able to arrive at a universal explanation for hung parliaments in all three cases, it is able to explain 
hung parliaments in Australia and Canada. 
INTRODUCTION 
Elections in majoritarian states are designed to produce single-party majority 
governments. However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial 
majoritarian parliamentary democracies - the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia - failed 
t� produce majority governments. No single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in 
any of these three elections, a condition commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the 
literature's tendency to dismiss hung parliaments as electoral abnormalities, the recent wave of 
hung parliaments among such institutionally similar states suggests the presence of an 
underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes.1 This study seeks to analyze the 
role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in the occurrence of hung parliaments in 
advanced industrial societies. 
After the UK's 2010 general election, its hung parliament sparked a national 
conversation over electoral reform. However, there is widespread disagreement over which 
system is best.2 If the UK and other countries seek to ameliorate their "hung parliament 
problems" and want to enact electoral reform, it is imperative to first understand what causes 
hung parliaments. Armed with that information, these countries can make educated decisions 
about more appropriate electoral systems. While this discussion is limited to three specific 
countries, the general lessons can be extended to other advanced industrial states, especially 
those with majoritarian electoral systems. 
1 Kalitowski 2008. 
2 Wheeler 2010. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Westminster Model 
The UK, Australia and Canada are all built on the Westminster model of parliamentary 
democracy, also referred to as the majoritarian or plurality model. Westminster model 
democracies generally have two-party systems. Proponents of this structure emphasize the 
ability of the two-party system to provide voters with a clear choice between two alternatives 
and produce dominant single-party majority governments.3 Two party systems also tend to be 
one-dimensional in that the two parties generally only differ on one main issue.4 
Electoral systems in majoritarian polities generally follow the first-past-the-post style of 
elections and use single member districts. Whoever wins the most votes in a given district, 
whether a plurality or a majority, wins the seat. While this is the most common electoral format 
in Westminster model democracies, there are some exceptions. Australia uses the alternative 
vote system, in which voters order the candidates in terms of preference. First, they calculate 
the vote based on voters' first choices. If no candidate wins a majority, the candidate who 
received the least number of votes is eliminated, and his or her votes are redistributed to the 
voters' second choice candidate. This process continues until one candidate wins a majority of 
the votes in that district; thus, it is often considered a true majority election formula.5 
Despite their electoral and party structures, third parties have been able to win seats in 
all three states included in the current study, albeit with varying degrees of success. Generally, 
one of the two traditional parties represents the ideological left, which is popular with the 
working class, and the other stands for the ideological right, which traditionally appeals to the 
middle class.6 In the UK, the traditional parties are the Labour Party, which has historically 
been ideological left party, and the Conservative Party, which has been the ideological right 
party; however, the Liberal Democrat Party has emerged as a strong, ideologically centrist third 
party. In Canada, the established national parties are the Liberal Party and the Conservative 
Party, where the Liberal Party represents the ideological left and the Conservative Party 
embodies the ideological right. A variety of minor parties are prominent. Together minor 
parties have garnered about thirty percent of the votes in recent elections.? Two-party politics is 
strongest in Australia. The Australian Labor Party is the traditional party of the ideological left, 
while the Liberal-National Coalition represents the traditional party of the ideological right. 
Although there are a variety of minor parties, the most notable is the recent rise of the Green 
Party in Australia, which has increased its share of the vote from 1 % in 1990 to 12% 2010.8 
3 Lijphart 1999. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Inglehart 1990. 
7 Parliament of Canada. 
8 Newman 2004-2005 (for years 1987-2004); Australia Votes 2007; Australia Votes 2010. 
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Hung Parliaments 
Elections in Westminster model parliamentary democracies are designed to produce 
stable single-party majority governments. However, exceptions do occur, and these exceptions 
are referred to as hung parliaments. By definition a hung parliament is "one in which no party 
has an overall majority," meaning also that no single party has won more than half of the 
parliamentary seats.9 Generally, hung parliaments have been interpreted as isolated electoral 
anomalies.1° 
The most recent elections in the UK, Canada, and Australia have all produced hung 
parliaments. Before Australia's 2010 election, its most recent hung parliament occurred in 
1940.11 In the UK, before the 2010 general election the most recent hung parliament occurred in 
1974.12 Of the three states compared in the present study, Canada has experienced hung 
parliaments most frequently. Of the nine federal elections held between 1957 and 1979, six 
resulted in hung parliaments. However, from the 1980 election until the 2004 election Canadian 
federal elections produced majority governments each time. The federal elections of 2004, 2006, 
and 2008 all produced hung parliaments)3 However, the phenomenon of hung parliaments has 
largely been ignored in the literature. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that 
explain this current wave of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model 
parliamentary democracies. 
The Decline of Class-Voting and the Rise of Postmaterialist Values 
Traditionally, class has been the primary electoral cleavage. Some scholars argue, 
however, that in advanced industrial societies the emergence of new social issues has led to a 
decline in the dominance of class-based voting.14 
Clark and Upset argue that the importance of class in advanced industrial societies is 
decreasing because "in recent decades traditional hierarchies have declined and new social 
differences have emerged."15 Clark and Upset claim that class-based voting has declined and is 
being replaced by post-industrial politics, which they refer to as the New Political Culture 
(NPC) . The following circumstances define the NPC: (1) social and economic issues are clearly 
distinguished; (2) social issues and consumption issues are more salient as compared to 
fiscalj economic issues; (3) issue politics and more widespread citizen participation are 
increasing while hierarchical political organizations have declined; and (4) the NPC views are 
more prevalent in younger, more educated, and more affluent people and societies.16 Clark and 
Upset ground their reasoning in terms of the economy and the family, which relate to the 
decreased influence of hierarchical social structures. It is these hierarchies, they argue, that 
9 BBC News 2010. 
10 Kalitowski 2008. 
11 Liddy 2010. 
12 Butler and Kavanagh 1974. 
13 Parliament of Canada 2009. 
14 Clark and Lipset 2001; Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2002. 
15 Clark and Lipset 2001, 40. 
16 Ibid., 278. 
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maintain rigid class structures. They contend that political issues change with increased 
affluence: with increased affluence, people will take basic security needs for granted and 
consider other things, including lifestyle and amenity issues. This decreases the power of class 
and hierarchy.17 They also argue that the family has embraced more egalitarian values, which 
further decreases the importance of hierarchical arrangements in society.18 
However, Hout, Brooks, and Manza dispute Clark and Upset's claim that class is 
declining; instead they argue that class is becoming more complex. They concede that 
dichotomous class models are no longer appropriate, but affirm that this does not mean class is 
dying. Hout and his colleagues make several specific criticisms of Clark and Upset's work. 
First, they point to the persistence of income inequality despite the growth of the middle class to 
show that class is still relevant in the modem context.19 From a methodological stance, they 
argue that the Alford Index used by Clark and Upset to measure the decline of class-based 
voting is too crude and underestimates the importance of class in voting.20 21 Most importantly, 
they argue that Clark and Upset do not clearly make the case relating hierarchy and class.22 This 
critique points to the conceptual gap in Clark and Upset's argument. 
While Clark and Upset focus on hierarchical societal structures that promote rigid class 
stratification, Inglehart's theory of postmaterialist values focuses on the impact of increased 
affluence on an individual's value priorities, drawing primarily on Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs. His argument is two-fold. First, Inglehart posits that when people experience economic 
scarcity and hardship they will give high priority to economic security and safety needs. 
However, people in an environment of affluence do not experience the same scarcity, so they 
will move beyond economic security and safety needs and place more value on higher order 
aesthetic and intellectual needs, which he refers to as postmaterialist values.23 Second, Inglehart 
stresses that the conditions in which one grows up are most important, since it is when values 
form. Because of this he stresses that the impact of postmaterialist values should increase over 
time as more people grow up in affluent circumstances.24 
Inglehart recognizes that materialist values, those based on economic security and safety 
needs, will still be prevalent in society. This leads him to argue that postmaterialists will prefer 
change-oriented political parties.25 Traditionally, the "change-oriented" parties are those of the 
ideological Left. This would lead affluent, middle-class voters to vote for Leftist political parties 
despite their class-based connection with the parties of the Right. Furthermore, working class 
17 Clark and Upset 2001, 4l. 
18 Ibid., 51. 
19 Ibid., 60. 
20 The Alford Index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of middle class voters who vote for the 
traditionally working class party from the percentage of the working class that vote for the working class 
party. 
21 Ibid., 63. 
22 Ibid., 59. 
23 Inglehart 1971. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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voters, who are more likely to experience scarcity and possess materialist values, may choose to 
vote for the parties of the Right who traditionally espouse those values.26 Because of this, 
Inglehart contends, liThe rise of Postmaterialist issues, therefore, tends to neutralize political 
polarization based on social class."27 
Dalton characterizes Inglehart's framework as lithe most systematic attempt to describe 
the value changes that are transforming advanced industrial societies."28 Dalton makes a clear 
distinction between materialist and postmaterialist values. Values that stem from physiological 
needs, which include both sustenance and safety needs, are deemed materialist; these values 
include economic stability, economic growth, fighting rising prices, strong defense forces, 
fighting crime, and maintaining order. After safety and sustenance needs are met, people can 
attend to their social and self-actualization needs. Postmaterialist values stem from these higher 
order needs and include having a less impersonal society, having more say in your job or 
community, having more say in government, valuing free speech, believing that ideas count, 
and valuing green space.29 
However, he also identifies two key areas of criticism of Inglehart's argument. The first 
pertains mostly to Inglehart's methodology. Several studies argue that Inglehart's value index is 
closely associated with the tides of economic conditions instead of the conditions of one's 
childhood. The other school of criticism debates the nature of value change. Flanagan argues 
that values are changing on more than just a single materialjpostmaterial dimension, while 
Braithwaite contends that societal values are moving from security-based to harmony-based 
values3o. Dalton concedes that Inglehart's theory is overly simplistic, but also contends that 
critics who disagree on the nature of value change can fit their frameworks within Inglehart's 
broader one. 
Beck presents another critique of the postmaterialist values argument. He posits that 
societies have moved from the first modernity to the second modernity. The first modernity 
entails lithe collective patterns of life, progress and controllability, full employment and 
exploitation of nature;" however, the developments of the first modernity have been fraught 
with unintended consequences, which the second modernity must now rectify.31 Thus, the 
recent concern with issues like environmentalism and nuclear disarmament, which are 
postmaterialist values from Inglehart's perspective, actually is the result of the consequences of 
development during the first modernity. Thus, for Beck the second modernity is reflexive.32 
While Beck presents an interesting alternative thesis to the discussion of value change, he still 
seems to agree that postmaterialist society or second modernity has different values than 
materialist society of first modernity. Thus, while the exact nature of value change is still being 
26 Inglehart 1990. 
27 Ibid., 259. 
28 Dalton 2002, 79. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.; Flanagan 1982; 1987; Braithwaite 1996. 
31 Beck 1999, 2. 
32 Ibid. 
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debated, scholars agree that values have changed in advanced industrial societies; it is this point 
that is central to the current study. 
Both Dalton and Inglehart posit the existence of a New Politics dimension that accounts 
for the emergent postmaterialist values.33 Dalton distinguishes between the "Old Politics" and 
"New Politics" to differentiate between traditional and postmaterialist political alignments.34 
Class is the primary factor that structures the old political cleavages, with the Old Left 
representing the working class and labor unions and the Old Right identifying with business 
interests and the middle class.35 New Politics is the postmaterialist political dimension. While 
Dalton recognizes that Old Politics is still the primary ground for partisan conflict, he argues 
that New Politics affects party systems in advanced industrial societies, because "it can cut 
across the established Old Politics cleavage."36 Since new political cleavages do not line up with 
old political cleavages, the emergence of this second dimension does not further polarize the 
major parties. Also, non-established parties have been more likely to adopt postmaterialist 
positions than the major parties, which has helped smaller parties be more successfuP7 
Furthermore, the introduction of the New Politics cleavage has contributed to partisan 
dealignment, which refers to "the erosion of the social group basis of party support."38 This 
trend has increased electoral volatility and loosened the hold that the cleavages of Old Politics 
had on voter choice. 
This may also help to explain the importance of anti-party sentiment amongst 
electorates in the UK, Canada, and Australia. Belanger contends that there is a feeling of 
"political malaise" in postindustrial nations; people are becoming more critical of political 
parties, especially after those parties fail to meet the electorate's expectations for policy and 
service provision. While Belanger does not specifically connect his argument to those made by 
Dalton, this could be due to Dalton's claim that it is generally minor parties that embrace 
postmaterialist platforms rather than the traditional parties. Similarly, Belanger argues that 
while this feeling is detrimental to major parties, it can be positive for third parties. Political 
malaise manifests itself in two forms: negative attitudes toward the major parties, which he calls 
specific antiparty sentiment and negative attitudes towards parties per se, which he refers to as 
general antiparty sentiment.39 He finds that antipartyism brings people to vote for third parties. 
This is especially true of people who feel specific antiparty sentiment; however, third parties 
who utilize antiparty rhetoric and paint themselves as "antiparty parties" benefit from general 
antiparty sentiment as wel1.40 
33 Dalton 2002; Inglehart 1990. 
34 Dalton 2002, 134. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Dalton 2002. 
38 Ibid., 183. 
39 Belanger 2004. 
40 Ibid. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
But why are these developments relevant to the recent wave of hung parliaments in 
majoritarian states? The decline of the old political cleavage of class and the rise of new political 
postmaterialist issues has complicated the way in which people vote. The choice is no longer 
between two distinct alternatives as proponents of the Westminster model claim. Class is 
declining in its importance because other issues - postmaterialist social issues - are rising in 
saliency. Thus, voters are no longer simply voting for whichever party most naturally 
represents them based on their class background. 
This study will draw primarily on Inglehart's conception of postmaterialist values and 
Dalton's analysis of party politics in response to the rise of these values. The central hypothesis 
of this work is that the decline of Old Politics and the concurrent rise of New Politics explains 
the increased frequency of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model 
parliamentary democracies. From this, I posit two hypotheses: 
Hl: The decline of class-based voting increases the likelihood of hung parliaments 
H2: The increase of postmaterialist values increases the likelihood of hung parliaments 
Following Dalton's argument that the rise of postmaterialist values has contributed towards 
party dealignment, I also predict the following: 
H3: Decreased partisanship increases the likelihood of hung parliaments. 
Furthermore, non-established parties are more likely than traditional parties to embrace and 
support postmaterialist issues. From this, I expect that minor parties that have incorporated 
postmaterialist values and also antiparty sentiment towards major parties because they have 
not adapted to these issues, which leads to the following hypotheses: 
H4: Increased specific antiparty sentiment increases the likelihood of hung parliaments. 
Hs: Incorporation of post-materialist values by minor parties increases the likelihood of hung parliaments. 
METHODS 
This study is a small comparative case study that includes the following cases: the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These cases have been selected because they are all 
advanced industrial Westminster model parliamentary democracies that have experienced 
recent hung parliaments. This study approaches hung parliaments not only from a cross­
national perspective, but also from a longitudinal one. General elections from the following 
years are included in the study: from 1983 until 2010 in the UK, from 1984 until 2008 in Canada, 
and from 1987 until 2007 in Australia. 
RES PUBLICA 21 
OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT 
Dependent Variable: 
Occurrence of Hung Parliament: While a dummy variable could be used to denote whether or not 
a state's general election resulted in a hung parliament, this study operationalizes the hung 
parliament variable instead as the size of the majority, in terms of parliamentary seats obtained 
by the party that wins the most seats in the election. Explicitly, this will be measured as the 
percentage of parliamentary seats won by the "winningest" party, which controls for the size of 
the parliament. This variable indicates a hung parliament when the value of this measure is less 
than fifty percent. 
Independent Variables: 
Class-based voting: To measure class-based voting the Alford Index is used. This measure 
subtracts the proportion of middle-class voters who vote for the working class party from the 
proportion of working class voters who vote for the working-class party. 
Postmaterialist values: To measure the prevalence of postmaterialist values in each of the states in 
this study, I use the four-item index of postmaterialist values from the World Values Survey.41 
This index is derived from the following question series: "If you had to choose, which one of the 
things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most 
important?" The answer choices are: "maintaining order in the nation," "giving people more 
say," "fighting rising prices," and "protecting freedom of speech." Depending on their answers 
to both questions, respondents are coded as materialist, postmaterialist or mixed. For each 
country, the measure used is the percentage of respondents that are coded as postmaterialist on 
this index. 
Strength of Party Identification: To measure strength of party identification, the following 
question is used: "Would you call yourself a very strong (fill in party), fairly strong, or not very 
strong?" The measure used is the percentage of respondents who indicate very strong party 
identification as a proportion of the total sample, which includes respondents who did not 
identify with a political party. 
Strong Antiparty-sentiment: In accordance with Belanger's operationalization of this sentiment, 
questions from election studies asking for the respondent's feelings toward major parties are 
used. If the respondent expresses negative feelings toward both major parties, they exhibit 
specific antiparty sentiment. Questions used to measure this variable are worded similarly to 
the following: "How do you feel about the [insert appropriate party]?" Strong antiparty 
sentiment is measured as the percentage of respondents that indicated strong negative feelings 
toward both major parties. 
41 European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file; World Values Survey 2005 official 
data file. 
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Index of Third Party Ideology: This index ranges from zero to two and is comprised of two criteria: 
social justice issues in minor party ideologies and success of green parties. With regards to the 
former, third party platforms are referenced where available for mentions of social justice and 
equality for women and minority groups. Where party platforms are not available, secondary 
data describing the political parties is used. Environmentalism is another prong of 
postmaterialism. However, the presence of this cannot be measured by looking at party 
platforms because in the contemporary political climate, most parties, not just third parties, take 
a stance on environmental issues. A better indicator of the importance of environmental issues 
is the presence of a green party. However, the mere presence of a green party does not indicate 
that it is politically strong. Therefore, this study counts only green parties that won at least one 
parliamentary seat in the general election. These two indicators, inclusion of women's and 
minority rights into the party's election platform and the presence of a seat-winning green 
party, are combined into an index of post-materialist value incorporation. This index ranges 
from 0 to 2, where zero means neither criterion is met. One indicates that one of the criterions is 
met, and two indicates that both criteria are met. 
DATA AND ANALYSIS PLAN 
Most of the data for this study is gathered from the Australian Election Study (AES), the 
Canadian Election Study (CES), and the British Election Study (BES) . However, the data 
regarding postmaterialist values came from the World Values Survey (WVS) . While it would 
have been ideal to measure postmaterialist values using the various national election studies, no 
question or set of questions regarding postmaterialist values has been consistently asked across 
all three nations over time. Although the waves of the WVS do not directly correspond to the 
election years in the UK, Canada, and Australia, this data is preferable because it asks 
consistently worded questions to respondents in all three nations for each wave, providing 
greater consistency over time and across cases. Therefore, the data for each country from the 
wave of the WVS that is closest to the election is used as a measure of postmaterialist values at 
the time of the election. Finally, data regarding the dependent variable is obtained from election 
result archives. The data will be analyzed using a series of multiple least squares linear 
regressions. Preliminarily, bivariate correlations are run at each stage of the analysis to test for 
multicollinearity. Next, regression models are run for the entire model using data from all three 
cases. Then, separate regression models are run for each country individually. Because of the 
small number of general elections included in this study, a significance level of .10 is used. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Analysis Across All Cases 
The bivariate correlations show that multicollinearity exists between the percentage of 
respondents who exhibit anti party sentiment and both the percentage of respondents who are 
strong party identifiers and the Alford Index of class voting. To account for this, five separate 
multiple regressions are run: one including all variables (Model l), one excluding antiparty 
RES PUBLICA 23 
sentiment (Model 2), one excluding strong party identifiers (Model 3), one excluding class 
voting (Model 4), and finally one excluding both strong party identifiers and class voting 
(Model S) . Model 2 and Model S completely alleviate the effects of multicollinearity from the 
analysis. 
Table 1: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in All Cases 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by the winningest party 1983-2010) 
Model Make-Up Model l Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(Variable excluded to All variables Strong Antiparty Strong Party Class voting Class voting and 
account for included Sentiment Excluded Identifiers excluded Strong party 
collinearity) excluded identifiers 
excluded 
Dependent Variable 
Class Voting 0.050 .069 .072 
(Alford Index) (.140) (.097) (.140) 
Postmaterialist Values -.144 -.359* -.152 -.167 -.188 
(.216) (.188) (.218) (.209) (.210) 
Percent of Strong .421 .992** .442 
Party Identifiers (.377) (.311) (.381) 
Strong Antiparty -1.709* -1.880* -1.603** -1.887** 
Sentiment (.096) (.948) (.723) (.687) 
Index of Third Party -6.149 -6.958 -6.738 -6.705 -7.317 
Ideology (5.161) (5.750) (5.179) (5.245) (5.274) 
Adjusted R2 .418 .454 .418 .378 .364 
F-test 3.692 5.365 4.229 3.885 4.630 
Model Significance (.027) (.006) (.019) (.023) (.016) 
N 19 19 19 19 19 
***p<.OO1, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Model l includes all five variables. The model is significant (p<.027) and accounts for 
41.8% of the variance in the dependent variable, the percentage of parliamentary seats won by 
the winningest party. However, because of the multicollinearity, the only variable that is 
significant is antiparty sentiment in the expected direction: as strong antiparty sentiment 
increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, which means that 
hung parliaments are more likely. Excluding antiparty sentiment from the analysis resolves the 
problem created by multicollinearity. 
Model 2, which excludes anti-party sentiment and resolves the multicollinearity 
problem, is significant (p<.006) and accounts for 4S.4% of the variance. Both postmaterialist 
values and strong party identifiers are significantly related to the percentage of seats won by the 
winningest party in the hypothesized directions. As the percentage of respondents who are 
postmaterialist increase, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making 
hung parliaments more likely. As the percentage of respondents who are strong party 
identifiers decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. 
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Models 3, 4 and 5 exclude strong party identifiers, class voting, or both, respectively. 
Each of these models is significant; however, the only significant independent variable is 
antiparty sentiment. This suggests that the antiparty sentiment variable is picking up on 
variance in the dependent variable that can be attributed to class voting and strong party 
identification. Class voting and the third party ideology index are not significant in any of the 
five models. 
The United Kingdom 
Amongst only the UK cases, bivariate correlations show that class voting is significantly 
negatively correlated with the third party ideology index, and postmaterialist values are 
significantly and negatively correlated with the percentage of respondents that are strong party 
identifiers. This again poses the problem of multicollinearity. To avoid multicollinearity a 
variety of different regression models are run. The first model includes all five independent 
variables. Models 2 through 6 each exclude one of the independent variables. These models do 
not completely alleviate the multicollinearity issue, since no single variable is responsible for 
this problem as in the overall analysis. To completely resolve multicollinearity, Model 7 
excludes both class voting and postmaterialist values, and Model 8 excludes both the 
percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the third party ideology index. 
Table 2A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 1 -4 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by 
the winningest party (1983-2010) 
Model Make-Up Model l Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Variable excluded to All variables included Class voting excluded Postmaterialist values Strong party 
account for excluded identification 
collinearity) excluded 
Dependent Variable 
Class Voting .938 1.224 -.491 
(.690) (.743) (.961) 
Postmaterialist Values .803 1.086 .545 
(.636) (.716) (1.313) 
Strong Party 2.465 1.567 2.301 
Identification (.887) (.706) (.999) 
Strong Antiparty -2.127 -.529 -2.845 1.147 
Sentiment (1.790) (1.610) (1.934) (2.814) 
Third Party Ideology 5.095 -12.545 12.960 -21.929 
(1.790) (5.643) (14.048) (20.497) 
Adjusted R2 .709 .586 .622 .270 
F-test 3.923 3.120 3.471 .681 
Model Significance (.365) (.257) <.236) (.667) 
N 7 7 7 7 
*p<.10, **p<.OS, ***p<.OOl 
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Table 2B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 5-8 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by 
the winningest party (1983-2010) 
Model Make-Up Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
(Variable excluded to Strong Antiparty Third Party Ideology Class voting and Strong party 
account for Sentiment Excluded Excluded postmaterialist values identification and 
collinearity) excluded third party ideology 
excluded 
Dependent Variable 
Class Voting .399 .699* .410 
(.571) (.178) (.474) 
Postmaterialist Values 1.043 .909 -.561 
(.662) (.428) (.829) 
Strong Party 1 .771 2.234** .904 
Identification (.733) (.475) (.663) 
Strong Antiparty -1.627 -.878 -.510 
Sentiment (.880) (1.907) (2.405) 
Third Party Ideology -7.346 -8.773 
(9.903) (6.064) 
Adjusted R2 .649 .835 .406 .331 
F-test 3.772 8.573 2.368 .503 
Model Significance (.220) (.107) (.249) (.707) 
N 7 7 7 7 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.OOl 
None of the models are significant. However, in Model 6, which excludes the third 
party ideology index, class voting and the percentage of respondents who are strong party 
identifiers are significant. These relationships are significant in the hypothesized directions: as 
the class voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, and 
as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases the percentage of 
seats won by the winningest party decreases. While Model 6 itself is not significant, it accounts 
for 83.5% of the variance in the dependent variable. This suggests that lack of significance may 
be attributable to the small sample size. 
The prevalence of postmaterialist values is not significant in any of the models. 
Antiparty sentiment is not significant in any of the models and is not significantly correlated 
with any of the other independent variables. This stands in sharp contrast to the overall 
analysis where antiparty sentiment is highly correlated with two of the independent variables 
and the only significant independent variable when it is included in the model. This and the 
overall insignificance of any of the models suggest that the UK does not follow the pattern 
observed in the overall analyses. 
Analysis of Canada 
Amongst only the Canadian cases, the third party ideology index is excluded from the 
Canadian analyses because it did not vary. All cases received a value of one, because there have 
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consistently been third parties that espouse postmaterialist values, but a green party has never 
won a parliamentary seat. The bivariate correlations indicate that postmaterialist values are 
significantly correlated with the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and 
the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment. Also, class voting is 
correlated with strong antiparty sentiment. 
Again, these correlations introduce the problem of multicollinearity to the multiple 
regression analysis. To account for this multiple models are run. The first model includes all 
four independent variables. Models 2 through 5 each exclude a different independent variable. 
Model 6 excludes both the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the 
percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment. Model 7 excluded both 
class voting and postmaterialist values. 
Table 3A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 1 -3 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by 
the winningest party (1984-2008) 
Model Make-Up Model l Model 2 Model 3 
(Variable excluded to All variables included Strong antiparty Postmaterialist values 
account for collinearity) sentiment excluded excluded 
Dependent variable 
Class Voting -.704 .314 .640 
(.554) ( . . 482) (1.268) 
Postrnaterialist Values -4.599 -2.091** 
(1.160) (.571) 
Strong Party Identifiers .518 -.049 .149 
(.427) (.554) (1.206) 
Strong Antiparty 1 .634 -2.242 
Sentiment (1.282) (2.393) 
Adjusted R2 .915 .912 .288 
F-test .14.409 21.847 1 .674 
Model Significance (.195) (.015) (.395) 
N 6 6 6 
***p<.OOl, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 3B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 4-7 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by 
the winningest party (1984-2008) 
Model Make-Up Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
(Variable excluded to Strong Party Class voting Strong party Class voting and 
account for Identifiers excluded excluded identifiers and postmaterialist 
collinearity) strong antiparty values excluded 
sentiment excluded 
Dependent variable 
Class Voting -.574 .334 
(.605) (.371) 
Postrnaterialist -4.292* -4.376** -2.046*** 
Values (1 .259) (1.205) (.232) 
Strong Party .590 .493 
Identifiers (.584) (1.173) 
Strong Antiparty 1.255 2.552 -2.755 
Sentiment (1.381) (1.642) (1.508) 
Adjusted R2 .895 .819 .934 .266 
F-test 15.153 10.026 43.577 2.086 
Model Significance (.063) (.045) (.002) (.240) 
N 6 6 6 6 
***p<.OOl, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Model l is not significant, nor is any of its independent variables, which is most likely 
due to the various multicollinearity issues present in this model. In all of the subsequent 
models, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is the only significant independent variable. 
Furthermore, the relationship always is in the hypothesized direction: as the prevalence of 
postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. 
Furthermore, only models 2, 4, 5 and 6 are significant, but models 3 and 5 are not. The key 
difference between these two sets of models is that the former includes the postmaterialist 
values variable and the latter does not. The most instructive comparison is between Model 6 
and Model 7 both of which completely resolve any multicollinearity problems. Model 6 
accounts for 93.4 % of the variance in the dependent variable and only the postmaterialist values 
variable is significant, while Model 7 excludes postmaterialist values and only accounts for 
26.6% of the variance. This suggests that the prevalence of postmaterialist values is most 
important in explaining the size of the parliamentary majority in Canadian elections. 
Analysis of Australia 
When analyzing only the Australian cases the third party ideology index is also 
excluded because it does not vary. While there has also been a history of third parties 
espousing postmaterialist values, the 2010 election is the first federal election in which a green 
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party candidate won a seat in the House of Representatives. However, the 2010 Australian 
Election Study data is not available at the time of writing and the election has been excluded. 
Therefore, all Australian elections scored a value of one for the third party index variable. 
Table 4: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Australia 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by winningest party (1987-2007) 
Model l Model 2 Model 3 
All variables included Strong antiparty sentiment Postrnaterialist values 
excluded excluded 
Independent Variables 
Class Voting -1.060 -.913** -1.076*** 
(Alford Index) (.321) (.130) (.088) 
Postmaterialist Values .362 .424** .339*** 
(.154) (.081) (.043) 
Percent of Strong Party 1.043 .988** 
Identifiers (1.963) (.156) 
Strong Antiparty -.172 -5.634* 
Sentiment (10.473) (1.588) 
Adjusted R2 .880 .923 .958 
F-test 10.185 21.036 53.870 
Model Significance (.230) (.046) (.001) 
N 6 6 6 
***p<.OO1, **p<.05, *p<.10 
The percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significantly 
correlated with the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment, which 
indicates multicollinearity. The problem of multicollinearity is addressed by running three 
different models. Model l includes all four independent variables. The second model excludes 
the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. The third model excludes the 
percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment. 
Due to multicollinearity, the first model is not significant nor is any of its independent 
variables. However, Model 2 is significant and accounts for 92.3 % of the variance in the 
dependent variable. All three included independent variables are significant. Model 3 is also 
significant and accounts for 95.8% of the variance in the dependent variable. All the variables 
included in the model are significant. 
In Model 2, the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong anti party sentiment is 
significant in the expected direction: as the percentage of respondents exhibiting antiparty 
sentiment increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In Model 3, 
the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significant in the expected 
direction: as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases, the 
percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making hung parliaments more 
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likely. Class voting is significant in both Model 2 and Model 3, but not in the expected direction: 
as class-based voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. 
In both Model 2 and Model 3, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is significant, but not in 
the expected direction. The data show that as the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases, 
the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Possible reasons for these 
unexpected results will be discussed in the following section. 
DISCUSSION 
This study set out to find a causal explanation for hung parliaments that is applicable 
across all cases. The significance of Model 2 in the overall cross-country analysis, as well as the 
significance of postmaterialist values and the percentage of respondents who are strong party 
identifiers, all support the theory that the rise of postmaterialist values and corresponding 
developments contribute to the increased prevalence of hung parliaments. Three of the five 
hypotheses are supported: those regarding the prevalence of postmaterialist values, the 
percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers, and the level of antiparty sentiment 
(H2,H3, and I-L). The hypotheses regarding class voting and the ideology of third parties are 
supported. The simultaneous support of the postmaterialism hypothesis and the lack of 
support for class voting suggest that these two developments occur independent of each other 
and lends credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza's argument that class is not declining. 
However, the country-by-country analysis shows that no consistent relationship exists across all 
three cases. The analyses of each country show a different relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, which suggests that the national context plays an 
important role in hung parliament electoral outcomes. 
The UK 
The analyses of the UK cases show that my theory does not account for the results of the 
general elections in this case. Of all three countries, the UK is the only case in which none of the 
multiple regression models are significant. This could be due to a variety of factors. Firstly, 
class-based voting remains strongest in the UK. Dalton finds that class interests continue to be 
important in British politics, but that this influence has declined by approximately fifty percent 
between 1950 and 2000.42 However, even with this decline class voting in the UK is still higher 
than the other cases in Dalton's study, the US, France and Germany. This is congruent with the 
finding in Model 6 of the UK analyses that as class voting decreases - as indicated by lower 
scores on the Alford Index - the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the winningest party 
decreases. Thus, the decline in class voting that has been noted by Dalton is related to 
increasingly narrow electoral margins. However, this study uses a much smaller time period 
than Dalton's investigation, which suggests that the observed trends are less pronounced. This 
could explain why the class-based voting variable was only significant in one model and why 
no models are significant. 
42 Dalton 2002. 
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Dalton also finds that the UK has lower levels of postmaterialist values than many other 
advanced industrial nations.43 It seems that the UK is lagging behind Canada and Australia in 
terms of the developments of these values. This case exhibits less pronounced changes than 
Canada and Australia, and the significance of the models could then be more highly impacted 
by the small number of cases. In order to better understand the UK case, it would be useful to 
use a longer period of time. It could be useful to not only go further back in time but also 
analyze new data that comes out in the future. This will help to identify whether or not the rise 
of postmaterialism and the decline of class are becoming stronger in the UK. 
Canada 
Of the three countries included, the analysis of the Canada shows the clearest support 
for the postmaterialist theory. The increased prevalence of postmaterialist values is related to a 
decline in the percentage of seats won by the winningest party in each significant model where 
the postmaterialist values variable is included. Furthermore, each model that includes the 
postmaterialist values variable explains more than 80% of the variance in the percentage of seats 
won by the winningest party. However, the postmaterialist values variable is the only 
significant independent variable in any of the models. From the bivariate analyses, we see that 
the prevalence of postmaterialist values is positively related to strong antiparty sentiment and 
negatively related to the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. Since the 
data are only bivariate correlations it cannot be discerned whether the change in postmaterialist 
values causes a change in antiparty sentiment and strength of party identification or vice versa. 
More research is needed to determine the causal direction of these relationships. 
According to the theory presented here, one would expect that the increased prevalence of 
postmaterialist values amongst the electorate is causing increased antiparty sentiment against 
major parties and a decline in the percentage of people who consider themselves strong party 
identifiers because major parties have not incorporated postmaterialist values into their 
platforms. Also, decreased levels of class-based voting are related to levels of strong antiparty 
sentiment. Again, the causal direction of this relationship cannot be proven without further 
research, but it is hypothesized that as people become more disgruntled with the traditional 
parties, they will be less likely to vote with their natural " class" party. 
Finally, class-based voting is not significant in any of the models. This lends further 
credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza's argument that class may not be declining as a 
significant electoral cleavage. The fact that class-based voting and postmaterialist values are not 
related to each other also further indicates that the processes of increasing postmaterialist 
values and declining class are independent of each other. 
Australia 
The Australian case provided two unexpected results. Both class-based voting and the 
prevalence of postmaterialist values are related to the percentage of seats won by the 
43 Ibid. 
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winningest party, but in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. Firstly, as class-based 
voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Secondly, as 
the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the 
winningest party increases. 
In order to explain these findings, it was necessary to examine the responses to the 
individual questions in the World Values Survey (WVS) from which the postmaterialism index 
is derived. Between the two Australian waves of the WVS (1995 and 2005), the biggest shift in 
respondents' first priority is a ten percentage point increase in the number of respondents who 
named maintaining order in the nation. Furthermore, maintaining order in the nation is cited as 
respondents' first choice about twice as often as fighting rising prices in both 1995 and 2005. 
These results can be reconciled with Australia's recent economic and security situations. 
With regards to its economy, Australia experienced seventeen consecutive years of economic 
growth until the global financial crisis. After the financial crisis, Australia's economy 
rebounded after only one quarter of negative economic growth, and the government expects to 
return to budget surpluses by 2015.44 This history of strong economic conditions in Australia 
explains the comparative unimportance of economic issues when measured against maintaining 
order in the nation. 
In the early 2000s, illegal immigration became Australia's most salient security issue. 
The increased importance placed on the issue of illegal immigration is most likely driving the 
decline in postmaterialist values from 1995 to 2005 and may account for the observed positive 
relationship between postmaterialist values and the percentage of seats won by the winningest 
party. Results from the Australian Election Study indicate that the percentage of seats won by 
the winningest party may be a function of the degree of consensus in the Australian electorate 
on which party is seen as best on issues of national security and defense.45 Thus, the salience of 
security issues causes a decrease in the level of postmaterialist values, and the divide in the 
electorate over which party is best suited to handle these issues could be correlated with 
declining electoral majorities. Furthermore, this shift from viewing the coalition as 
overwhelming more capable of dealing with security issues may have led some voters - most 
likely working class voters who had voted for the coalition because of their strong position on 
national security - to return to their "natural" class-based parties. This accounts for the finding 
that as class-voting increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In 
the future, it will be interesting to see how class-based voting and postmaterialism are impacted 
if and when the issue of illegal immigration loses political salience. 
LIMITATIONS 
This study is limited in a several ways. First, only a small number of elections are 
included for each case. This is due to the lack of Australian data, as the Australian Election 
44 CIA World Factbook 2010. 
45 McAllister and Clark 2010, 16. 
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Study only bean being conducted in 1987. In order to cover a comparable time span for each 
country, the data for earlier elections for Canada and the UK are not included. In closer 
analyses of these two cases, it would be beneficial to use a longer time span. 
Also, another central weakness is the operationalization of the third party ideology 
index. The index was not detailed enough to allow for adequate variation between cases and 
had to be excluded from both the Australian and Canadian analyses, which made it impossible 
to test the fifth hypothesis in these analyses. Where it has been included in the analysis, the 
third party ideology index is never significant. This could be due to the limits of the measure 
and not the unimportance of third party ideology itself. A better measure would account for 
more dimensions of postmaterialist values than social justice and environmental issues and 
allow for a wider range of variance. Data from the election studies could be used in crafting 
such a measure, since questions are generally asked about which party is seen as most capable 
of dealing with various issues. These sorts of questions could be useful in creating a more 
nuanced index. However, a more in depth understanding of third party ideologies and how 
that ideology is manifested is required in order to do this. If this concept were accurately 
measured, further analysis may in fact show that it does play a role in explaining electoral 
outcomes. 
FUTURE RESEARCH & CONCLUSIONS 
Since this study cannot conclude that its framework provides a universal explanation for 
the occurrence of hung parliaments, future research should focus on the individual countries 
included in the study, in order to better understand the role of the national context. Future 
research should also investigate the impact of illegal immigration on postmaterialist values and 
on electoral outcomes in Australia. The Canadian case should be further evaluated in order to 
ascertain why postmaterialist values play a much larger role there than in other countries. 
Alternative explanations should be investigated for the UK, since this theory does not seem to 
explain the cause of its hung parliament. Also, antiparty sentiment should be further 
researched since it was the variable that most often exhibited a relationship with the other 
independent variables. Research is needed that investigates the causal relationship between 
antiparty sentiment and class voting, postmaterialist values, and strong party identification. 
This could prove important in better understanding the role of these variables in contributing to 
the occurrence of hung parliaments. 
This study has endeavored to find a universal explanation for the occurrence of hung 
parliaments in advanced industrial democracies. However, the current study has not met this 
lofty goal. While the implications of the rise of postmaterialism seem to explain hung 
parliaments in Canada, the UK and Australian cases do not provide such clear-cut support for 
the present theory. Despite these mixed results, this study has found some causal factors that 
influence electoral results in majoritarian parliamentary democracies. This is an important first 
step in explaining why hung parliaments occur and to what extent the national context plays a 
role in these outcomes. 
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WHAT WILL TIP THE SCALE?: TOWARD A THEORY FOR UNDERSTANDING 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN IRAN 
Sara Ghadiri 
35 
Abstract: The world watched Iran in 200 9 to see what the aftermath of its presidential election would 
hold. It seemed as if the stage was set for regime change - all requisite factors appeared to be present. Yet 
the theocratic Iranian regime that has been in place since 197 9 remains as entrenched as ever. This leaves 
us at an interesting juncture. What is the reason for this entrenchment? What explains the fact that the 
200 9 election did not spark a successful democratic transition? I posit that Iran has an additional factor 
that must be taken into account when considering democratic transition: its institutional structure. It is 
not enough for the opposition to coalesce around a symbolic figure - they must coalesce around a real 
leader with enough power to push for democratic change. However, if this leader is to arise out of the 
system, he or she will likely be tainted by the system through which power was gained. This phenomenon 
will stunt any push for change that might come from within the ranks of the elites. As the result of a 
systematic examination of normal mechanisms for the occurrence of regime change, this study concludes, 
then, that a push must then come from elites outside of the system if Iran is to achieve democratic 
transition. 
IRAN 2009: WHAT HAPPENED? 
The world watched Iran in 2009 to see what the aftermath of its presidential election 
would hold. It seemed as if the stage was set for regime change -all requisite factors seemed to 
be present. The economy was faltering, divisions were arising within the elite, parts of the 
opposition had coalesced, large portions of the population were mobilized in protest, and the 
international and expatriate communities had become involved. Add to this litany the fact that 
there existed a history of active struggle for democratic rule, a relatively homogeneous 
population, few border contentions, high literacy rates, movement towards modernization, and 
high urbanization, and nearly every typical indicator of a transition seemed to be in place. Yet 
the long-standing Iranian regime remains as entrenched as ever. This leaves us at an interesting 
juncture. What is the reason for this entrenchment? What explains the fact that the 2009 election 
did not spark a successful democratic transition? In order to understand what is required to tip 
the scale in favor of democratic transitions in Iran, we must examine factors that tipped the 
scale in other cases, and then attempt to understand why it is that Iran does not follow these 
models. 
The goal of understanding regime transition in Iran is framed by the context of 
understanding the influence of factors that could cause regime change in Iran, along with 
predicting what factor or factors will tip the scale towards democratic transition. In this study, I 
first analyze and assess the current status of the aforementioned factors that can tilt a regime 
towards transition or indicate that a regime is headed towards a transition. I then posit that the 
institutional structure through which the most powerful Iranian leaders have arisen was 
purposefully designed to parcel out just enough power for them to have political influence, yet 
36 RES PUBLICA 
still keep each one from truly realizing enough power to convince any other faction that they 
ought to lead. Upon examining this institutional structure, I find one factor vital to Iran 
achieving a democratic transition: A clear leader must emerge who can organize the opposition, 
either by virtue of his own power or the conglomeration of power to which he has access, all 
while avoiding becoming tainted by the system through which that individual gained power. 
In order to achieve a successful democratic transition, political scientists must first 
attempt to understand the concept of democratic transition. For this study, a democratic 
transition refers to a precise moment in time in which a regime "makes a qualitative leap in 
levels of democracy, either from an authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy or from a 
semi-autocratic regime to a more democratic system."l With this definition in mind, where does 
Iran stand? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In 2005, Michael McFaul noted that Iran has "the best structural endowments for 
democracy that is still ruled by an authoritarian regime."2 McFaul's observation sets an 
interesting tone for this inquiry. Iran employs a three branch institutional scheme, but exhibits 
several idiosyncrasies. There is a two-part leadership between the President and Supreme 
Leader in the executive. In addition to these two institutions, Iran's executive branch includes 
the Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and Council of Guardians.3 Inherent in this large 
executive is the illusion of checks and balances, because all power lies either directly or 
indirectly in the hands of the Supreme Leader. Another of its idiosyncrasies comes in the fact 
that Iran also has elections. The candidates for all elections, however, must first be screened by 
the half-cleric, half-jurist Guardian Council. These elections do feature high turnout and high 
public interest, and while recently of questionable validity, they still present a potentially 
democratic institution that could function liberally were it given the opportunity. 
I first examine the literature on democratic transition. The broad-based theories that 
currently exist generalize based on cases that share a common geographical location. These 
theories, however, are often not generalizable to other geographic areas. In spite of this, these 
theories can still be examined and used to extract factors that have triggered transition in other 
countries as a starting point. This framework can then serve to evaluate the factors at play in 
Iran. This 'approach acknowledges that there are several factors that tend to predispose regimes 
towards democratization. Although these vary based on time or place, they can be separated 
into four categories of factors: economic, political, social-cultural, and geographic. 
In the economic category, the greatest factor is the strength of the economy.4 A weak 
economy, signaled by high unemployment, high inflation, and low growth, is often seen as the 
fault of the government. Haggard and Kaufman also note that in years preceding democratic 
1 McFaul et al. 2008. 
2 McFaul 2005. 
3 CIA World Factbook 2010. 
4 Haggard and Kaufman 1997. 
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transitions, patterns of declining growth and increasing inflation tend to be evident.5 Though 
economic crises are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause a transition, poor economic 
performance reduces inter-elite bargaining power and strengthens anti-regime opposition 
movements. Even where economic crises are not the source of factional conflicts between hard­
and soft-liners, however, they are likely to widen them.6 Economic factors such as these surface 
so prevalently in situations of regime transition that they seem to be the only factors that can be 
generalized across geographic areas. 
In terms of political factors, almost all of the studies on development and democracy 
focus on the interests, choices and strategies of political actors. Furthermore, most research on 
transitions focuses on the interests and strategies of regime and opposition elites, along with the 
constraints facing them? Political factors for regime change vary widely and include domestic 
and international features. For example, opposition cohesion can point to a regime that may be 
tipping towards transition.8 Institutionally, a two-ballot electoral system can often be helpful in 
producing a successful transition, and have been helpful, especially in Africa.9 O'Donnell and 
Schmitter's theory states that divisions within the authoritarian regime itself cause change.10 
This model fits many Latin American transitions, but not post-Soviet ones. Contrary to their 
theory of internal divisions of the regime, however, elite pacts, or agreements between elite 
leaders, also might facilitate successful transition, as has been the case in Africa.11 There is, 
however, little support for the second theory outside of that continent.12 Additional political 
factors for regime transition include international engagement and external pressure, though 
the extent to which those are relevant varies widely by geography and by case.13 Finally, Bratton 
and van de Walle, as well as McAdam et al., have pointed to popular mobilization and 
contentious collective action as a cause of democratic transition.1 I14 Bratton and van de Walle 
note that collective action often played a critical role in pushing African authoritarian rulers to 
initiate liberalization.15 If this trend holds in Iran, it is possible that we could see these protests 
play an important role there as well. Work by McAdam et al. makes the stronger claim that 
democratization and contentious collective action are inseparable. In fact, McAdam et al. argue 
further that " democratization, then, never happened without contention;" however, they also 
note that there are " only certain cases in which contention causes democratization."16 Popular 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Geddes 1999. 
8 Van de Walle 2006. 
9 Ibid. 
10 O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986. 
11 Geddes 1999. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Bunce and Wolchik 2010. 
14 Beissinger 2002, 14. 
15 Bratton and van de Walle 1997. 
16 McAdam et al. 2008, 269, 272. 
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mobilization and contentious collective action did not cause transitions in Latin America; they 
did, however, force elites to begin negotiations in Eastern EuropeY 
There are also social-cultural factors that might tip the scales in favor of democracy, 
including a history of active popular struggle for democratic rule, a homogeneous population, 
and high literacy rates.18 McFaul also points towards movement towards modernization and 
high urbanization as explanatory factors for transition. This category, however, has less 
literature devoted to it. Recent work is being done on the impact of social media and the 
Internet in relation to the socio-cultural organization of protest movements, but much still 
remains unanswered about how new media " digital democracy" contributes to pushes for 
democracy across the world. It is certainly clear that the increased prevalence of Facebook, 
Twitter and other Internet sites are changing the way people communicate, and that has some 
sort of impact on democratic transitions. 
The geographic considerations for regime transition focus mostly on having a set of 
clearly defined state borders and a clear sense of who is a part of the state.19 McFaul also 
indicates the importance of having few border contentions. This category essentially establishes 
that countries that are involved in external conflict or border disputes are less likely to 
transition, as transitions do not occur as commonly during wartime. This is a well-studied 
factor, but Iran does not have border disputes that would make this an issue. 
In addition to these bodies of literature surrounding specific groups of factors, Geddes 
notes that "it seems as though there should be a parsimonious and compelling explanation of 
the transitions, but the explanations proposed thus far have been confusingly complicated, 
careless about basic methodological details, often more useful as description than explanation, 
and surprisingly inconsistent with each other."20 Most of the generalizations that have been 
proposed have failed either to accommodate the details of the real-world variation or to explain 
that variation. To combat this, many attempts have been made to classify types of authoritarian 
regimes in order to better understand them and generalize based on those types. There are 
current theories and models that seek to separate these types of regimes, most popularly 
Geddes' division of authoritarian regimes into personalistic, militaristic, or single-party regimes, 
and Howard and Roessler's tree typology categorizing countries using the relative freedom of 
their elections.21 Geddes notes that military regimes are those where a group of officers decide 
who will rule and exercise some influence on policy, while single-party regimes' access to 
political office and control over policy are dominated by one party. In personalist regimes, 
access to office and the fruits of office depend solely and completely on the discretion of an 
individual leader.22 Iran's constitution, however, enshrines both guardianship and popular rule 
in the constitution, and puts far more power in the hands of the people and individuals other 
17 Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Ulfelder 2005; McAdam et al. 2008. 
18 McFaul 2005. 
19 Rustow 1970. 
20 Geddes 1999, 117. 
21 Howard and Roessler 2006. 
22 Geddes 1999. 
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than the Supreme Leader than a traditional personalist regime.23 It also has no political party 
system that would give rise to a single-party regime, and the Supreme Leader is not a military 
general, nor did his power come about because of a military coup. 
Howard and Roessler, on the other hand, divide regimes into five classifications: closed 
authoritarian, hegemonic authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, electoral democracies, and 
liberal democracies. These categories are defined by freedom of elections and status of civil 
liberties and move from most restrictive, closed authoritarian, to most free, liberal democracy. 
Howard and Roessler differentiate competitive authoritarian regimes from hegemonic 
authoritarian systems by identifying cases where the winning party or candidate received over 
70% of the popular vote. Ahmadinejad won the 2009 election with 63%,24 which would put 
Iran in the competitive authoritarian camp. However, there were wide allegations of fraud in 
this election, in addition to the candidate vetting system, which calls into question how truly 
"competitive" these elections are. It seems, then, as if it is unfair to label these elections as 
competitive. As it has been shown, Iran evades both of these classification systems, and, even 
when forced, appears as a hybrid or seems to be caught between two categories. Existing 
classification schemes concerning regime type and factors for regime transition do not 
encompass the unique situation in Iran. I thus reject these classifications and approach Iran as a 
case study on its own. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR IRAN'S 2009 ELECTION 
The presidential election of 2009 cannot be considered as a harbinger of reform or 
revolution without understanding the underlying dynamics of the election. This election was 
pitched by the Western media as a powerful impetus for the democratic movement. For context, 
we must take a historical perspective. Iranian elections have always been a struggle between 
reformists and conservatives. Reformists, also called soft-liners, "seek more expansive powers 
for republican institutions," while conservatives, or hard-liners, "support the absolutist power 
of the Supreme Leader and related unaccountable institution."2s In 1997, Iran saw the election of 
its first "reformist" president, Mohammad Khatami. In 2000 it saw a reformist victory in the 
Majles (also called the National Assembly, or Islamic Consultative Assembly), including the 
solidification of the 2nd of Khordad Coalition, a coalition of 18 reformist groups that was formed 
after Khatami's 1997 win.26 In 2001, Iran saw Khatami's reelection. However, 2004 saw 
widespread allegations of fraud in the parliamentary elections.27 In 2005, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, a "true believer in the antidemocratic and anti-liberal dictates of the late 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini" and hard-line conservative, was elected. Ahmadinejad 
23 Tez�iir 2008. 
24 Ansari 2009. 
25 Posusney and Angrist 2005, 65. 
26 Boroumand and Boroumand 2000. 
27 McFau1 2005. 
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represents the most conservative of the factions in Iran gaining power.28 The 2008 parliamentary 
elections were marred by the mass disqualification of reformist candidates.29 With this electoral 
history, Iran approached the 2009 elections. 
Four candidates for the presidency were cleared to run in 2009 by the Guardian Council. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sitting president, was backed by the Supreme Leader, Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Mohsen Rezaei, also a conservative, was deemed the pragmatic and 
technocratic successor of former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mehdi Karroubi, a long­
time politician and reformist cleric, campaigned on nationalization of the oil industry. Mir 
Hossein Mousavi, another leader in the reformist camp, was designated as the ideological 
successor to Mohammad Khatami. These candidates illustrate the main elite cleavages that 
exist in Iran.3o One side champions a fundamentalist, confrontational approach to domestic as 
well as international problems. Internally, the fundamentalist group works to suppress all 
dissidents, even among its own allies, and quell any voice of moderation. Internationally, it 
pushes an aggressive and uncompromising program. In contrast, the opposite camp, the 
reformists, favor an open society at home, one that is able to move on a democratic path, albeit 
step-by-step, while pursuing a rational and clear diplomatic approach to Iran's international 
problems. Even with these broad groupings, however, four candidates surfaced in the election. 
While they can be grouped into reformists and conservatives, stark ideological differences 
existed between each individual candidate, even those from the same side of the ideological 
divide. 
Mousavi was and is the most publicized of the reformist candidates. However, he was 
and is not the most "reformist." He marketed himself as a "religious intellectual" dedicated to 
lawfulness and advancement of Iran, both economically and socially. His campaign materials 
expressed that his platform consisted in "coming to make an Iran far from lies, superstition, and 
backwardness."31 His revolutionary credentials allowed him to pass through the candidate 
vetting system of the Guardian Council, and his status as a sayyid, or direct descendant from the 
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), solidified his religious credentials. Once he passed through, he 
stated that he would push for the same policies that Khatami had espoused: equality of the 
sexes, freedom of speech and other civil liberties, and the resumption of relations with the West, 
provided that Iran would not suffer great costs because of it. His base was made of the urban 
middle class, professional elites, women, and young voters.32 They were well educated, and 
many of them had relatives that have left Iran in favor of economic or academic opportunities 
elsewhere. Many groups printed individual campaign literature supporting Mousavi,33 
28 Ibid. 
29 Tez<;tir 2008. 
30 Milani 2009. 
31 SeUad-e Javanan-e Hamieh Khatami 2009. 
32 Esfandiari et al. 2009. 
33 During my visit to Iran from May 2009-July 2009, I personally collected campaign literature from all 
four candidates. The references to campaign materials regard materials that were collected and translated 
between May 30, 2009 and June 12, 2009. Please see contact author for images and translations of 
campaign materials. 
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including workers groups, student and youth groups, and martyr groupS.34 In addition, he had 
the support of filmmakers, actors and actresses, athletes, and a group of reformist-leaning 
clerics.35 His popularity was partly due to the fact that he was not a cleric, and partly the fact 
that he, as the most prominent reformist, was not Ahmadinejad. 
In a manner unusual for an Iranian election, Mousavi's wife was also quite prominent 
during the campaign, and has remained prominent since. She appeared often on his campaign 
literature, and has appeared with Mousavi and spoken in public as well. She has been described 
as a "Michelle Obama-like figure" and has her own political credentials, including a PhD in 
Political Science from one of Tehran's premier universities, as well as a chancellorship at the 
premier women's university in Tehran.36 She is an ardent supporter of women's rights, though 
also has revolutionary Islamic credentials. Her influence in this structure is unclear; however, it 
is clear that her prominence in this election gave the Mousavi campaign credence in his 
women's policy as well as strengthened his support among women. 
Karroubi, the other reformist, had a slightly different platform and base. His policies 
were and remain the most reformist, even more so than Mousavi. His advisers are among the 
country's most respected reformist technocrats, and he ran on a specific program of reforms 
targeted at specific electoral groups such as women, students and non-Persian minorities.37 
Along with policies supporting fiscal responsibility and strengthening the rule of law, Karroubi 
promised that, if elected, "he would sign Iran up to international protocols on women's rights, 
and would end patrols by the country's religious police, who enforce Islamic dress codes for 
women."38 Karroubi has the support of both the largest student group and the largest group of 
university graduates who came out of that activist student group,39 
Another candidate, Rezaei, represented the military faction within the right-wing 
movement, and was the face of the pragmatic conservative movement that included former 
President Rafsanjani for this election. Rezaei's agenda included criticism for Ahmadinejad's 
inflammatory rhetoric and "games of chicken" in the international sphere. He mentioned 
reducing military service from two years to one, and also promised to incorporate more ethnic 
minorities in his cabinet. His economic agenda revolved around better management of oil 
revenues and more robust economic planning. He also wanted to develop Iran by easing 
relations with the West and being less confrontational. Rezaei had largely technocratic support, 
and as a technocrat himself, ran as the "architect of the Iranian economy."40 His support base in 
the election, which continues even after the fact, was made of conservatives who were 
dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad's carelessness in politics and economics, yet were still staunch 
34The martyr community in Iran holds a significant amount of clout in politics. The government entitles 
veterans, martyrs, and their families to special benefits and recognition. Their support is "revolutionary 
support" and the individual who can capture this support has important social capital. 
35 Summary Testimony of Actors/ Artists, Athletes, Religious Scholars, and Families of Martyrs 2009. 
36 Esfandiari et al. 2009. 
37 Esfandiari et al. 2009. 
38 Laban-Mattei 2009. 
39 Esfandiari et al. 2009. 
40 Rezaei Campaign Flyer 2009. 
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supporters of the regime and individuals within it. Their issue was more with Ahmadinejad 
himself and less with the status quo. 
Among all of the 2009 candidates, Ahmadinejad's platform was (and remains) best 
known. He ran largely on his agenda and his populist past record. Ahmadinejad supports very 
seclusionist policies, and advocates for programs that have alienated Iran in the international 
sphere, including the nuclear program. He is best noted for his " clampdown on all forms of 
dissent - on press, on women, on bloggers, on dual nationals--and for strengthening the role of 
the revolutionary guards and the revolutionary guard culture that has developed with the 
former commanders and former members."41 Allegations abound that Ahmadinejad used state 
funds for travel, and for "bussing in supporters from one district to another so he looks like he 
has big crowds at many events."42 Local papers also reported during the run-up to the election 
that his government handed out " gold coins, cash and 400,000 tons of potatoes to rally 
support."43 Allegations of corruption abound even beyond this. For example, during the 
campaigning period, Mousavi campaign materials raised questions for Ahmadinejad regarding 
where $207 billion in oil revenues went.44 
Ahmadinejad's base in the election was drawn from the lower class, both in rural areas 
and among the urban poor. His populist policies of handouts to individuals either in the form 
of money, loans, or food, have endeared him to these classes. These families are often also the 
families of martyrs or have members in the Basij, the paramilitary force that was responsible for 
some of the violent clashes during the protests. Their support is crucial to the maintenance of 
the existing power structure, as control of the paramilitary force is paramount for suppressing 
dissidents in the streets.45 
However, the matters at stake in this election should not be confused. None of the 
candidates spoke of any serious overhaul of the Islamic system. They were, and are, all fully 
committed to the idea of the Islamic republic. A nuanced examination suggests that the 
concepts of "Islamic-ness" and "republican-ness" were actually in question. The broad-based 
ideological coalitions that exist in Iran continue to follow the patterns suggested by this election. 
They are thus split between the reformist and conservative camps. However, there remains no 
complete unification within these movements. Additionally, is important to note that, strictly 
speaking, there are not organized political parties in Iran that parallel those that exist in other 
countries. The II parties" that exist are largely ideological coalitions around political figures, and 
thus the nature of the political system is largely centered on individual players within the 
system. Several conservative groups have come together under two separate coalitions, which 
are called the United Front of Principlists and the Broad and Popular Coalition of Principlists.46 
Some conservative groups remain outside either coalition. Similarly, several reformist groups, 
41 Esfandiari et a1. 2009. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Settad-e Javanan-e Hamieh Khatami 2009. 
45 Esfandiari et al. 2009. 
46 CIA World Factbook 2010 
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such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front (also known as Mosharekat) and the Mojahideen of 
the Islamic Revolution came together as a reformist coalition in advance of the 2008 Majles 
elections.47 Another influential reformist group is the National Trust Party, of which both 
Mousavi and Karroubi are members, though the group supported Mousavi in 2009.48 These 
facts present Iran against an unusual backdrop as compared to other cases examined in the 
literature about regime transition. From this point, I move to the analytical portion of this study, 
in which I examine the presence of factors for regime transition within the Iranian case, and 
note the circumstances of their failure to produce typical regime transition. 
In our consideration of the political climate, it is important to also note the history of 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's reign in Iran. Khamenei rose to power after the death of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini. His religious credentials have been questioned--when Ayatollah Khamenei 
took the seat of Supreme Leader, the constitution was amended to allow the post to be held by a 
lower-ranking theologian, as he did not have the religious rank of Khomeini.49 He has often 
been at odds with high-ranking clerics regarding his interpretations of Islam and his place as 
Supreme Leader is more fragile than he would admit. In the months preceding the 2009 
elections, he had clashed individually with Khatami, Mousavi, Rafsanjani, Larijani, and even 
Ahmadinejad. It is his precarious position that set the stage for the 2009 election. 
IRANIAN REGIME CHANGE ANALYSIS: FACTORS FOR TRANSITION 
METHODS 
Because of the unique nature of the Iranian case, a case-study approach examining the 
specific factors for transition in the aftermath of the 2009 elections serves as the only theoretical 
approach that allows the depth required to fully understand Iran in the light of the literature. 
Iran has not, to this date, had a truly successful democratic transition. Yet, as McFaul et al. note, 
a II serious analysis of the external influences on internal change cannot focus only on cases of 
democratic development, but must also look at instances of regime change when the outcome 
was not democracy."5o Comparative studies in general rarely use Iran because of its 
uniqueness, and this trend holds true in group case studies regarding democratic transition. I 
have thus selected Iran on its own for two reasons: first, because the fragile nature of the politics 
of the region suggest that this topic requires inquiry that can only be comprehensively achieved 
through a case study, and secondly, because examining factors for a democratic transition is 
just as necessary where they did not succeed as where they did. Because I am assessing a certain 
point in time as the II tipping point" for democratic transition, all of the data that will be used to 
assess the aforementioned economic, political, and social factors for democratic transition is 
from three months prior to three months after the 2009 election. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 British Broadcasting Company 2010. 
50 Mc Faul et al. 2008, 8 .  
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ECONOMIC FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN 
Iran faces a number of significant economic challenges. Internal challenges include: the 
large role of oil export revenues in financing government spending and vulnerability to oil price 
fluctuations, dependence on gasoline imports to meet domestic energy needs, high inflation, 
unemployment and poverty levels, reported domestic economic mismanagement, and 
widespread economic inefficiency.51 The central role of oil exports makes the economy quite 
volatile and vulnerable to changes in oil price. For example, the price of oil dropped 38 % 
between 2008 and 2009, leaving Iran with budgetary problems, and giving credence to the 
rentier state theory. This theory states that in countries that are largely dependent on the export 
of one commodity, the revenues from that commodity are used to co-opt groups through 
patronage or placate large swaths of society with public aid.52 Political instability can be 
expected when there is a downturn in commodity revenue and the state no longer can use that 
revenue. In the cases of oil crises in the 1970s, populations that were plunged into poverty 
blamed their governments and gradually took the risk of demanding change.53 It would not 
have been unlikely, then, for a similar effect to have taken place with the drop in oil prices in 
2009. 
On June 9, 2009, in the days preceding the election, an inflation rate of 23.6% was 
released by the Central Bank of Iran. Unemployment figures had skyrocketed from 10.5% in 
2005 to 17% in 2009.54 Additionally, the International Monetary fund had projected that Iran's 
economy would expand less than it had in previous years, up by only 3.2% in 2009, which is 
down from 4.5% in 2008 and nearly 8% in 2007.55 Real GDP growth was estimated by the IMF to 
have decelerated to 2-2.5% in 2008-09, from almost 7% in 2007-08.56 
These economic problems spread dislike of Ahmadinejad to the lower and middle 
classes as well. "Dismissing opposition to Ahmadinejad as a north Tehran phenomenon, limited 
only to affluent urban areas, is insulting to the millions of middle-class Iranians who have 
suffered the most under his tenure."57 Affluent Iranians, much like affluent individuals 
anywhere, are not affected as sharply by high inflation and unemployment. It is people of 
modest or low income who feel the pinch when an economy begins to falter and slides into 
stagnation. These are the people who end up in the streets protesting, which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
Not only do economic downturns cause public discontent, but they can also cause elite 
fragmentation over policy. Lisa Anderson points out that " divisions between 'hardliners' and 
'softliners' are not necessarily linked directly to differences over economic policy" .  However, 
"even where economic crisis are not the source of factional conflicts . . .  they are likely to 
51 Ilias 2010. 
52 Anderson 1999. 
53 Geddes 1999. 
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exacerbate them."58 This points to an important interplay between factors, further confusing the 
possibility of assigning causality. Most significantly, though, economic downturns generally 
spell trouble for the ruling government. 
These factors present the necessary economic platform for democratic transition: the 
state of the economy, especially inflation and unemployment, had led to widespread discontent. 
As Anderson notes, "for incumbents, deteriorating economic performance cuts across social 
strata and affects a wide swath of society."59 The abysmal economic conditions in Iran, then, are 
widespread and far-reaching, therefore presenting us with the requisite platform to provoke a 
democratic transition. Yet in 2009 even with these economic factors in mind, Iran failed to 
achieve a democratic transition. Continued evaluation of possible triggers and indicators thus 
becomes necessary, and my analysis hence moves to the examination of political factors. 
POLITICAL FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN 
As a framework for this political discussion, van de Walle noted several suggestive 
patterns in his analysis of African cases of transition. He showed that opposition cohesion is 
positively correlated with opposition electoral victory, though it "is not a cause of transition but 
rather a consequence of a growing probability of transition due to a number of interrelated 
factors."6o This study, therefore, focuses on opposition cohesion as a predictive indicator for 
transition. The Iranian opposition is loosely consolidated as what is known as the "Green 
Movement" or the "Green Wave." It has three symbolic leaders: Former President Mohammad 
Khatami, Former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, and the sixth Speaker of the Parliament 
(Majles) Mehdi Karroubi. The opposition movement began with the election of Mohammad 
Khatami in 1997 and the development of the 2nd of Khordad Coalition. This coalition is a very 
loose association of factions that includes moderate right and democratic-Islamist groups. In the 
2009 election, the coalition had come together around former Prime Minister Mir Hossein 
Mousavi. He was deemed a "smart move to garner votes from the anti-Ahmadinejad elements 
within the Islamic right while at the same time inoculating the reformist movement against 
accusations to be essentially counterrevolutionary."61 This rejuvenated the coalition, which had 
suffered defeat in 2005 when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was first elected president. It appeared as 
though the opposition was coming together. Even after the elections, these candidates both filed 
petitions protesting the election results, citing similar ballot inconsistencies. They made several 
public appearances together, and pushed for an investigation into the election. 
Secondly, van de Walle notes that the majority of the cases examined that had successful 
electoral transitions took place in two-round systems (TRS). This means that in a case with TRS, 
we might be more likely to find a transition. A two- round system, as described by the ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network, works in the following manner: The first round is conducted in 
58 Anderson 1999, 96. 
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the same way as a single-round plurality/majority election. In the most common form of TRS, 
this is conducted using FPTP. A candidate or party that receives a specified proportion, 
normally an absolute majority of valid votes, is elected outright, with no need for a second 
ballot. If no candidate or party receives an absolute majority, then a second round of voting is 
held and the winner of this round is declared elected. Van de Walle notes that two-round 
systems "facilitate opposition unity."62 Iran uses this system, and the 2005 election was pushed 
to the second round. Had the election of 2009 been pushed to a runoff between Mousavi and 
Ahmadinejad, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Karroubi's followers would have thrown 
their support behind Mousavi, as both of them come from same group and both draw support 
from within the 2nd of Khordad Front. The election, however, rife with allegations of fraud, did 
not go to a second round. In my travels, I heard it widely theorized that the fraudulence in the 
election was perpetrated for just this reason. 
As suggested by varied authors throughout the literature, no transition is embarked on 
without some kind of internal division within the regime itself."63 This happens most often in 
cases of single-party electoral hegemonies. Since 2005, Iran has become more like one of these 
electoral hegemonies, mostly because of the alleged fraud of 2009. If we take Iran as one of these 
hegemonies, we can examine the role of the fragmentation of the elite in Iran. Currently, there 
are four main leaders within the regime in Iran: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Expediency Council 
chair Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
During Ahmadinejad's first term as president, a split developed within the 
conservatives. The split places pragmatic conservatives, led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, against an emergent ultra-conservative faction led by Ahmadinejad. This division 
has only become more inflamed in the final years of Ahmadinejad's last term and has been 
exceptionally vicious since the June presidential vote.64 Ayatollah Khamenei had tried to 
remain above the factional politics of Iran. He has generally preferred to pit various blocs 
against one another to perpetuate his own top position in the Iranian political system. The 
election fallout from 2009 was so intense because of the popular discontent, however, that 
Khamenei was faced with the choice of intervention or the potential loss of his position. The 
Supreme Leader, in a risky but calculated move, came out in support of Ahmadinejad and the 
hard-liners, angering parts of the conservative ideological groUp.65 This backing prompted 
Rafsanjani and his pragmatic and technocratic conservative followers to come out against the 
Supreme Leader and instead ally with Mousavi's reformists.66 Khamenei's outright support of 
Ahmadinejad exacerbated this and other divisions. 
The last player in this complex milieu is Iran's current speaker of parliament, Ali 
Larijani, whose family now controls two of the three branches of the Iranian government - Ali 
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controls the legislature while his brother, Sadegh, heads the judiciary. Ali Larijani has emerged 
publicly in opposition to Ahmadinejad, often finding himself at odds with Ahmadinejad's 
inflammatory rhetoric. He was also one of the few regime officials to publicly warn that many 
Iranians questioned Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2009 presidential election.67 The Larijani­
Ahmadinejad split exemplifies the ideological rift in the conservative camp as well, framing 
pragmatists against fundamentalists over Ahmadinejad's behavior. 
Besides the split between political leaders, there has also been a split between the 
leading clerics in Iran. Following the election of 2009, many of the most powerful ayatollahs, 
including Hossein Ali Montazeri, Yousuf Sane'i, Jalaluddin Taheri, and Hossein Mousavi­
Tabrizi, "openly defied Khamenei, dismissed the election, and either called for a fresh vote or 
else implied that even that would no longer be sufficient."68 In the aftermath of the election, 
Khamenei began to have trouble with many senior clerics in the holy city and seat of Shia Islam, 
Qom. The Supreme Leader has also been publicly denounced by Grand Ayatollahs Bayat 
Zanjani and Vahid Khorasani, who refused to meet him during his 10-day visit to Qom.69 There 
was also discontent from Grand Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, Makarem Shirazi, and Sobhani 
over the handling by Khamenei 's office of the 10-day show in Qom, where "private" meetings 
turned into photo opportunities and displays of the Supreme Leader's authority.7o The level of 
discontent from such a large number of these clergymen hints at a certain weakness for 
Khamenei. He must have the support of these individuals in order to maintain his power, and 
divides within these religious leaders could also hint at trouble lurking beneath the surface. 
These ayatollahs have significant clout with the general population, many of whom look 
to the ayatollahs for guidance in life as well as in religious matters. The most politically 
significant intra-clerical rift is between Rafsanjani and Khamenei. Rafsanjani has repeatedly 
challenged decisions by Khamenei, and Khamenei has responded threateningly to him. This 
split has extended through the senior clerics, as they have taken either the side of Rafsanjani or 
Khamenei. Three more Grand Ayatollahs -Javadi Amoli, Shobeiri Zanjani, and Makarem 
Shirazi -have "politely" criticised Khamenei for not challenging Ahmadinejad's non-deferential 
behavior toward Rafsanjani. Grand Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili did not visit the Supreme 
Leader on the latest trips to Qom either, because of how Rafsanjani has been treated by 
Khamenei.71 It is not only the split in the political elite that is present in Iran, but also in the 
religious elite. Even with splits in both of these elite groups, we are still at a loss for a reason 
why transition did not occur. 
Geddes (1999) notes that little evidence was found to support the claim that pacts 
increase the likelihood of democracy. They may have had that effect in isolated cases, and 
Geddes notes that "we cannot rule out the possibility that the likelihood of both pacts and stable 
democracy is increased by the existence of well established, coherent parties" that can make and 
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adhere to pacts.72 Because Iran does not have an established party structure, a discussion of 
pacts in reference to parties is not particularly relevant, and is not a transition factor that we can 
consider in this case. 
International engagement and external pressure are also factors that are of consequence 
to democratic transition. Levitsky and Way posit a theory of leverage and linkage to explain the 
effectiveness of international intervention in democratic transition. International actors exert 
leverage in different ways, including political conditionality and punitive sanctions, diplomatic 
pressure, and military intervention. Leverage raises the cost of repression, electoral fraud, and 
other government abuses. However, Western leverage over electoral authoritarian regimes is 
"rarely sufficient to convince them to democratize."73 According to Levitsky and Way, leverage 
is "most effective when combined with extensive linkage to the West."74 
The United Nations issued a non-binding resolution condemning the post-election 
protests and the crackdown on protesters. In addition to the UN, the United States also passed 
resolutions condemning Iranian actions regarding the election. On June 19, 2009, ABC News 
reported that President Obama warned Iran that " the world was watching." Major European 
politicians, including Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Angela Merkel also issued 
statements condemning the actions.75 The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 
A/C.3/64/L.37 on October 29, 2009, which condemned the government response to the 
protests. This resolution, which passed with 74 yes, 59 abstain, and 48 no votes, contained an 
explicit reference to the 2009 elections, in that it expressed "particular concern at the response of 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Presidential election of 12 June 
2009 and the concurrent rise in human rights violations."76 The leverage factor, then, is present. 
The West, though Iran would fain admit it, does have linkages in the case of Iran, but 
not by the usual methods of trade, foreign investment, or mutual involvement in international 
organizations. Iran has a very large diaspora community in many European countries as well 
as the United States. The Iranian diaspora population, based on a compilation of the most recent 
national censuses from major receiving countries (excluding Turkey), is estimated in the range 
of two to four million, with an estimated 691,000 to 1.2 million in the United States alone.77 This 
community was involved in the protests in the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as 
other European countries, and many send sizeable remittances back to Iran.78 Additionally, the 
expatriate community runs radio broadcasts, internet sites, and satellite channels that are 
routed into the country both legally and illegally, and the BBC now supports a Persian service. 
Because the leverage and linkage between Iran and the West is unusual, it is difficult to say 
whether it can be thought of as extensive enough to meet Levitsky and Way's requirements. 
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What is certain, however, is that the international community was indeed "watching" during 
these protests. While no military action was undertaken, action was taken through diplomatic 
channels. This action, however, did not create enough momentum for a democratic transition. 
The most internationally prominent feature of this discussion is the protests that 
occurred after the June 2009 elections in Iran. Protests are examples of contentious collective 
action, which is defined as collective events which represent "potentially subversive acts that 
challenge normalized practices, modes of causation, or systems of authority. The case of Iran 
can be approached with this notion of protests. There are three types of contentious collective 
action: riots, general strikes, and anti-government demonstrations.79 Of these three, two 
occurred in Iran. Most of what occurred in the two months following the 2009 presidential 
elections were anti-government demonstrations, which are " any peaceful public gathering of at 
least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign 
nature."80 Some of these demonstrations, however, degenerated into riots, which are described 
by Ulfelder as "any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use 
of physical force."81 
June 12, 2009 saw thousands of protesters pour into the streets, later clashing with 
police. On June 15, seven people were killed during a march by Mousavi supporters in Tehran, 
state media said, and protests broke out in other cities. Tens of thousands of pro-Mousavi 
demonstrators marched in northern Tehran in June 16. June 20 saw state television report that 
450 people were detained during clashes in Tehran in which 10 people were killed. These 
actions certainly qualify as contentious collective action under Ulfelder's typology. The 
question of the political logic behind these protests remains unanswered. The reasons for 
individuals flooding the streets are numerous, though analysts have been unable to completely 
explain the mass riots. They were clearly expressions of pent-up frustration and anger at the 
regime. The extent to which they were instrumentalized by the opposition, however, remains to 
be seen, though many marched in green clothing, carrying pictures of Mousavi. At this point, it 
does not appear that the protests were effectively used to channel political motives past the 
months after the election. These protests, however, did not trigger democratic transition. 
We have now examined the economic and political considerations for democratic 
transition and found them all met. There is still the problem that all factors point to transition. 
However, there has been no regime change. With the economic and political factors in mind it is 
now necessary to examine social-cultural factors. 
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SOCIAL-CULTURAL FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN 
There are several social-cultural factors that might tip the scales in favor of democracy, 
including a history of active struggle for democratic rule, a homogeneous population, and high 
literacy rates, as well as modernization and high urbanization.82 Iran has a hundred-year history 
of active struggle for democratic rule. The norms, traditions, and organizations characteristic of 
a democratic civil society existed in various forms for most of the twentieth century, and they 
endure to this day. Most recent in Iran's collective memory is the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
This event, as well as the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 (which was caused by 
dissatisfaction with economic stagnation, influence of Western power, results of the Russo­
Japanese War of 1904-05, and the Russian Revolution of 1905), in addition to the popularly 
supported 1953 coup by Mohammad Mossadegh (that prompted the nationalization of the oil in 
the face of Reza Shah's Western-friendly oil policies), are both examples of the history of 
popular expression of discontent with the government.83 
Iran also has a relatively homogeneous population and has maintained a unique 
national identity even through its long history of invasion and occupation. Though the 
dominant ethnic group, the Persians, make up only 51 % of the total population, literary and 
artistic traditions have served to unite the populace behind an Iranian identity.84 Additionally, 
most of these minorities, including the 24% Azeri Turks, are integrated into Iranian society, 
participate in politics, and identify with the Iranian nation.85 For example, of candidates 
running in this past election, Mousavi is an ethnic Turk, and Karroubi is an ethnic Lor, 
however, neither of them faced problems regarding their ethnicity in the elections or in their 
moves toward power. 
If we use Lipset's factors of higher levels of education and urbanization and more 
sophisticated and varied means of communication,86 it is apparent that Iran is also moving 
towards modernization. In Iran, 36% of the popUlation of tertiary age is in tertiary education 
(post-high school education program), up from just 18% in 2002.87 The overall literacy rate is 
77%, and that rate is even higher, 96.6%, among youth aged 15-24. Iran also scores high on 
many other proxies for measuring modernization, including level of urbanization and density 
of communications connectivity. 68% of total population lives in urban areas, and the current 
rate of change in urbanization is 2.1 % .88 Additionally, Iran is incredibly connected in terms of 
communications density. It ranks seventeenth in the world in number of internet users, twelfth 
in number of land lines in use, and twenty seventh in number of mobile phone users.89 High 
levels of internet use coupled with the extensive use of social-networking sites such as Facebook 
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and Twitter, as well as YouTube and large e-mail listservs, indicate that Iran is on the forefront 
of cornrnunication.90 After examination of socio-cultural factors in addition to all other varieties, 
it seems that Iranian regime change should have occurred in keeping with the political science 
literature. We are still at a loss for the explanation of why Iran did not experience a democratic 
transition in 2009. There must be another factor. 
ANOTHER FACTOR? 
I posit that Iran has an additional factor that must be taken into account when 
considering democratic transition: its institutional structure. The government of Iran consists of 
a three branch scheme, but with certain additions. As mentioned previously, there is a multi­
part leadership in the executive, with the Supreme Leader as head of state and the President as 
head of government. The executive branch also includes the Assembly of Experts, Expediency 
Council, and Council of Guardians.91 Iran has a unicameral legislature, the 290-member Majles. 
The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Judiciary. 
The interaction of the political structure and the elite cleavage structure is of greatest 
interest in this study, as it is the elite structure that largely leads the ideological factions due to 
the personalistic nature of Iranian politics. The aftermath of the 2009 elections saw important 
implications in this structure. I argue that it is this structure that reinforces the fractionalization 
of the elites, and that this fractionalization prevents a realization of the possibilities in coalition 
organization. 
Within this structure, there are certain elected bodies and certain unelected bodies. The 
most notable feature of the system is that is that the "Supreme Leader either directly or 
indirectly controls almost every aspect of governrnent."92 Of all of the bodies in the executive, 
the Council of Ministers, Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and Council of Guardians, 
the only one completely elected by the people is the Assembly of Experts. It is important to 
note, however, that all candidates for all elected officials must first be vetted by the Guardian 
Council, which is half appointed by the Supreme Leader and half nominated by the judiciary 
and confirmed by the parliament. The institutional structure is intentionally designed to 
dissipate power and consolidate power simultaneously. It is clear that the Supreme Leader has 
considerable power; it remains that the factions in Iran are still quite powerful throughout all of 
these institutions. How is this possible, and what does this mean for Iran's prospects for 
democratic transition? 
The Iranian system of government is confusing and convoluted. Figure 1 demonstrates 
this confusing yet ultimately somewhat ingenious structure. The Supreme Leader is the most 
important official in Iran, but seeks input on policy decision from a small circle of elite advisors, 
including the President. The President's influence is dwarfed by that of the Supreme Leader, 
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but it is by no means negligible.93 Though the Iranian president's policymaking power is under 
the direct oversight of the Supreme Leader, especially in issues of foreign policy, this is not to 
say the president is powerless. As proven by Ahmadinejad, the president can be the voice and 
face of the entire nation. The behavior of the president within the international community 
directly affects the issues that are most important to Iranians, including issues of trade and 
human rights. Furthermore, the president does actually have the weight necessary to 
implement domestic economic and human rights policies as he sees fit.94 This is the kind of 
power in which all of the individuals grappling for power are interested. 
Figure 1 :  Power-Flow of Iranian Elected and Unelected Institutions95 
KEY: -+Directly elected """,Appointed or approved ,,+Vets candidates 
The Guardian Council is key to the Supreme Leader's position, and is the most powerful 
group in the government. The Council must approve all bills passed by parliament and has the 
power to veto them if it considers them contrary or inconsistent with the constitution and 
Islamic law. The Council is currently chaired by Ayatollah Jannati, the most conservative high­
ranking cleric in Iran.96 While the Supreme Leader can change the rulings of the Council, he 
does so rarely as to attempt to preserve the legitimacy of the body, preferring to instead install 
like-minded individuals in the positions instead. The Council can also bar candidates from 
standing in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts, and thus holds 
quite a bit of power, as they decide who can and cannot be in the running to gain power. They 
determine the players in the game, and thus can alter the playing field as well by restricting 
what role any given individual can play. 
The Assembly of Experts is not a particularly active body, but it ought not be cast aside 
as a do-nothing body. It meets but twice a year, and its sole purpose is to elect a Supreme 
Leader, monitor his performance, and remove him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his 
duties. There are 86 members in this body, and it is headed by Former President Rafsanjani. 
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Here, we can see Rafsanjani's strategy. It is unlikely that an Assembly would ever be chosen 
that would remove Khamenei, because the Guardian Council approves who can and cannot run 
for Assembly seats. Rafsanjani has been president once, but has tried running for president 
since then and reached the runoff election in 2005. Since his loss in 2005 to Ahmadinejad, he has 
moved to pursue other venues for power. Rafsanjani is poised for when Khamenei either passes 
away or for some other reason falls from power. As head of this committee, he will direct the 
selection of the next Supreme Leader. Whoever is chosen will owe a great debt to Rafsanjani 
and thus, Rafsanjani stands to gain very much from a change in leadership. His main goal at 
present is to remain powerful- he will not endanger his political position any more than he has 
to for fear of losing his game of time. This means that he will likely not throw weight behind the 
reformists again while he still perceives a threat. 
The Expediency Council is the Supreme Leader's advisory body. It has ultimate 
adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the parliament and the Guardian 
Council. The members, who are prominent religious, social and political figures, are all 
appointed by the Supreme Leader. In October 2005, the Supreme Leader gave the Expediency 
Council supervisory powers over all branches of government, delegating some of his own 
authority as is permitted in the constitution}7 This body is also chaired by Rafsanjani, and 
again, we can see him simply waiting for his opportunity to use the political capital he has 
accumulated thus far to secure even more power. 
The Majles is largely a podium for addressing the public. Its powers are severely 
constrained, and thus the legislation that is passed is mostly irrelevant, for legislatively-driven 
change is all but impossible given the Guardian Council's oversight. The speaker of the Majles, 
however, can use his place to make public statements on behalf of legislators. For example, 
Larijani and Karroubi, who have both held this position, have used it to issue statements and 
gain public attention. The power of this institution as a legislative body, then, is not as 
important as the role it plays as a venue to establish the power of the speaker. 
While none of the candidates spoke of any serious overhaul of the Islamic system, it is 
clear that they saw an opportunity to grab power in the system.98 Whenever such weakness is 
identified, however, it is sometimes the case that an individual will not join with others and 
form pacts, but rather sojourn alone. While there is evidence that Rafsanjani has been to Qom to 
speak with leading clerics on behalf of Mousavi, ultimately he is a pragmatist and a self-server. 
His silence since the election /I may well reflect a desire to hedge his bets so as to protect his 
influence and power over whoever remains in control."99 
Karroubi has also moved away from Mousavi following the election, recently choosing 
instead to pursue a more confrontational policy towards the government, thereby dashing any 
hopes of a united reformist opposition.100 When Mousavi announced the creation of a new 
97 STRATFOR 2009. 
98 Esfandiari et al. 2009. 
99 Newman 2009, 2. 
100 Butters 2010. 
54 RES PUBLICA 
movement, the Path of Green Hope, Karroubi said that he would not be joining it.101 Instead, 
Karroubi is focusing his efforts on pressuring the government on the allegations of rape and 
abuse of opposition supporters arrested in the post-election crackdown -an issue to which the 
Iranian populace is very sensitive. His high moral ground as a cleric allows him the ability to 
criticize the government on this issue, and the nature of the topic endears him to the people. 
His success with this approach during the 1979 revolution might lead him to believe that such 
tactics will be equally successful this time around. This move, however, further splits 
Mousavi's base of support. Karroubi does not have enough power in the system to be successful 
alone. 
I examined earlier the coalition of the opposition, and examined how the opposition had 
come together in support of Mousavi. It is because of these powerful figures that the opposition 
was able to move together as it did before the election. Unfortunately, having such strongly 
delineated factions within the groups hurts the ability of the opposition to maintain a coalition 
with a clear and definite leader post-election. The institutional structure has allowed too many 
heavy-hitters that have gained power in the institutional arena. They have created a body of 
elites with citizen followers that are not content with the current system, yet refuse to 
completely defer to or support one individual that could truly push the movement forward for 
fear of loss of personal power. Though Mousavi is the symbolic head of the movement, the 
power he would need to sustain the Green Movement is not in his hands. The institutional 
structure through which he and the other powerful leaders arose parcels out just enough power 
for them to have a modicum of political clout, yet still keep each one from truly realizing 
enough power to convince any other faction that they ought to lead. Too many of these 
individuals (and others, including Khamenei's first choice for the 2005 presidential election and 
the current mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Qalibaf) do not perceive the political opportunity to 
form such an alliance without severely losing personal power. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the time following the June 2009 presidential election, the stage was set. All of the 
factors that, in other locales, point towards or have caused democratic transitions were present. 
The economy was down, growth had slowed, oil prices were down, divisions had erupted 
within authoritarian regime itself, the populace was mobilized and there was contentious 
collective action in the streets, the opposition moved to support Mir Hossein Mousavi as their 
candidate in the election, and the international community was engaged with external pressure 
from the US, UN, and European Union. Iran has a history of active struggle for democratic rule, 
a homogeneous population, few border contentions, and high rates of literacy, urbanization, 
and modernization. Had the elite factions been willing to choose one leader and throw all of 
their power behind him, or if any of the leaders had been able to collect enough individual 
power to pose a real threat, Iran would have had a tipping factor that, on top of all of the other 
101 Butters 2010, 2. 
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indicators that marked Iran as ready for change, plus Khamenei's weakness, might have 
triggered a democratic transition. 
55 
As it stood in 2009, the post-election movement lacked a real leader. The impetus for 
movement was there--the symbol of movement is Mousavi, but the actors behind the scenes 
have to stop forcing their way through the door all at once and let someone go first. It is not 
enough for the opposition to coalesce around a symbolic figure -they must coalesce around a 
real leader with enough power. This leader, however, if they are to arise out of the system, will 
be tainted by the system through which they gained power. This will stunt any push for change 
that might come from within the ranks of the elites. A push must then come from outside. This 
leaves us with several questions for further research. Who are the players outside of the system? 
Where are they? What are the extra-institutional powers that players outside of the system can 
gain? And perhaps most interestingly, what will be the role of further protests in Iran? 
There is no answer as of yet. The political landscape in Iran is ever-changing, and Iran 
analysts have continually posited reasons for the durability of Iran's authoritarianism. Political 
actors jump from seat to seat, moving from Speaker to President to Expediency Council 
chairman, attempting to achieve power through as many alleys as possible, yet are continually 
thwarted by the nature of the institutional structure. The institutions are designed to be 
debilitating, provoking competitions between actors, thus making it exceptionally difficult to 
garner enough power to exact change from within the system. As details arise about the nature 
of the relationships between these elite players, further examination will be required to assess if 
there is movement within the elites towards alliances, or if it appears that someone has found a 
way to gain more power outside of the system. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for regime 
change to come from within the system. Simply by virtue of the fact that all elites must be 
vetted by the Guardian Council, there will never be actors that will be able to both gain power 
and unseat the regime. The elites are tainted, and thus any change will be as a result not, as 
Geddes claims, from elites and their discourse and alliance structure, but from motion outside 
of the elites. An outside force must be able to gain extra-institutional power that can rival that 
of the Supreme Leader, and that requires some sort of catalyst, be it a severe miscalculation or 
misstep by the Supreme Leader, or his death. As is the trend that is evident in the history of 
Iran, only time will telL 
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REDISTRICTING EFFECT IN A NONPARTISAN WORLD: 
TOWARD A THEORY OF REAPPORTIONMENT AT THE COUNTY BOARD 
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
Amy Uden 
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Abstract: Electoral redistricting shapes political scientists' perceptions of partisan polarization and 
incumbency. This paper examines the redistricting process at the county level of government, using the 
cases of McLean and Champaign Counties, Illinois. This research analyzes the McLean County board's 
voting cleavages in order to highlight considerations of nonpartisan electoral bodies. With Champaign 
County as a comparison, it also uses a series of linear regression models to analyze redistricting's effects 
on county incumbency and board composition. Redistricting impact proved insignificant, but the study 
demonstrates correlations between county electoral composition and state-level electoral trends, and also 
confirms the important influence of partisanship on redistricting and electoral outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In February of 2007, the McLean County Board voted to take a stance regarding a legal 
ban of smoking indoors in Illinois, with eleven out of nineteen members voting against a board 
declaration of support for the ban. At a time when the issue was a contested topic at the state 
level of government, the board members, though not capable of directly impacting the state 
legislation's outcome, felt compelled to declare a position. Ideological and personal 
considerations undoubtedly played into this vote, which did not split cleanly along party lines, 
although the issue had partisan overtones at the state leveL Significantly, such votes often occur 
on the McLean County Board, in spite of its reputation as a nonpartisan body. At other 
instances in the board's history, members have chosen to take similar stances on everything 
from video gaming to terrorism. For an ostensibly nonpartisan body, this behavior raises 
questions of a more nuanced background story of board interaction. 
County governments receive very little attention from political scientists, and have been 
famously acknowledged to be the /I dark continent of political science,"l although perhaps they 
deserve more attention than they generally stimulate. Political scientists often perceive county 
government as insignificant because of characteristics such as local specificity and 
nonpartisanship. Yet why, in a body with allegedly little partisan influence, would board 
members feel the need to act in such an ideologically driven fashion? Issue positions like those 
taken on the smoking ban could be harmful to board cohesion and personal interaction, and 
could also risk alienating state-level legislators whose work controls county intergovernmental 
constraints. Under these circumstances, the risks of the situation seem high compared to the 
psychological pay-off involved. This anecdote highlights just one instance of interest within 
county politics, suggesting the merit of further study in this area. 
This study will examine one of the most highly contested issues in political science 
within the unusual framework of a county government-that of electoral redistricting. This 
research will use cases from central Illinois for an exploratory look at a largely ignored subject. 
1 Gilbertson 1917. 
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Reapportionment problems touch many aspects of political science, from incumbency to 
partisanship. In this exploratory study, the role of partisanship in McLean County Board voting 
is examined, as well as the applicability of redistricting theory to county government. A 
comparison of McLean County, a body with a reputation for little partisanship, to Champaign 
County, a more competitive body, as well as to other findings in the field, could provide a 
springboard for further research on the role of these political issues in all levels of government. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is little doubt that electoral redistricting is a hotly contested issue at federal, state, 
and local levels of government. Incumbency advantage, district competitiveness, and partisan 
competition constitute some of the concerns expressed by scholars and politicians with respect 
to redistricting. For purposes of this county government research, the most directly relevant 
issues are those of partisan competitiveness. Generally, scholars agree that the institutional 
arrangements for redistricting do impact partisan competitiveness.2 Partisan and bipartisan 
plans pursue different ends, and deal with the often-competing interests of the party 
organization and individual incumbents. No definitive answers exist for these questions of seat 
efficiency and polarization. While some perceive redistricting as beneficial to democratic 
representativeness and responsiveness, others find that its impact is limited or diminishes over 
time.3 Overall, the exhaustive redistricting literature emphasizes the importance of partisan 
competition in the reapportionment process, and the redistricting process's well-studied nature 
at the national and state levels far eclipses its examination within the context of counties .  
Addressing the situation of county-level redistricting also implies examining urban­
rural representation, bringing nonpartisan voting effects to the forefront. Regional voting 
patterns tend to be insignificant alongside partisan splits, unless they are somehow 
institutionally reinforced.4 Even if a split based on non-partisan characteristics exists for a 
legislative body, its impact is less likely to hold up over time without the backing of some 
structural trait of the body, such as its electoral districts. At this point, McLean County's 
historically limited competitiveness becomes relevant to the discussion. Partisan 
competitiveness sparks interest most often when a formerly weak party becomes stronger, 
which seems to be the case in McLean County at this time, as two-party competition has only 
recently developed. For instance, in the case of post-war Southern realignment, as migration or 
social changes caused the growth of the Republican Party, the shift was aided by congressional 
redistricting, and incumbents had to adjust representation accordingly.5 Southern realignment 
could provide a comparative example for the perceived strengthening of partisan 
competitiveness in McLean County. This case's progression of social change and gradual 
2 Mann and Cain, eds. 2005; Gelman and King 1994; Jewell 1955. 
3 Cain 1985; Squire 1998; Gilligan and Matsuska 1999. 
4 Robeck 1970; Broach 1972. 
5 Polsby 2004; Sundquist 1983; Shafer and Johnson 2006; Basinger and Ensley 2007. 
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electoral change can provide a springboard story for future research on county 
reapportionment. 
61 
When measuring partisan competition, scholars look to the attitudes of both candidates 
and voters within elections.6 In state legislatures, parties both provide a default cleavage 
structure and help with institutional and ideological organization.7 While that approach 
examines electoral impact of partisan competitiveness, party formation and competitiveness 
may apply differently at the local level where legislative indicators are not fully developed. 
When applying this to county or local party context, past research often stresses both the 
importance of a "trickle-up effect" of party, and points out that although variations exist in 
county-level party organizations, even without a clear chain of command, local parties 
undergird electoral process.8 
However, little of the existing research deals with the shape and make-up of partisan 
competitiveness within county government. While Beck discusses county demographics in 
relation to party, even his work does not explicitly examine county governments.9 This provides 
another basis for comparing the constituent make-up and partisan competitiveness of counties. 
Although party organization may not be directly tied to the redistricting process in the county, 
the connections between these fields of study suggest that vibrant partisan competitiveness has 
significant implications in the electoral redistricting process. As more intense competitiveness 
arises, the level of partisanship in redistricting will also likely rise. MacManus extends these 
studies with a compilation of county make-up survey responses dealing explicitly with board 
elections and partisanship. Although she notes a trend toward increased competition reported 
in board elections, she also suggests at several points that the effects of term structures and 
other generally influential institutional electoral arrangements have received no empirical 
testing at this levepo 
Intertwining these several different bodies of scholarship will add to the scholarly 
conversation by linking these fields to the " dark continent." The county can provide a venue 
through which to examine the variance of electoral competition and party development in a 
different ideological environment. The states have often been dubbed "laboratories of 
democracy" by political scientists, and by similar logic, local governments can bring 
experimentation to new levels and throw structure of government into even sharper relief.11 
While reviewing the scholarship on redistricting, Theodore Arrington discusses the multiplicity 
of issues touched by redistricting questions, including party, race, representativeness, local 
boundaries, and decision making in the face of competing criteria.12 Less weighed down in 
bureaucratic and federal limitations, local governments can be uniquely situated to embrace 
6 Basinger and Ensley 2007. 
7 Wright and Schaffner 2002. 
8 Frendreis et al. 1990; Dyck, et al. 2009; Eldersveld and Walton 2000. 
9 Beck 1974. 
10 MacManus 1996. 
11 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 1932. 
12 Arrington 2010. 
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future redistricting questions by implementing different plans and experimenting with new 
technologies. Connecting local partisan competition to redistricting politics, along with 
applying these principles to the county level of government in both McLean and Champaign 
counties, may provide new perspective to our knowledge of electoral redistricting and 
partisanship. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The use of theoretical approaches that examine incumbency and partisan advantage in 
conjunction with redistricting has been supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, 
particularly at the national level. Most research distinguishes between partisan, bipartisan, and 
nonpartisan redistricting processes)3 County governments experience electoral 
reapportionment in a similar manner to those at state and national levels of government, yet 
application of redistricting theory to counties has seldom occurred. Conversely, normative 
theory suggests that, particularly when we emphasize democratic representation, local 
governments provide for citizen-government interaction in unique and more direct ways. 
Moreover, local context can also indirectly play a significant role at high levels of government, 
due to mixed influences such as perceived competition, ideological similarity, and complacency 
effects.14 In addition to partisan representation, constituent-based representation, such as 
urban-rural interest splits, can play an important role at this level, though perhaps only if 
institutionally reinforced in the county legislative body.ls Therefore, applying redistricting 
theory to county governments has potential normative significance. The approach here will be, 
to the greatest extent possible, to apply the theoretical frameworks surrounding redistricting to 
the county level of government in an exploratory type of study. 
Based on this foundation, redistricting will be examined through the implications of 
partisan competitiveness, or lack thereof, in the county environment. McLean County is 
historically a one-party Republican county, but has experienced a strong trend toward 
increased two-part competition over the last generation. Historically, the political divisions in 
the county were more likely to be urban-rural than Democratic-Republican. McLean County's 
urban-rural divisions are also somewhat similar to the up-state versus down-state split of 
Illinois at large. As the county has become more competitive, the county board's "nonpartisan" 
reputation has increasingly been called into question. This does not, however, indicate that 
Democratic considerations have replaced urban ones on the McLean County Board, because 
party lines have not necessarily coincided cleanly with urban and rural areas thus far. 
This research also examines Champaign County as a useful electoral comparison and 
control. Champaign County and McLean County are similar in size and close in proximity. 16 
13 Gelman and King 1994. 
14 Dyck 2009. 
15 Broach 1972. 
16 According to the u.s. Census Bureau's 2009 estimates, Champaign County's population is 195,671, and 
McLean County's population is 167,699. 
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Both counties have twin-cities at their center, with influential universities, high mobility, and 
parallel urban-rural divisions. The county board structures of the two also have similar features, 
with relatively large elected bodies and staggered terms. Despite these similarities, Champaign 
County has a reputation for being a much more partisan. An examination of the voting margins 
for election to the Champaign County Board as compared to those of McLean County provides 
empirical evidence supporting this claim (See Figure 1 below) . Since questions of partisanship 
play so heavily into redistricting, these two cases supply a controlled comparison of the state of 
partisanship within counties. 
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Since partisan composition of electoral districts plays such a vital role in the redistricting 
process, the existence or lack of existence of partisan competitiveness in the county has key 
significance. This solidifies the rationale for examining partisan competitiveness in conjunction 
with electoral redistricting in McLean County and other counties. Furthermore, the increasing 
population of McLean County, fueled by migration to the twin cities of Bloomington-Normal 
may be intensifying two-party competition. It may also be producing higher levels of 
partisanship in its elected legislative body. Empirical confirmation for these trends would assist 
in applying the standard theories of redistricting to the county level of government. If this is the 
case, partisanship could be expected to be the most salient in the politics of redistricting. The 
hypotheses will therefore include the following: 
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HI: As partisan competition in the county electorate increases, partisan decision-making in the 
county board also increases. 
H2: As the role of partisan competitiveness in the county board increases, standard electoral 
trends accompanying redistricting will also become more evident in the county. 
These hypotheses focus primarily on the existence of, or increased growth of, partisan 
competitiveness. This phenomenon is not always active at the county level, but plays a strong 
role in determining redistricting plans' outcomes and effects. Because of the role of 
competitiveness in redistricting theory, its place in McLean County must be established. The 
questions concerning redistricting theory are contingent upon this first descriptive aspect of 
research concerning the nature of county representation, so only after uncovering this 
relationship should the other hypothesis be pursued. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 1 
This study uses a number of basic linear regressions to test its theoretical framework. A 
very limited level of compiled data exists at the county level of government, so measures had to 
be created. For the first hypothesis, the model aims to discover the impact of partisan 
competitiveness in the county electorate as a whole on county board decision-making 
considerations or cleavages. Board decision-making splits will be measured based on a 
comparative group cohesion score, defined as the average percentage of each groups' cohesion 
over the percentage of average total board cohesion.17 These cohesion scores were based on 
aggregated roll call voting patterns for pairings of individual members across time. Roll call 
votes are a standard measure of legislator behavior. Although increasingly less common in 
recent years for the McLean County Board, roll call voting occurs at the county level for 
controversial or procedurally significant votes. These votes can potentially explain members' 
17 To construct these cohesion scores, individual board members' roll call voting histories were initially 
established. Then, pairs of individual members were matched up to create member to member cohesion 
scores for each pair of members on the board. Cohesion can be described as the number of votes together 
out of the total number of votes on which both member voted. Once these scores were compiled, group 
averages were calculated, i.e. Republicans voting with Republicans, Democrats voting with Democrats, 
and so on. Again, because some board members did not vote in every roll call, either due to absence from 
meeting, abstention, appointment to the board mid-year, or (in the case of the chair) procedure, the 
cohesion scores for each pair of members come from the percentage of votes " together" out of votes in 
which both members voted. Unanimous votes always remain within the set, because although they 
elevate the scores slightly, members did have opportunity to vote non-unanimously and chose not to do 
so. In the case of some members who voted only on one or two votes in the course of the year, their scores 
were outliers that skewed the average. Accordingly, if an individual member votes on less than one third 
of the roll call votes, their percentages do not make up a part of the board average scores. One third of the 
votes functioned as the threshold because it minimized the number of cases that would be removed while 
still accounting for the problem of outliers. However, in order not to haphazardly remove nuance from 
the voting patterns, this rule only took effect in situations for which theoretical justification existed, such 
as in the case of board chairpersons or members with partial-year terms. 
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actions based on their ideological framework better than any other measure. Using this measure 
of the comparative frequency with which members of different groups on the board vote 
together will serve as a proxy measure for how important the different considerations of party 
and regional interest are to board decision-making. If board members vote together by group 
substantially differently from how they vote as an overall body, movement across time or in 
comparison to county electorate trends may be revealing about partisan competitiveness and its 
role in the board as a legislative body. 
Independent variables in the model include the state of Illinois' presidential and 
gubernatorial margins (Republican vote minus Democratic vote), McLean County presidential 
and gubernatorial models, the change in composition of the county board in the previous 
election year, the number of uncontested seats in the previous election year for each party, and 
the number of incumbents reelected in the election of the year before the cohesion scores. Each 
of these variables demonstrates the strength of partisan competition in the electorate, as 
opposed to the existence of an electorate not dominated by only one party or ideological 
framework. Furthermore, since this study also attempts to uncover the impact of redistricting 
on county boards, it controls for redistricting with a variable indicating the number of years 
since the last redistricting process. 
The model examines the McLean County Board's roll call voting back to 1982, the year 
when the current County Board ten-district structure came into place. Within the data set, each 
case covers a two-year time span, including election data from only election years and board 
decision-making data from the election year and the following year. This time lag provides a 
built-in attempt to gauge the effects of competition in the county at large, measured through 
various election results, on the board's decision-making cleavages. Using the two-year span as 
the unit of analysis presumably meshes the actual outcome of the various elections with county 
board actions. Previous studies on electoral redistricting also examine the impact of redistricting 
on incumbent security and partisan composition over an extended period of time, strengthening 
the rationale for using two-year intervals as opposed to the one-year intervals common in roll 
call analyses.18 
In terms of other measures, the presidential and gubernatorial votes measure the 
strength of partisan competition in the county as compared to a control of the state for macro­
level trends. State-level data serve as the control because factors that impact McLean County 
will presumably be more likely to parallel those of impacting Illinois more closely than those at 
the national level. Including a variable representing the strength of local parties, such as those 
from each party who filed to be precinct committeemen, may also have been beneficial, but the 
data for this component were not available. 
Changes in board composition also play a large theoretical role in explaining the 
variance in the dependent variable. This research tracks board composition as it changes in 
election years by measuring the number of Democrats elected out of the total number of 
18 Gelman and King 1994. 
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available seats, including those for unexpired terms that were up for election. Especially in the 
case of McLean County, increasing Democratic presence on the board would suggest a more 
competitive body, in a fashion that may parallel the growth of Democratic competition in the 
county over time. The number of uncontested seats from each party could work in opposite 
directions, as Republican uncontested seats would indicate less competition, but Democratic 
uncontested seats may mean the opposite in a generally Republican county context. The 
average margin of victory for McLean County Board seats serves as a final indicator of 
competition. To measure this margin, Republican percentage of the two-party vote is used. The 
average of each Republican candidate's strength across all of the districts shows the electoral 
strength, and therefore measures change the same way as the mathematical margin. Greater 
margins of victory indicate a less competitive county, and in the model, should be negatively 
related to the expected outcome of movement in cohesion scores based on increased party 
competitiveness.19 The controls for incumbent reelection and redistricting also attempt to 
incorporate redistricting theory, by taking into account the potential for the board to have its 
partisan composition influenced by these factors. 
As explained above, the models separate the board into Republican, Democratic, rural, 
and urban groups, in order to uncover the strength of each of these cleavages as considerations 
for board decision-making. More fit in a model indicates that board group cohesion moves in 
relation to changes in county partisanship. In other words, increased group cohesion suggests 
possible increased prevalence of group association in members' decision-making. The model 
tests whether or not movement in board group considerations occur based on the impact of 
increased partisanship within the county electorate. Significant results indicate that a group on 
the board votes more cohesively with increase of county partisanship. Practically speaking, the 
shape of McLean County's efforts to redistrict in 2011 may be determined by whether or not 
urban-rural considerations remain consistent. Therefore, in order to explain which group votes 
together most strongly in conjunction with the level of partisan competition in the county, the 
model has been run with each group's cohesion scores individually serving as dependent 
variables. Results of each model appear as follows: 
19 In 1998 for McLean County, and in 2002 for Champaign County, incomplete election records left out 
some of the districts. Accordingly, a margin that averages the preceding and following years' election 
margins has been created as a substitute measure, in order to preserve all possible cases. 
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Table 1: Models of McLean County Partisan Competitiveness and 
Average Board Roll Call Vote Cohesion, by Group, 1982-2009 
67 
Dependent Variable: McLean County Board Average Group Cohesion Compared to Average Total Cohesion 
( . h . d h . . 'bl . d 1 f . b '  d 
. .  ki) WIt mcrease group co eSlOn suggestmg POSSI e mcrease . preva ence 0 group assocIation m mem ers eCIslOn-ma ng) 
Independent Variable Republican Cohesion Democratic Cohesion Rural Cohesion Urban Cohesion 
Constant 62.430 4.165 -149.789 137.214 
(47.428) (204.299) (266.206) (86.509) 
State Presidential Margin -.614 1.323 -1.030 5.830 
(.903) (3.889) (5.075) (1.647) 
State Gubernatorial -2.892** 2.410 .220 -.780 
Margin (.186) (.800) (1.045) (.339) 
McLean Presidential 1.092 -1.587 .938 -5.426 
Margin (.805) (3.467) (4.524) (1.468) 
McLean Gubernatorial 3.057** -2.939 -.285 -.429 
Margin (.243) (1.048) (1.368) (.444) 
Board Composition -1.215** .960 .365 -1.175 
(Percent Democrats (.214) (.921) (1.202) (.390) 
Elected) 
McLean Uncontested .339 -.322 -.796 -.638 
Races-Republican (.145) (.625) (.816) (.265) 
McLean Uncontested -.138 .315 .554 .338 
Races- Democratic (.226) (.972) (1.268) (.412) 
McLean County Board -1.132* .342 .753 -1.253 
Average Margin (.334) (1.437) (1.875) (.608) 
(Rep. Vote) 
McLean Incumbents -.189 -.043 .551 -.202 
Reelected (.062) (.269) (.351) (.114) 
Redistricting Year -.287 .278 .388 .088 
(1.218) (5.246) (3.589) (2.221) 
N 14 14 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .751 .030 -.942 -.589 
F-Test 4.917 1.040 .369 .518 
Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p �.1, ** P �.05, ***p �.01 
Table 1 presents the results for each of these models, although none are statistically 
significant overall. Interestingly, the model explains the most for Republican group cohesion 
and the least for rural group cohesion. By this logic, rural-urban splits on the board could be 
influenced least by changes in the partisan composition of the county. While this may suggest 
that these considerations vary less over time in board decision-making, it also may suggest that 
urban-rural groupings' importance to the board simply moves inconsistently as compared with 
county partisanship. On the other hand, the random variance in cohesion scores based on 
member personality, along with the limited number of cases, could be interfering with or 
diminishing the effects of any discernible trend. Within the models, some of the variable's 
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correlations are significant, but the findings are mixed in terms of their movement in the 
direction anticipated. The number of cases limits possibility for significance in these models, as 
well as others throughout the study. However, this limited "N" comes from the fact that the 
current board structure did not come into place until 1982, so cases before this time would cause 
internal inconsistency within the model. 
The model for Republican group cohesion on the board had the greatest explanatory 
power. When the average margin of victory for board seats increased, meaning that 
Republicans were more secure, they voted together less frequently. This suggests that 
insecurity, or increased competitiveness, would impact board decision-making along partisan 
lines. The significance of this model of increased county competitiveness on Republican voting 
cohesion suggests that party may be becoming more important to board process. On the other 
hand, as the board becomes more Democratic (Board Composition Change), Republican 
cohesion also decreases. Bivariate correlations between the various indicators of partisan 
competition and board cohesion measures also present mixed findings. In most cases, cohesion 
scores across years waver around a central score, but do not trend in any particular direction. 
This creates difficulty in identifying the overall strength of voting cleavages on the board, and 
distinguishing partisan or urban-rural considerations from those of particular members' voting 
habits and personalities. In McLean County's specific case of redistricting, to rule out 
institutionally reinforcing urban and rural considerations in the board decision-making process 
may at this point be empirically unsupported. 
To clarify some of these models' mixed findings the bivariate relationships between 
Board Composition Change, Average Margin of Republican Victory, and each of the cohesion 
scores were examined. Interestingly, the only correlation that achieved significance, aside from 
those measuring similar phenomena, was that of Democratic Cohesion and Board Composition 
Change. Since Board Composition Change measures the increase in the percentage of 
Democrats elected to the board, the expected positive correlation (.458*) occurred. For this 
correlation only to achieve significance among the other measures suggests that Democrats, as 
the smallest group on the board, tend to experience the effects of partisan competition the most. 
Accordingly, their voting patterns on the board, including their relative tendency to vote 
together as a group, move significantly with their strength in the board composition. This 
finding has interesting implications for board voting patterns if the board's composition 
continues to become more competitive, as predicted. 
A graphical representation of two of these group cohesion measures, Republican and 
rural, as compared to McLean County's presidential vote margin, displays some of the 
ambiguity surrounding groups' cohesion scores. Depicted visually below in Figure I, contrary 
to the hypothesis, rural voting patterns have stayed equally cohesive and even discernibly 
increased as partisan competition has increased (shown in terms of a decreasing Republican 
margin of victory over time). Republican voting cohesion, on the other hand, seems to neither 
trend upward nor downward over time, though it may be in the process of increasing slightly. 
In spite of statistical insignificance, this trend, at least in McLean County up to the present, 
would seem to indicate that partisan decision-making on the board has not necessarily become 
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a more salient cleavage even as the partisan competition of the board changes. These findings 
emphasize the benefit of maintaining the urban-rural split in McLean County's board, and the 
type of decisions faced by board members, concerning issues like zoning, may support this 
emphasis. 
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Significance issues for all of the data supporting this hypothesis again make it difficult to 
draw substantive conclusions. Perhaps, however, this reinforces a different aspect of local 
government and partisanship. Because of its face-to-face nature, partisan competitiveness may 
have a less overt impact on county government. Alternatively, these measures may not be the 
best depiction of the interactions that take place within county government. For instance, more 
qualitative or content-based analysis could better represent the influence of different voting 
considerations on the county board. 
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EMPIRICAL MODELS AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 2 
This study has also hypothesized that in counties with greater partisan competitiveness, 
electoral redistricting has a greater impact on county board composition. This model utilizes 
variables similar to those that made up the independent variable set in the previous modeL This 
portion of the studies deals with the effects of redistricting on various measures of board 
security and incumbent advantage. Table 2 presents the data from Champaign County, an 
adjacent jurisdiction with a history of much higher partisan competition. 
The first regression uses as its dependent variable the composition of the counties' 
respective boards, measured in terms of percent of Democrats elected. While this variable does 
not measure total board composition because it accounts only for those elected in each election 
cycle and county board members have staggered terms, its change from year to year captures 
the shape of change in board composition. By looking at this measure first, one can gauge 
whether or not redistricting has any influence on board composition at the county leveL 
The model's independent variables consist of multiple controls, including state and 
county presidential and gubernatorial margins of victory. Controlling for the overall change in 
the political or partisan forces impacting the county will allow for any effects of redistricting to 
be distinguished from the general pattern of board composition change that might have 
occurred even without redistricting. In this model, the logic of including uncontested races has 
shifted slightly from that in the first model of this study. Here, uncontested races contribute a 
general control for the tone of the board in terms of its normal trend of competition, and 
accounts for local electoral patterns in specific districts. The percentage of incumbents reelected 
also serves as a control in this situation. Incumbency advantage and redistricting effects are 
often tied to one another in the literature. Yet if the counties experience robust incumbency 
advantage effects from year to year, their impact would skew the perception of redistricting 
effects, and for this reason, incumbency also serves as an independent variable. 
Finally, the redistricting variable should, according to the hypothesis, influence the 
board composition. As the years since a redistricting process occurs lapse, the redistricting's 
effects on board elections should decline. The table below presents the results of this model for 
both Champaign County and McLean County: 
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Table 2: County Board Redistricting and Board Composition Measure, 1982-2009 
Dependent Variable: Board Composition (Percent Democrats Elected) 
Champaign County McLean County 
Independent Variable Independent Variable 
Constant -37.730 Constant 83.406 
(41.370) (102.756) 
State Presidential 1.192 State Presidential .740 
Margin (1.005) Margin (2.094) 
State Gubernatorial 1.021 State Gubernatorial -.344 
Margin (.185) Margin (.430) 
Champaign Presidential -.634 McLean Presidential -.530 
Margin (.998) Margin (1.872) 
Champaign -2.107* McLean Gubernatorial -.057 
Gubernatorial Margin (.366 Margin (.569) 
Champaign Uncontested -1.224* McLean Uncontested -.587 
Races-Republican (.550) Races-Republican (.308) 
Champaign Uncontested 2.033** McLean Uncontested .460 
Races- Democratic (.881) Races- Democratic (.474) 
Champaign County -1.190 McLean County Board -.423 
Board Average Margin (.824) Average Margin (.730) 
(Rep. Vote) (Rep. Vote) 
Champaign Incumbents .435 McLean Incumbents -.102 
Reelected (.156) Reelected (.144) 
Redistricting Year .609* Redistricting Year .341 
(1.802) (2.633) 
N 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .744 .291 
F-Test 5.192* 1.591 
Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** p ::;.05, ***p ::;.01 
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In this model, a positive relationship exists between the lapse in years after redistricting 
and change in board composition, although it is only significant for Champaign County. One 
feasible explanation hinges on the Republican strength. As more time passes from the 
redistricting more Democrats are elected, so perhaps redistricting favors board Republicans. Yet 
another possibility is that the relationship between these two variables does not capture 
redistricting effects within the right time span or type of measurement. Especially in 
Champaign County, where the board is more competitive and composition may be more stable, 
a simple measure of board composition change may not reveal the full story of redistricting 
effects. Again, the problem of a small sample size surfaces as well, since various races' 
individual characteristics may impact board composition more, especially at the county level. 
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Because of the ambiguity accompanying an exploratory study such as this, it was 
necessary to measure redistricting effects in terms of other dependent variables as well. Board 
Composition may only suggest one part of the total impact redistricting has on a county board. 
The next model examines the effect of redistricting on incumbent reelection rate. If county 
government parallels other governmental bodies, redistricting may be used to make incumbents 
safer. Therefore, using incumbent reelection rates as a measure of the impact of redistricting on 
the nature of the county board ultimately meshes with the logic of the question. The 
construction of the incumbency dependent variable was similar to that used in other studies, 
and consists of a percentage of incumbents reelected out of the total number of seats up for 
reelection. In some instances, this may not account for the fact that incumbents chose not to run 
for reelection. However, eliminating these instances from the possible pool of seats up for 
election may remove some of the data's descriptive power because the fact that incumbents 
chose not to run for one reason or another could also be an effect of redistricting. Therefore, 
retaining the total number of possible seats in which incumbents could have run and won for 
the basis of comparison in the variable contributes to its theoretical power to explain. With the 
logic of this variable set forth, the findings of the impact of redistricting on incumbent reelection 
rates for McLean and Champaign Counties are listed in Table 3 below: 
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Table 3: County Board Redistricting and Board Member Security Measures, 1982-2009 
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Reelection Rate 
Champaign County McLean County 
Independent Variable Independent Variable 
Constant 77.936 Constant 147.788 
(110.366) (372.386) 
State Presidential -1.657 State Presidential .000 
Margin (2.578) Margin (7.227) 
State Gubernatorial -1.224 State Gubernatorial -.940 
Margin (.534) Margin (1.445) 
Champaign Presidential 1.173 McLean Presidential .126 
Margin (2.487) Margin (6.442) 
Champaign 2.659* McLean Gubernatorial .586 
Gubernatorial Margin (1.056) Margin (1.931) 
Champaign Uncontested 1.289 Mclean Uncontested .744 
Races-Republican (1.884) Races-Republican (1.096) 
Champaign Uncontested -1.948 McLean Uncontested .077 
Races- Democratic (3.848) Races- Democratic (1.804) 
Champaign County -1.041 McLean County Board -.548 
Board Average Margin (2.595) Average Margin (2.560) 
(Rep. Vote) (Rep. Vote) 
Board Composition .811 Board Composition -.261 
Change (Percentage of (1.036) Change (Percentage of (1.689) 
Democrats Elected) Democrats Elected) 
Redistricting Year -.801* Redistricting Year -.449 
(4.873) (9.256) 
N 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .522 -.815 
F-Test 2.576 .351 
Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** P ::;.05, ***p ::;.01 
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For McLean County especially, this model has the least explanatory power of any of the 
models put forth in this study, and is also not significant. However, this could be more 
indicative of a truth about the county level of government than it would appear. In other levels 
of government, one would expect measures like redistricting, the composition of a legislature, 
and the partisanship of the surrounding district to play a significant role in explaining 
incumbency advantage. Interestingly, only in the Champaign model did redistricting play a 
statistically significant role in explaining the movement in incumbency reelection rates. 
Furthermore, in Champaign County, redistricting did impact incumbency in the expected 
direction, since as time since redistricting increased, incumbent advantage decreased. The 
findings of this model, therefore support the second hypothesis, although the models achieved 
only mixed levels of significance. 
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The final model presented below follows a similar logic in terms of controls to that of the 
two preceding models. Here, however, average election margin of county board races serves as 
the dependent variable. This shuffling of variables attempts to test the different directionality of 
effects on various measures of redistricting effect in order to uncover the most useful way of 
examining these questions at this level of government. Cycling dependent variables in this way 
allows for more discovery of what measures function best as controls or capture variation the 
most. Average Election Margin for county board races depicts the level of safety that victors 
experience in the election, along with the general competitive nature of the county. This would 
estimate redistricting effects on the general competitiveness of the county board races which 
would potentially be linked to each county boards' composition in the long run. 
Table 4: County Board Redistricting and Board Race Competitiveness Measures, 1982-2009 
Dependent Variable: Average County Board Election Margin (Republican Percentage of Two-Party Vote) 
Champaign County McLean County 
Independent Variable Average Margin Independent Variable Average Margin 
Constant 37.623 Constant 124.039 
(7.699) (34.778) 
State Presidential Margin -.638 State Presidential 3.070 
(.455) Margin (1.042) 
State Gubernatorial -.471 State Gubernatorial -.322 
Margin (.097) Margin (.275) 
Champaign Presidential .340 McLean Presidential -2.618 
Margin (.449) Margin (.967) 
Champaign 1.167* McLean Gubernatorial -.223 
Gubernatorial Margin (.170) Margin (.363) 
Champaign Uncontested .789*** McLean Uncontested .153 
Races-Republican (.165) Races-Republican (.216) 
Champaign Uncontested -1.175** McLean Uncontested -.227 
Races- Democratic (.368) Races- Democratic (.326) 
Board Composition .384 Board Composition -.291 
Change (Percent (.165) Change (Percent (.300) 
Democrats Elected) Democrats Elected) 
Champaign Incumbents -.180 McLean Incumbents -.147 
Reelected (.078) Reelected (.090) 
Redistricting Year -.309 Redistricting Year -.294 
(.912) (1.676) 
N 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .917 .512 
F-Test 17.022*** 2.516 
Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p ::;;.1, ** P ::;;.05, ***p ::;;.01 
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The significance of the Champaign County model with average margin as the dependent 
variable causes it to stand out from among other models in the study. Problematically, most of 
this significance and explanatory power could come from the uncontested seats variables, 
which are among the only independent variables also significant in this model. This suggests 
that collinearity may also have occurred, discrediting the model. For example, in Champaign 
County, these variables most likely move together with the average margin of victory because 
there are fewer contested seats, so they pull the average more severely and the movement is 
thus more significant. The logic behind retaining the uncontested seat variables, however, was 
an attempt to control for local effects, wherein a board member may remain unchallenged for 
years because of his or her high name recognition in the community. Alternatively, in McLean 
County, even these measures do not have a significant correlation with the dependent variable. 
In addition to the uncontested races variables, the Champaign County gubernatorial margin 
achieves significance in this model, though the opposite is true for McLean County. The most 
plausible explanation here comes from Champaign's more competitive county make-up, which 
causes it to move more in line with the pattern of the state. 
In this model, redistricting does not have a significant correlation with Republican 
electoral strength. Again, this insignificance possibly results from the small number of cases 
available here. Theoretically, with a larger number of cases, if a negative correlation were 
sustained, it would suggest that as time passes after a redistricting, the gap between Republican 
and Democratic electoral strength shrinks. In some ways, this could be opposed to the 
hypothesis that redistricting will directly impact board composition by altering the status quo of 
electoral districts, potentially improving prospects for change. On the other hand, redistricting 
could strengthen the majority party, causing its electoral strength to increase most when the 
time lag since redistricting is at its least, so this negative correlation could also have some 
theoretical justification. 
With models that have so little statistical strength due to their small number of cases, the 
overall picture of these findings may be more important than the predictive success of the 
individual variables. The fact that greater explanatory power and more instances of significance 
occurred in Champaign County models than in McLean County models provides insight into 
redistricting theory on a broader level. McLean County's board has been demonstrated by 
Hypothesis 1 and Table 1 to be the much less competitive body. Interestingly, it shows less 
overall tendency to fit the basic tenants of redistricting theory in political science literature, such 
as expected redistricting effects on incumbency, electoral safety, and board composition. 
Perhaps redistricting's impact only arises in a more partisan political culture, where electoral 
competition provides more of an impetus in the redistricting process. Champaign County's 
models' comparatively high levels of explanatory value in some ways confirm the expectation 
that McLean County's redistricting issues are much less centered on partisan lines. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In spite of statistical significance issues that followed from the data's limited number of 
cases, the findings presented in this study fill a gap in the existing literature. Although an 
increased number of cases could provide more conclusive statistical evidence, the expectations 
of increased partisan strength in county board decision-making in McLean County have thus 
far failed to surface. The findings of this study are exploratory and suggest possible patterns in 
electoral politics of county redistricting and board members' decision making. For example, the 
number of roll call votes taken by the county board decreases dramatically within the sample 
time frame from 1982-2009. As the board increased its reliance on committee structure in 
government, its partisanship may not surface in roll call voting as reliably as in previous years. 
The discussion of voting cleavages within the McLean County Board would therefore 
necessitate further examination, although in general it would seem that increasing partisan 
competition has the most correlation with the cohesion of the Republican group of board 
members, and the urban-rural group cohesion patterns do not seem to vary in a specific 
direction over time. A final note on this segment of the study draws attention also to the 
significant bivariate correlation between board composition change and Democratic voting 
cohesion, which again may indicate that future increases partisan competition could continue to 
impact the strength of party as a mechanism for the formation of voting blocs on the county 
board. Because of Republican model strength and the seemingly contradictory picture of 
continuing urban-rural group cohesion, I also find it likely that the impact of partisan influence 
in McLean County may be increasing, but just as in the case of Southern realignment, may not 
yet be fully iterated in the legislative body of the county board. 
The models comparing the impact of partisan competition on redistricting trends 
suggest that a more competitive partisan county government follows trends of electoral politics 
and redistricting more closely than a less partisan body. However, the redistricting process 
itself has minimal discernible impact in both communities, at least in terms of measurement 
used in this model. Although results were mixed within the models, the McLean County data's 
lack of significance in the relationships between standard measures of electoral competition and 
board composition, incumbency, and member security all suggest that units of government 
with strong two-party competition have more consistent patterns of electoral behavior. This 
broad finding may assist public administrators and managers in understanding the principles 
behind different redistricting schemes. 
A more detailed look at redistricting impact or a comparison of redistricting processes 
from county to county could be valuable additions to future research. For instance, covering a 
broader range of counties would assist in minimizing the small N issues with the model and 
would add greater confidence to the findings of this exploratory study. Furthermore, measuring 
redistricting only in terms of time lapsed since the last redistricting process most likely limits 
the measure of the impact of this variable. One useful addition would be a measure that 
included the impact of the redistricting on different districts and their partisan makeup. This 
would require an in-depth examination of individual counties' redistricting processes year by 
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year. Again, the impact of having this improved measure would help scholars isolate the impact 
of redistricting at the county level. 
Other measures could generate more explanatory power about the workings of partisan 
competition within county boards themselves. For instance, including committee votes and 
action would be relevant in a situation with more cases. Analyzing the use of party as a 
decision-making mechanism for board members through a content analysis of divisions on 
issues at board meetings could also be insightful. One additional possibility for measuring the 
strength of local party organizations would be the percentage of precinct committeemen chairs 
filled by parties. 
This study strengthens the framework of the literature, applying it to a new level of 
government with the suggestion that bodies that are traditionally less partisan experience less 
well-defined impact of redistricting and national party -strength trends. In linking the study to 
the literature, Broach's ideas of institutional reinforcement of non-partisan divides parallel the 
research of this study.20 Interestingly, the conclusions from these models also bolster his claim 
that redistricting effects apply more clearly in two-party systems than elsewhere. Even in the 
face of insignificant findings, this exploratory study has attempted to lay the groundwork for a 
fresh method of applying party development, competition, and redistricting theory to 
America's 1/ dark continent." County government directly impacts the lives of citizens in 
tangible ways. The role of electoral competition in its operations, although it varies from county 
to county, is important for developing an understanding of politics in the most neglected level 
of government. 
20 Broach 1972. 
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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A PLAN TO MAKE THE GRADE 
Megan Weinstein 
Abstract: Since World War II, millions of immigrants have settled into European societies. While many 
of these ethnic minorities are entering their second and third generation within their host countries there 
is still a deep sense of disunity and alienation. Some researchers suggest that the best way to acculturate 
these migrants into society is through structural integration where migrants are exposed to and involved 
in institutions such as the educational system. To examine the importance of education's impact on 
socio-cultural integration, this article examines the effect of educational structures on the socio-cultural 
integration of Europe's ethnic minority populations, including foreign-born migrants. More specifically, 
this report examines the relationship between socio-cultural integration and starting age and duration of 
compulsory education. 
INTRODUCTION 
In almost any immigration country, the integration of minorities into the host society is 
vital to the cohesion and harmony within that society. Since World War II, Europe has 
witnessed a large influx of immigrant populations, mainly due to temporary and guest worker 
programs followed by permanent settlement. Many of these migrants, even two or three 
generations after settling, encounter economic and social disadvantages, discrimination, 
xenophobia, and exclusion from civic and political participation. Of the many vehicles through 
which integration can be improved, structural integration, and more specifically education, has 
gained recent esteem within studies conducted by the European Union. These studies have 
recognized that education is able to set the ground work for further integration in both the 
cultural and structural realms because it reaches the population at a young age. 
Policymakers throughout Europe are aware of the dangers of social exclusion and have 
been experiencing greater pressure to adopt effective approaches for increasing the integration 
of these new members into their respective host societies. The European Commission has called 
for leadership committed to overcoming social division and adopting policies that will promote 
equality. This is a problem that is not likely to go away on its own. In an increasingly 
globalized world, migratory movements will continue to bring an influx of minority 
populations, and as long as there continue to be cultural differences, there will be a distinct 
need to increase levels of social tolerance and inclusion. 
This research inquires how institutions, particularly compulsory education, play a role 
in advancing the integration of migrant cultures in Europe. The role of education has been 
generally neglected by policymakers in the past, but holds value because of the state's ability to 
make structural changes which may further affect socio-cultural aspects of integration. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defining Integration 
This research examines the inclusion process of migrant populations within the social 
and institutional realms of the host society. Within social science research, several terms have 
been used to describe this phenomenon including but not limited to: absorption, adaptation, 
race relations cycle, assimilation, acculturation, inclusion, incorporation, and integration. For 
the purpose of this research, the focus is on social integration, referring to "the process by which 
people who are relatively new to a country become part of a society."l This consists of "the 
inclusion and acceptance of immigrants into the core institutions, relationships, and positions of 
a host society."2 According to the Council of the European Union, it acts as a dynamic, two-way 
process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the member state.3 
Integration vs. Assimilation 
The most common terms used to describe this process are integration and assimilation. 
The notion of integration differs from assimilation mostly in historical conception. Historically, 
assimilation has been viewed as a unidirectional process where migrants are forced to abandon 
their own culture in order to adapt to the host society. This often arouses negative 
connotations of suppression, ethnocentrism, and violence. This reaction stems from the rise of 
abusive nationalism throughout Europe in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Some of these 
extreme forms of nationalism motivated attempts to create culturally homogenous nations; in 
the process, I assimilation' became a form of cultural suppression. The most obvious cases of 
such occurrences include Germany throughout WWII and the "brutally homogenizing" 
aspirations of Jacobian Republicanism in France.4 
However, Rogers Brubaker argues that, in reality, there are two distinct forms of 
assimilation: the general and abstract term and the specific and organic term. The specific and 
organic term depicts assimilation as "convert into a substance of its own nature, as the bodily 
organs convert food into blood, and thence into animal tissue . . .  to absorb into the system, 
incorporate."s In this sense, this form implies a sense of total absorption and is the form of 
I assimilation' most associated with negative historical connotations.6 Meanwhile, the general 
and abstract form of I assimilation' is rooted in the idea of increasing similarity or likeness. Here, 
assimilation regards only the notion of becoming similar, to make similar, or to treat as similar. 
This version of the word is being used more widely in the past decade. Authors are challenging 
the taboo by incorporating the term in their research instead of integration.7 Heckmann and 
1 Rudinger and Spencer 2003. 
2 Bosswick and Heckmann 2006. 
3 Joppke 2007. 
4 Brubaker 2003. 
5 Oxford English Dictionary. 
6 Brubaker 2003. 
7 Brubaker 2003; Bosswick and Heckmann 2006; Joppke 2007. 
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Schnapper state that it does not need to just be a one-sided process but can instead be used to 
shrink the differences and social distance between two or more groups or parts of them. 
Regardless, "assimilation" does have negative and distorted connotations that require continual 
clarification.8 Because of this, for pragmatic and communicative purposes, 'integration' serves 
as a more appropriate word than ' assimilation' within the realm of migrant integration. It better 
serves as a concept that is adequate for scientific purposes as well as for communication with 
policy makers and the wider public. 
Modes of Integration: Integration of a Nation 
Methods of migrant regulation vary from country to country. However, they have often 
been generalized into four main approaches for the incorporation and integration of migrants 
into society: assimilation, differential exclusion, multiculturalism, and two-way integration. 
These approaches to integration are strongly connected with the past immigration trends 
unique to each country, as well as the historical concepts of nationalism and citizenship. Each 
approach demonstrates a cultural view of integration and places integration responsibility on 
the migrant population, the host society, neither, or both. 
The first main category focuses on the complete assimilation of migrants in terms of 
learning the national language and adopting the social and cultural practices of the host society. 
As previously discussed, the concept of assimilation usually includes migrants giving up old 
practices in order to fully adopt the new national identity. Therefore, the responsibility of 
integration falls entirely on the shoulders of the migrants. This approach is appropriately titled 
an "assimilationist approach" by both Castles and Crul.9 Meanwhile, the differential exclusion 
method focuses more on the separation of migrants and the host society. Typically, this form is 
found in countries with temporary migration schemes like guest-worker or labor programs. 
Migrants are considered strictly temporary and are therefore not given the right to family 
reunification or permanent residence. This leaves migrants only temporarily integrated in the 
labor market and excludes them from integrating into other levels of society such as political 
participation and national culture.1° The next category is referred to as the "multiculturalism" 
approach. Unlike the assimilationist and civic integration approaches, multiculturalism does 
not assume the existence or necessity of homogenous and monocultural nation-states. It instead 
works through the concept of pluralism in accepting cultural diversity and community 
formation and emphasizes the promotion of equality.11 This is often times carried out through 
anti-discrimination legislation and equal opportunities policies. The responsibility of 
integration falls more on the host society as it is expected to accept newcomers along with the 
cultural practices they carry. 
While the previously described approaches to integration have been prevalent in the 
past, the European Union is now encouraging member states to adopt an approach that focuses 
8 Heckmann and Schnapper 2003. 
9 Castles 2002; Crul and Schneider 2009. 
10 Castles 2002; Crul 2009. 
11 Castles 2002; Crul and Schneider 2009, "Children of Turkish Immigrants". 
RES PUBLICA 83 
more on the fusion of the migrant and host societies. In this II two-way integration" both the 
migrants and the receiving societies must change in the process of integration. In reality this 
supposes two separate one-way processes in which the burden of change falls on both actors.12 
Christian Joppke states that this occurs in the dual presence of civic integration and the 
antidiscrimination measures found in the multiculturalist approach.13 This method is 
supported by the European Union because it acknowledges that integration is not a one-sided 
process.14 Both the migrants and host communities are active participants in the integration 
process, each with their own characteristics, reactions, and levels of adaptation.15 There is an 
inherent interaction between these parties, and successful integration incorporates a change in 
the perspectives of both the migrant population and the host community.16 
This push towards two-way integration is relatively recent, only gaining serious 
attention in the past five years. Methods of assimilation, differential exclusion, and 
multiculturalism still exist in many European countries. Those countries that have adopted the 
two-way integration method have done so quite recently. Therefore, past ideologies of each 
nation still have a large effect on the attitudes towards immigration and integration today. The 
level of socio-cultural integration, social tensions, and discrimination can still be largely 
influenced by this history. 
Process of Integration: Integration of Individuals 
While the national ideologies regarding immigration and integration are extremely 
influential in determining the nation's capacity for integration, the actual process takes place at 
the individual level. Opportunities and incentives for integration manifest themselves in 
multiple spheres of active life, whether going to the office, participating in local sports clubs, or 
even just eating at a local restaurant. Integration acts as a multi-dimensional phenomenon 
which manifests itself through 3 key systems: Legal! political, cultural, and structural 
integration. 
Legal! political integration refers strictly to the process of immigrants' inclusion as 
members of the political community. The fundamental aspect of this process regards the 
naturalization of immigrants and national policies directed at citizenship requirements. These 
policies determine the difficulty with which migrants are able to claim national citizenship and 
therefore gain full access to the political system. This access serves as a precondition for 
exerting influence on the political system and provides a way for immigrants to partake in the 
host societyP Often, the level of difficulty of naturalization relates back to the national ideals of 
integration. For example, Germany, until roughly five years ago, did not consider itself an 
immigration country ('Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland') and thus employed a strict 
12 Christian 2007. 
13 Joppke 2007, "Transformation," 247-248. 
14 Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003. 
15 Penninx 2005. 
16 Rudinger 2003, 5. 
17 Bosswick and Heckmann 2006. 
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system of differential exclusion, which made gaining citizenship relatively difficult compared to 
other European states. 18 Even today with its new acceptance of two-way integration, the 
citizenship requirements are still extensive. Meanwhile, the French assimilationist model 
allows for full-fledged citizenship to those who subscribe completely to the principles of the 
country's political system and accept its national ideals. However, while naturalization is quite 
simple, upon subscribing to this culture one forfeits any state recognition of individual cultural 
or religious heritage and receives no safeguards against discrimination. In general, the 
legalj political aspect of integration has a large impact on an immigrant's ability to partake in 
society as the stepping stone to gaining legal and political rights. However, this one-way form 
of integration focuses solely on the burden on the immigrant and has little effect on the host 
culture. Such legalj political inclusions are a necessity but not sufficient for full integration. 
While legalj political integration is necessary for access to legal rights and the political 
system, it is through cultural and structural integration that two-way integration takes place 
and migrants are able to fully acculturate with the host society. Cultural integration refers to 
the cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal changes experienced as migrants acquire the core 
competencies of the host culture and society. It places the individual's personal identification 
within the social system and determines whether they continue to identify with their national 
culture or, rather, see themselves as a part of the host society.19 This does not necessarily mean 
that immigrants must completely forego the culture and ideologies of their respective countries 
of origin; cultural integration promotes an interactive, mutual process in which the host society 
also experiences change as it adapts and learns to relate to the newcomers. Typically, cultural 
integration includes knowledge of the host country language and cultural standards; it involves 
adapting to a new way of life and social participation in the host culture. Such adaptation 
associates higher rates of immigrants in social networks of the host society, including but not 
limited to friendships, partnerships, marriages, and membership in voluntary organizations.2o 
Structural integration is closely linked to cultural integration but includes migrants' 
participation in the " core" institutions of the host culture. Bosswick and Heckmann title this 
'placement' and define it as the process of an individual gaining a position in society, which 
enables them to partake in socioeconomic institutions and gain cultural, social, and economic 
capital,21 It includes the attainment of access to position and status within the economy and 
labor market, the educational institutions, the housing system, etc. Bosswick and Heckmann 
argue that structural integration is the most essential aspect of integration, for it enables 
migrants to partake in socioeconomic institutions and gain capital, which, he believes, leads to 
cultural integration over time. 
While these different forms of integration have been discussed separately, it is important 
to note that they are extremely interconnected.22 Heckmann argues that structural integration 
18 "Migration Citizenship Education - Germany." 
1 9  Bosswick and Heckmann 2006. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Entzinger 2003, 30-31. 
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has the greatest effect because it introduces immigrants to the society and the host culture 
through co-workers, classmates, neighbors, etc. Furthermore, failing to integrate migrants into 
the institutions of a nation can severely impair their ability to culturally integrate because they 
have no way of gaining capital and prominence within society. However, the same can be said 
for the effect of cultural integration. Becoming acculturated in society and understanding the 
basic social skills relevant to the host culture can positively impact migrants' abilities to succeed 
in the labor market. Because integration is such a cyclical concept, it is imperative that policies 
address both the structural and cultural aspects of integration as key to a better acculturated 
society. 
IMPACT OF EDUCATION 
One strategy for integrating ethnic migrants begins with the reform of procedures, 
practices, and policies that address the foundational systems through which integration takes 
place. A key example of this is the education system. The education system serves as a major 
vehicle for integration because of its direct impact upon both structural and cultural integration. 
The beauty of education is that it targets youth while they are still at impressionable ages and 
has the ability to help set the foundation for their future success. However, education can also 
be indirectly discriminatory or exclusionary if it fails to narrow the gap between the 
achievements of migrants and host nationals. 
Within the European Union, it is widely recognized that education serves as an excellent 
medium through which a state can increase equal opportunities and foster the recognition of 
diversity. It is because of this that the education sector is the main field of targeted integration 
policies among European Union member states. Even those states averse to minority-specific 
anti-discrimination and equal-opportunity policies have adopted education measures to aid in 
the integration battle.23 
In terms of cultural integration, entrance into the school system usually marks 
immigrants' earliest and most intensive contact with the host society, and education has been 
found to play an important role in shaping immigrants' cultural identities and relations with 
host nationals. Policymakers suggest that education can bridge cultural gaps in times of high 
social tension and negativity towards migrants. The exposure of both migrant youth to the host 
culture and the host culture to the migrant youth encourages the recognition of diversity.24 
Education serves as a form of two-way integration where migrant students are exposed to the 
culture of the host society and adapt to social mores, while, simultaneously, students of the host 
culture are exposed to ethnic diversity and can expand social understanding. Furthermore, 
participation in education encourages social contacts and relationships across cultural and 
ethnic boundaries. According to the European Commission and Organization for Economic Co­
Operation and Development (OECD), it is through social contacts and the climate created by the 
23 OEeD, 3. 
24 Ibid., 8. 
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possibility of such contacts that people develop a sense of belonging in a particular social 
space.25 
Structurally, education encompasses the fundamental building blocks of opportunity 
that allow individuals to get ahead in society. Upon leaving the school system, students are 
supplied with the necessary know-how and intellectual skills needed to partake in 
socioeconomic institutions and to gain a position in the labor market.26 The level to which 
students are able to integrate within the school system determines the opportunities and 
resources available to them later on in life. One of the most recognized aspects of education's 
structural effect on integration focuses on migrants' perceived lack of skills, particularly 
language. It is through the acquisition and full competency of language that migrants are able 
to gain comparable social and economic capital within the host society. Without such skills, 
migrants compete at an inherently unequal level with host-country nationals and are often left 
much more vulnerable to social exclusion and further disintegration. It is not uncommon for 
migrant youth to be raised speaking a language that is foreign to the host society. In such 
circumstances many students actually begin learning integral language skills only upon 
entering the school system. 
The realm of education encompasses multiple facets that may influence success levels 
for migrants both within school and later on in the labor market and which may therefore have 
an impact on cultural and structural integration. These include systematic structure, 
curriculum, level of segregation, special programming, bilingual opportunities, and allocation 
of funds. 
INDICATORS 
Education 
While multiple aspects of education are relevant to migrant achievement, this study 
focuses on the technical and social benefits of education through a specific focus on educational 
structure, comprised of the age requirements and specific tracking of education. Educational 
structures vary across countries, especially in the extent to which they constrain and maximize 
choice and in how easy they are to navigateP Variations in structure may shape the pathways 
that migrant children take into the labor market, higher education, and their lives as citizens. 
According to The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) surveys, which 
address issues of structural integration by comparing education and labor market positions, 
there is a direct relationship between educational structure and attained levels of education of 
migrants (in this specific case they look at second generation migrants).28 These surveys 
demonstrate the impact of compulsory educational structure on second generation migrants' 
ability to adapt and keep up with host-country nationals in terms of educational competencies. 
25 0ECD, 6. 
26 Entzinger 2003, 33. 
27 Holdaway, Crul, and Roberts 2009. 
28 Crul and Schneider 2009. 
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For this project, the first indicator of educational structure is starting age. The starting 
age of migrant children can have a large effect on their capacity for integration because the 
beginning of formal education often times marks the beginning of many students' full exposure 
to the host culture. This means that students who enter formal education earlier are more likely 
to be exposed to social culture and language education during a critical period of emotional and 
cognitive development.29 Furthermore, it is not unusual for migrant students to be raised where 
the home language is other than that of the host culture. Therefore, their exposure to this 
language does not begin until the beginning of formal education.3D 
In this study, only the starting age for compulsory education is included because it is 
completely inclusive of the migrant society. While pre-primary education, often termed 
kindergarten, has been shown to have positive effects on the educational attainments of 
migrants, there is a significantly smaller proportion of the migrant population attending pre­
primary education in comparison to children of the host society. Including those ages in the 
measurement may exclude a large portion of the migrant population. 
The second indicator of educational structure is the length of time between starting age 
and the age of first selection track. This indicator shows the greatest amount of variance. For 
example, in Germany the selection of first track begins at age ten when students are placed in 
three rather strictly separate school levels (Hautschule, Realschule, and Gymnasim). Coupled 
with the later starting age, migrant students in Germany thus have comparatively little time to 
pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position. This early selection often leaves 
more migrants students in the lower qualifying streams, especially Hauptschule, which is the 
lowest track of secondary schooling.31 This is relevant for the exposure to the majority language 
and a mixed social environment, but also for the chances of acquiring the necessary skills and 
level of schooling for being tracked into higher qualifying strands of education. The longer a 
child of immigrants has had the chance to be in education before a decision is made about the 
most suitable track, the higher are her/his chances to access pre-academic paths.32 The problem 
is that being tracked in lower qualifying school types frequently limits the choices for 
professional careers afterwards. 
Integration 
The dependent variable in this study is the level of socio-cultural integration of the 
migrant population. This pertains to the level at which migrants are integrated into the host 
society, in terms of proficiency and use of the host-country language, mutual stereotypical 
attitudes, and interethnic social contacts. It is recognized that integration outcomes are affected 
by the interplay of a range of factors and that comprehensive measurement of this would 
include language proficiency, amount of societal organizations migrants were regularly 
involved in, mutual stereotypical attitudes, and the relationships they formed with members of 
29 Eurydice, 130. 
30 Eurydice, 11. 
31 TIES, 6. 
32 TIES, 10. 
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the host society. Unfortunately, due to resource constraints, the amount of involvement in 
social organizations and interethnic relationships are not available for this study. However, 
measures of discrimination and ethnic tension are readily available. The indicators that will be 
used to measure the dependent variable are the feelings of discrimination based on ethnic 
origin and the extent to which there exists discrimination in each host country, as measured in 
the Eurobarometer 71.2 (2009), and the amount of tension felt between people of different races 
and ethnic groups, as measured in the Eurobarometer 72.1 (2009). 
Specifically, the questions being analyzed are: 
Eurobarometer 72.1: 
QA15_1: In all countries there sometimes exists tension between social groups. In your opinion, how 
much tension is there between each of the following groups in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
Different racial and ethnic groups: 
(1) A lot of tension 
(2) Some tension 
(3) No tension 
(4) DK 
Eurobarometer 71.2: 
QEL1: For each of the following types of discrimination, could you please tell me whether, in your 
opinion, it is very widespread, fairly widespread, fairly rare, or very rare in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
On the basis of ethnic origin: 
(1) Very widespread 
(2) Fairly widespread 
(3) Fairly rare 
(4) Very rare 
(5) Nonexistent 
QE3_1: In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed on the basis of 
one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply. 
Ethnic origin mentioned 
(0) Not mentioned 
(1) Mentioned 
QE4_1: In the past 12 months have you witnessed someone being discriminated against or harassed on 
the basis of one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply. 
Ethnic origin mentioned 
(0) Not Mentioned 
(1) Mentioned 
QE16_1: Do you have friends or acquaintances who are of an ethnic origin different than yours? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't Know 
RES PUBLICA 
DESIGN AND STRATEGY 
My formal hypotheses for this research are as follows: 
H 1 :  Nations in which compulsory education begins at an earlier age will have higher rates of socio­
cultural integration. 
89 
H2: Nations in which compulsory education allows for more time between the starting age and the age of 
first specific track selection will have higher rates of socia-cultural integration. 
The methods used to test these hypotheses are based on a quasi-experimental design 
that focuses on population surveys from seven countries: Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Austria, 
the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom. This case selection allows for a variety of 
dissimilar educational structures. Scandinavian countries, on the one hand, have a single 
structure for all students until age sixteen and generally have automatic progression of students 
through the years. On the other hand, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands have 
differentiation in students' routes through school beginning at age twelve or earlier. 
Comparatively, this study includes France because of its intensive use of options and 
channeling within the general structure and the United Kingdom for its coexistence of several 
parallel structures. 
The unit of analysis is the individual respondent from these selected countries and the 
revised survey sample size contains an N of 7,248 total respondents. Findings first analyze the 
effect of educational structure measures on individual discrimination and social tension 
responses through cross-tabular descriptive statistics accompanied by Pearson's Chi Square 
levels of significance and the Gamma measure of association. Then, to control for country, 
crosstab analyses will be run and measured with Pearson's Chi Square and Gamma measures as 
well. Finally, the study will examine the foreign popUlation proportion, GDP per capita, and 
unemployment rates within each country to examine their separate effects on integration. 
The dependent variables as taken from the Eurobarometer surveys have been re-coded on a 0-1 
scale with 0 representing the highest level of discrimination or social tension within each 
question and 1 being the lowest level of discrimination or social tension within each question. 
This means that higher responses (those closer to 1) represent higher levels of integration and 
vice versa. Furthermore, an index has been created to represent the summation of all 
dependent variables regarding measures of discrimination. This will measure the cumulative 
effects in order to demonstrate the feelings of discrimination and tension across the board. The 
scale ranges from 0 to 1 in .25 unit increments where 1 again represents the lowest level of 
discrimination/highest level of integration and vice versa. 
One recognized potential problem within this design is the fact that the population 
being measured for the dependent variable may not have necessarily gone through the national 
school system in which they reside. Therefore, there is the potential that the sample will not be 
representative of the population parameter. 
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The independent variable measures are outlined as follows: 
Table 1: Independent Variable Measures by Country 
Start Track Duration % Foreign GDP Percent 
Age Age Population Per capita Unemployment 
Denmark 7 16 9 5.8% 36,000 4.3% 
Sweden 7 16 9 5.9% 36,600 8.3% 
Germany 6 10 4 8.8% 34,100 7.5% 
Austria 6 10 4 10.3% 39,200 4.8% 
The Netherlands 5 12 7 3.9% 39,500 4.9% 
France 6 11 5 5.8% 32,600 9.1 % 
United Kingdom 5 16 11 6.6% 34,800 7.6% 
The general spread of the dependent variables is as follows: 
Table 2: Model Dependent Variable General Statistics 
N Mean Standard Deviation 
Discrimination Spread 28504 0.6441 0.25001 
Personal Discrimination 29768 0.9736 0.16044 
Other Discrimination 29768 0.8951 0.30640 
Friends of Ethnic Origin 29458 0.5700 0.49509 
Social Tension 25659 0.6481 0.32850 
Index measures 
Discrimination spread overall is concentrated in the middle-high range with 70.1 % of 
respondents claiming it to be fairly widespread (26.9%) or very widespread (43.2%). Personal 
discrimination was only mentioned by 2.6% of the respondents. However, the proportion of 
respondents reporting witnessing discrimination of others was much higher at 10.�% of 
respondents. Meanwhile, 43.0% of respondents reported having friends of a different ethnic 
origin. 
The index measure, which ranged from 0 to 4 in .25 increments, had a mean of 3.09 and a 
standard deviation of .606. The distribution shows two major spikes around 2.75 and 3.75. To 
achieve a 2.75 score, respondent's responses would include a I/fairly widespread" measure of 
discrimination along with the recognition of 2 of the 3 other discrimination variables (personal 
discrimination, other discrimination, or reporting no friends of a different ethnic origin) . To 
achieve a score of 3.75, respondent's responses would include a "fairly widespread" measure of 
discrimination along with the recognition of all 3 other discrimination variables. This shows 
that, in general, much of the sample reports relatively high levels of discrimination. 
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CONCEPTUAL FINDINGS 
Table 3: Bivariate Correlations for Migrant Integration (All Countries) 
Independent Variable: Starting Age in Country's Educational System 
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Discrimination spread 155.915 8 .000 
Personal Discrimination 7.684 2 (at the .05 level) 
Other Discrimination 5.8 2 Not significant 
Friends of Ethnic Origin 6.385 2 0.041 
Social Tension 77.932 4 .000 
Table 4: Bivariate Correlations for Migrant Integration 
Independen(Variable: Duration (in years) Between Starting Age and Track Age 
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Discrimination spread 228.391 16 .000 
Personal Discrimination 25.980 4 .000 
Other Discrimination 40.293 4 .000 
Friends of Ethnic Origin 106.451 4 .000 
Social Tension 162.218 8 .000 
Hypothesis 1 
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Gamma 
-0.111 
0.127 
0.019 
0.015 
.045 
Gamma 
0.179 
0.192 
-0.018 
.107 
.076 
The cross-tabulations examining the relationship between the starting age of 
compulsory education and the dependent variables are significant at the 0.05 level, with the 
exception of those measured against the witnessed discrimination of others. The results 
demonstrate a positive correlation between starting age and levels of social tension with the 
highest peaks at ages five and seven. This finding supports the research hypothesis. However, 
the results demonstrate that there is actually a negative correlation between starting age and 
levels of discrimination; as the starting age increases, the level of discrimination decreases. This 
means that as the age at which students begin compulsory schooling increases, levels of 
integration also increase. These findings do not support the research hypothesis. 
Furthermore, for all cross-tabulations, the Gamma measure of association is quite low, 
ranging from -0.111 to 0.127. Therefore, while the correlation between starting age and the 
dependent variables is significant, the change in starting age only accounts for a very small, if 
any, proportion of the change in the dependent variables. 
Hypothesis 2 
The cross-tabulations examining the relationship between the duration of time between 
the starting age and first track age of compulsory education are significant at the .001 level. The 
results demonstrate a negative correlation between duration and levels of discrimination; as 
duration increased, the level of discrimination decreased. This means that as duration 
increases, levels of integration also increase. This finding supports the research hypothesis. 
However, the results also demonstrate a positive correlation between duration and the levels of 
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social tension; as duration increased the level of social tension increased. This means that as 
duration increases the levels of integration decrease. This finding does not support the research 
hypothesis. 
However, for all cross-tabulations, the Gamma measure of association is again very low, 
ranging from -0.018 to to 0.192. These results demonstrate that the change in the amount of time 
between starting compulsory education and the age of first track selection only accounts for a 
very small, if any, proportion of the change in the dependent variables. 
Ethnic Minority Control 
In preparation for the country control, the responses of those identifying as an ethnic 
minority in comparison to those not claiming ethnic minority status were examined. 
Respondents identifying as an ethnic minority show significantly different results than those 
not claiming ethnic minority status. The discrimination indicator's spread remains consistent 
on all levels. However, there is a much higher percentage responding liVery Widespread" 
among respondents identifying as an ethnic minority than those not claiming ethnic minority 
status. Meanwhile, the personal discrimination measures, other discrimination measures, and 
those reporting friends of different ethnic origin varied greatly with those claiming ethnic 
minority status showed higher rates of discrimination than those not claiming ethnic minority 
status. Within personal discrimination, 23.1 % mentioned being personally discriminated 
against compared to the 1.7% of non-ethnic respondents. Within other discrimination, 29.7% of 
ethnic minorities responded that they had witnessed somebody else being discriminated 
against due to ethnic origin compared to the 9.6% of non-ethnic respondents. Finally, 81 .9% of 
respondents identifying as an ethnic minority reported having friends of a different ethnic 
origin while only 55.8% of non-ethnic respondents reported having friends of a different ethnic 
origin. 
Country Comparisons 
In an attempt to control for the effect of individual countries upon the dependent 
variable, a linear regression was run with the United Kingdom as a dummy variable. However, 
the results could not be properly calculated because of the multicollinearity of the independent 
variables. To further investigate the effect of educational structures within each country, several 
cross-tabulations were run. The results were not significant, but may still be of interest. 
To compare the variables controlling for country, the countries with the same starting 
ages for compulsory education and the countries with the same duration of schooling before the 
first tracking were matched up and compared. If countries with the same dependent variables 
differ greatly, it is more likely that other country-specific variables are throwing off the data. If 
they are similar, it may mean one of two things. The hypothesis would appear stronger because 
a) there would be a continuation of effects across country borders, or b) countries with similar 
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educational structures may also be quite similar in other structural and policy-oriented ways, 
and the measures could be a result of these common variables.33 
To compare within starting age, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are paired 
up, both starting schooling at age five; Germany, Austria, and France are paired up, all starting 
school at age six, and Denmark and Sweden are paired up, both starting schooling at age seven. 
I 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have very similar responses for the discrimination 
spread, personal discrimination, and other discrimination. Meanwhile, friends of ethnic origin 
varied with 16.9% more respondents claiming friends of a different ethnic origin in the United 
Kingdom than in the Netherlands. However, this could be a result of higher levels of ethnic 
minority responses within the United Kingdom. For social tension, the United Kingdom 
reported much lower levels than the Netherlands. 
Germany, Austria, and France showed varying results. For discrimination spread, 
Germany and Austria demonstrated similar findings, with Austria reporting a higher spread of 
discrimination. However, France reported a much higher spread of discrimination than both 
Austria and Germany. The responses for personal discrimination and other discrimination 
were relatively comparable for all three countries. The number of respondents reporting having 
a friend of different ethnic origin was much lower in France. Social tension variables for Austria 
and France were very similar but Germany reported much less social tension. 
Finally, Denmark and Sweden reported very similar results for all measures except for 
the perception of other discrimination. Here, Denmark reported much higher numbers of 
respondents witnessing discrimination of others at 20.2% compared to the 6.2% of Sweden. 
To compare within duration, Austria and Germany are paired up, both with four years of 
duration between starting compulsory education and the age of first track. Denmark and 
Sweden are paired up, both with nine years of duration between starting compulsory education 
and the age of first track. 
Austria and Germany reported similar findings across all measures. Within 
discrimination spread, Austria reported with slightly higher discrimination measures, but the 
difference was mild. Affirmative responses for personal discrimination, other discrimination, 
and having friends of a different ethnic origin were also very closely matched. The most 
variation occurred within the social tension variable. Here, Austria reported more social 
tension with 47.7% of respondents reporting " A Lot of Tension" compared to the 36.9% within 
Germany, 46.8 % reporting "Some Tension" compared to the 54.9% within Germany, and only 
5.5% reporting "No Tension" compared to the 8.3% within Germany. This difference may be 
influenced by the fact that Austria had more respondents of ethnic minority than Germany. 
Denmark and Sweden were again compared for duration and therefore demonstrate the same 
results as stated before when compared for starting age. 
33 For percentage spreads of different dependent variables, see Tables 5-7 in the appendix. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, while the effects on integration of both the starting age of compulsory education 
and the duration between this age and the age of first track selection were significant, they were 
not of sufficient magnitude for the hypotheses to be supported. The effect of the independent 
variables on integration accounts for very little of the change in the dependent variable. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there are other factors that have a greater effect on 
integration than educational structure. 
In an attempt to account for such other factors, a multiple regression was run to examine 
the effects of the percent foreign population, GDP per capita, and unemployment rates. Again, 
there was a high level of significance, but with a very low Pearson's R-squared measure of 
association. It appears that the data may be picking up nuances because of the large number of 
cases being utilized. With such a large number, any variation in the data will impact the results, 
even if the independent variable is only accounting for a very small proportion of the 
dependent, as seen with the Gamma measures of association. Even upon controlling for 
country, foreign population percentage, GDP per capita, and unemployment rates, the data 
shows very little variation. Therefore, it is possible that the measurement for integration is 
incomplete or inaccurate. It could also be the case that the sample is not representative because 
it includes those who may have not gone through the education system of the country in which 
they reside. The most likely error is that of internal validity. The measures of socio-cultural 
integration do not appear to be accurately evaluating the theoretical concept. 
Upon examining the results of the first hypothesis, the direction of the relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables must be addressed. In order to support the 
research hypothesis, the effect of starting age on discrimination and social tension should show 
a positive relationship. While this was the case for the effect of starting age on social tension, 
the effect of starting age on discrimination demonstrates a negative relationship overall. 
Upon examining the results of the second hypothesis, again the direction of the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables must be addressed. In order to 
support the research hypothesis, the effect of duration of compulsory education on 
discrimination and social tension should show a negative relationship. While this is the case for 
the effect of duration of compulsory education on discrimination, the effect of duration of 
compulsory education on social tension demonstrates a positive relationship overalL 
While the discrimination and social tension indicators were meant to cumulatively 
measure the level of two-way integration, it appears that they may be measuring two different 
things. After examining the results of the first hypothesis, several potential explanations for this 
peculiarity surfaced. Upon further inspection, it seemed as though the measures of 
discrimination may address the manifest discriminatory acts which occur in society, while 
social tension addresses the more passive feelings of insecurity among those of different ethnic 
backgrounds.  In general, acts of discrimination have a high occurrence within structural and 
institutional aspects of society. It may be the case that starting school at an earlier age allows for 
more potential for discrimination to occur or for the perception of discrimination to occur. If a 
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student has more time in school exposed to the hierarchy of the host culture, they may feel more 
discrimination than if they were still at home. Furthermore, migrant parents with children in 
school are going to be more conscious of discriminatory acts that their child may undergo 
within the institution, which may further hamper the results. Social tension, on the other hand, 
may still decrease for the reasons hypothesized. While early entrance does allow more potential 
for acts of discrimination, the overall exposure to the student population may still reduce social 
tensions through the forming of friendship� and relationships and the general cultural exposure 
of the host culture to the migrant culture and vice versa. 
Unfortunately, the results of this research do not support the second hypothesis, thereby 
negating expected conclusions. In fact, they are completely reversed. The main explanation for 
this phenomenon simply points out the potential insufficiency of the dependent variable. As 
previously mentioned, there is a multiplicity of influences on integration. Perhaps the inclusion 
of a greater number or greater variety of these influences would hold more significant and 
similar results. When controlling for the country variables, there appeared no real pattern in the 
results. Apart from the differentiation explained by the number of respondents claiming ethnic 
minority status, most of the results were not cohesive. Furthermore, some of the results, such as 
the very low discrimination and social tension scores of Germany, appeared out of place 
considering the high political and media attention that such issues have received in recent 
years. This again may allude to the measurement problems of the dependent variable.  
Overall, the inconsistencies within the data create real challenges. While the project 
demonstrated some provocative results, they are extremely difficult to interpret because they 
fail to paint a clear picture. One aspect of this is simply the limitation of the methodology. Due 
to time constraints and the impracticality of extended cross-tabular analyses, few opportunities 
to test various controls existed. A suggestion for future research would include indicators for 
both the independent and dependent variables with more variance. This would eliminate the 
problem of multicollinearity, allowing the researcher to run logistic regressions. These 
improvements in methodology would expand the scope of the data and provide for clearer 
interpretation. Furthermore, as previously suggested, further research should include a greater 
variety of indicators to measure socio-cultural integration. Future research may be able to build 
upon the foundation laid by this project, in order to further our understanding of the link 
between European integration and education. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 5: Discrimination Spread (by percent) for Model as Controlled by Country 
Level of Discrimination Denmark Sweden France Austria Germany Netherlands UK 
Non-existent 0.4 0 0.2 3.1 1.8 1.4 1.1 
Very Rare 3.4 1.7 1.3 6.6 9.2 5.4 5.8 
Fairly Rare 19.7 19.2 15.9 24.2 34.2 20.9 31.2 
Fairly Widespread 51.3 60.4 55.8 50.2 44.3 54.9 45.0 
Very Widespread 25.1 18.7 26.8 15.8 10.5 17.5 16.9 
Table 6: Dichotomous Variables: Affirmative Responses for Experiences of Discrimination (in percent) 
Denmark Sweden France Austria Germany Netherlands UK 
Personal 2.4 1.2 2.1 5 2 4.1 3.9 
Other 20.2 6.2 17.7 15.3 13.6 9.8 10.6 
Have Friends of 41.1 42.0 34.1 43.8 45.0 48.6 31.7 Different Ethnicities 
Table 7: Respondents' Perceived Level of Social Tension (in percent) 
Denmark Sweden France Austria Germany Netherlands UK 
None 2.7 2.0 4.9 5.5 8.3 1.9 4.8 
Some 40.5 50.6 43.0 46.8 54.9 42.0 54.1 
A Lot 56.8 47.4 52.1 47.7 36.9 56.0 41 .2 
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PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY: POWER-SHARING IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
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Abstract: Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the 
world. Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher 
levels of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly 
divided societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive 
type, and level of decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for 
each of the 48 Sub-Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of 
democracy and state stability to determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy 
and stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and 
significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy 
and state stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sub-Saharan region of Africa is arguably one of the most divided and conflict-prone 
regions in the world. The region is home to more than a thousand languages, and in the past 
twenty years most Sub-Saharan countries have experienced violence ranging from ethnic 
rebellions to genocide.! The chronic instability and deep cleavages of the states in this region 
present comparative political scientists and institution crafters with a unique challenge: how to 
implement a democratic system that is truly representative and stable. This challenge is 
heightened by the question of how to set up a system that is not susceptible to failure and gives 
all parties involved an incentive to see it succeed. Power-sharing, it is theorized, can provide 
solutions to both of these problems. The ability for power-sharing institutions to include all 
major parties in the decision-making process would appear to make them ideal candidates for 
alleviating the tensions that exist between competing groups in Sub-Saharan states. For the 
aforementioned reasons, power-sharing institutions are considered especially relevant not just 
to the divided societies of Africa, but those across the globe. 
Sub-Saharan Africa provides a hard test for determining how effective power-sharing 
institutions can be in states that are often extremely divided and have experienced violence 
relatively recently. Disputed elections have produced violence, and tension between ethnic 
groups has often resulted in conflict, exemplified most shockingly by Rwanda. The resurgence 
of violence is often a concern to both policy makers within these states and the international 
community, as violence in one state can destabilize the surrounding region. Successful power­
sharing is theorized to prevent the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to 
the table. Evidence of this can be found in Burundi, where in 2009 the last rebel group, the 
National Liberation Forces, laid down their arms and were recognized as a legal political party.2 
1 Oppong 2006; Global Report 2009. 
2 Freedom House 2010: Burundi. 
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Such instances seem to provide evidence that power-sharing can promote peace and 
successfully integrate opposing groups into the political process. However, power-sharing is 
not without its critics. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may only serve to 
institutionalize differences and exacerbate existing tensions. Granting groups considerable 
levels of autonomy may only serve to weaken the state, as it can potentially lead to secession as 
in the case of Southern Sudan. Because of the controversial nature of power-sharing institutions, 
both its proponents and critics must be considered. 
This study will approach the topic of power-sharing first by taking a step back to 
consider the arguments and evidence of supporters and detractors of power-sharing 
institutions. The purpose of this study is not to consider why states adopt power-sharing 
institutions. Instead, it is to examine whether those Sub-Saharan states that have adopted 
institutions allowing for higher levels of power-sharing have experienced higher levels of 
democracy and stability. This study seeks to answer that question by comparing the 
institutional levels of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan states to their measured levels of 
democracy and stability. While power-sharing institutions are often cited as solutions for 
mitigating conflict and consolidating democracy in cleaved states, surprisingly enough, their 
influence as yet has not been tested in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST POWER-SHARING 
The importance of determining whether or not power-sharing institutions improve 
democracy and reduce conflict cannot be overstated. Establishing systematic evidence to 
evaluate the impact of power-sharing institutions is both theoretically and politically important 
for determining if these arrangements promote long-term peace, manage conflict, and 
consolidate democracy in ethnically divided societies. There exists an extensive literature 
dedicated to these very issues, which has been developed over the past several decades. This 
paper draws substantially from the seminal work by Pippa Norris in 2008 in which the theories 
of power-sharing are tested in a large number of cases across the globe. These power-sharing 
regimes are characterized by formal institutional rules that give multiple political elites a stake 
in the decision making process.3 Power-sharing constitutions share common characteristics that 
include the following: executive power-sharing among a grand coalition of political leaders 
drawn from all significant groups, proportional representation of major groups in elected and 
appointed offices, and cultural autonomy for groups. 
It is argued that in post-conflict or ethnically cleaved states the only viable types of 
settlements capable of attracting agreement from all factions are power-sharing regimes that 
avoid winner-takes-all electoral outcomes. The more inclusive these power-sharing 
arrangements are the more likely they will develop stronger support from stakeholders and 
therefore ensure stability. While other methods of resolving conflict in ethnically divided 
societies have been attempted in the past, such as partition, these are often costly and end in 
3 Norris 2008, 22. 
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failure.4 Street indicates that power-sharing addresses the key issues that have caused ethnic 
tension and hostility, and thus is ideal as a remedy to such problems. Institutions that allow for 
the horizontal and vertical dispersal of power are most relevant to heterogeneous societies that 
have a history of conflict and are in the process of democratizing. In Africa there is a tendency 
for elites to concentrate power at the center and use repressive means as a way of asserting 
controLS Avoiding such circumstances is necessary if there is to be any substantial consolidation 
of democracy. The use of power-sharing in these segmented societies guarantees all significant 
stakeholders a place in the national or regional governments and provides a strong incentive 
for politicians to accept the legitimacy of the rules of game, moderate their views, and 
collaborate with rivals. Norris suggests that power-sharing institutions also encourage support 
for democracy by avoiding winner-take-all elections and guaranteeing minorities a voice in the 
government. With assurances that they will not be excluded from government, minorities are 
also less likely to take actions that might undermine the stability of the state. 
While power-sharing institutions are often cited as being the best option for highly 
divided societies, there are still those who challenge the claims that power-sharing institutions 
are best for promoting democracy and mitigating conflict. Power-sharing regimes may in fact 
serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages and deepen rather than alleviate them. Explicitly 
recognizing the rights of ethnic groups can make it more difficult to generate cross-cutting 
cooperation in society by reducing electoral incentive for compromise. The formal recognition 
of ethnic or linguistic groups may magnify the political importance of these identities. Solutions 
to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic factions as fixed and grant each group rights and 
autonomy may in fact reinforce sub-national identities. By de-emphasizing such identities it 
may be possible to turn citizens towards a concept of society that is more inclusive and tolerant 
of other groupS.6 
In addition to reinforcing societal divisions, Spears argues that power-sharing 
institutions lead to a surprisingly unstable form of government that at best only provides a 
short reprieve from violent conflicU Power-sharing arrangements are difficult to achieve and 
even more difficult to put into practice, and do not stand the test of time or resolve conflict. At 
the same time power-sharing regimes in post-conflict societies have an extremely difficult task 
ahead of them; they must bridge the cleavages of groups in conflict.s Power-sharing is not about 
forming a grand coalition of friends, but reconciling groups that are enemies. Including warring 
parties and excluding moderates can have negative consequences for divided societies using 
power-sharing.9 Using Rwanda as an example, Spears suggests that it is as difficult to forge an 
alliance with a member of the opposition as it is to form an alliance with someone who is 
4 Street 2004. 
5 Bratton and Rothchild 1992. 
6 Norris 2008, 28. 
7 Spears 2002. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jarstad 2006. 
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considered a murderer. For many of these ethnically divided or post-conflict societies, power­
sharing can be equated to making a deal with the devil and is therefore unlikely to last. 
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: PR OR MAJORITARIAN? 
Of the factors considered in this study, the type of electoral system a state institutes is 
arguably the most important. Electoral system design is a crucial variable in democratic stability 
because it provides the means by which political parties or minorities are either included in or 
excluded from government. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems typically employ 
open or closed party lists or the use of a single transferable vote. In a study of several Sub­
Saharan states, Reynolds finds that those states using proportional representation were more 
successful and stable democracies.lo Lijphart (2004) notes that the type of electoral system is 
crucial because it is significantly related to the development of the party system, type of 
executive, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive.ll States using 
plurality methods are more likely to have a two-party system and a one party state with a more 
dominant executive. PR, on the other hand, is likely to be associated with a multi-party state, 
coalitions, and a more equal legislative-executive relationship. These characteristics define the 
consensus model of democracy that relies on separation, instead of concentration of power.12 
The former two characteristics are significant for the representation of a diverse number of 
groups in divided societies, while the later prevents an executive take over. Like Reynolds, 
Norris also finds that states making use of PR are more successful at democratic consolidation, 
as opposed to those using majority or plurality electoral rules.13 
However, proportional representation has several shortcomings, often cited by its critics. 
To begin with, the low voting thresholds that are characteristic in many proportional 
representation electoral systems give small minority group representatives little incentive to 
appeal to people outside their own ethnic group, while moderate political leaders may be 
branded as traitors for attempting to appeal to a wider base. Proportional representation also 
may serve to institutionalize and reinforce ethnic tensions in society by failing to provide 
political leaders with incentives for cross-group cooperation. As Lardeyret (1991) argues, PR 
systems are inherently more unstable since coalition governments cannot cope with serious 
disagreements. This leads to instability as the executive is left vacant and time is needed to 
construct a new coalition and government. These small minority parties tend to wield an undue 
amount of power as they are often the swing votes in coalitions.PR's tendency to allow even 
extremist parties into government is also problematic as they often are anti-state. Lardeyret's 
most important criticism is that PR is the worst system to adopt for ethnically divided states in 
Africa.14 Elections often degenerate into a competition between ethnic groups over public office 
10 Reynolds 2009. 11 Lijphart 2004. 
12 Lijphart 2006; 1999; Norris 2004. 
13 Norris 2008, 130. 
14 Lardeyret 1991. 
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and the best way to counteract this is to encourage members of each group to run against one 
another on trans-ethnic issues in single member districts. 
Majoritarian electoral systems, in contrast to PR, are characterized by the use of either a 
majority or plurality system. Majority systems usually employ a second ballot, while plurality 
systems typically use a first-past-the-post method and both types of systems also make use of 
single member districts (SMD). These majoritarian systems are thought to encourage bridging 
strategies and force political leaders to appeal to a wider base of voters. It is theorized that more 
moderate electoral appeals should therefore foster social tolerance and cooperation. Parties 
must combine the differing interests of as many voters as possible and offer their electors a 
coherent program that they will govern by. A moderation of parties also comes from this, as 
most of the votes parties receive are from undecided voters in the middle.15 As Barkan suggests, 
in agrarian societies - common in Sub-Saharan Africa - PR often does not produce electoral 
results that are much more inclusive than majoritarian systems with SMD.16 In addition, 
majoritarian systems make elected members directly responsible to constituent concerns and 
provide each district with a representative at the national level.17 Conversely, PR tends to 
weaken the links between voter and representative as each region has no definitive 
representative. This in turn reduces the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation.18 
Majoritarianism, like PR, has a number of shortcomings. Critics of majoritarian systems 
argue that winner-takes-all elections often fail to produce stability in post-conflict or divided 
societies19. According to Lijphart, in ethnically divided societies "majority rule spells majority 
dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy."2o Majoritarian regimes often fail to 
incorporate minorities into the government and encourage excluded groups to resort to 
alternative methods to express their demands. These can range from violent protests to civil 
war, and even state failure. Majoritarian systems are also capable of producing vagaries, such as 
the exclusion of substantially supported third parties and a parliamentary majority being won 
with fewer total votes than the opposition. Established democracies may be able to tolerate such 
representational anomalies, but these could prove catastrophic for fledgling African 
democracies.21 
PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENTS 
The concept of a parliamentary executive, or using the legislature as a source for the 
executive, lends itself well to power-sharing and is advantageous for a number of reasons. The 
prime minister and cabinet can only continue to hold power so long as they have the support of 
the majority of the legislature. There is then a stronger incentive for the executive and 
15 Lardeyret 1991. 
16 Barkan 1995. 
17 Norris 2004. 
18 Barkan 1998. 
19 Binningsbo 2006. 
20 Norris 2008, 25. 
21 Reynolds 1995; 1999. 
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legislature to collaborate, which increases inter-electoral flexibility and acts as a safeguard 
against unpopular prime ministers.22 Prime ministers also tend to lead more collegial cabinets, 
as opposed to the hierarchical cabinets found in presidential systems. This creates more 
collective accountability, as the ministers must present a united agenda. Overall, parliamentary 
executives offer more forms of accountability and come closest to exemplifying power-sharing. 
Opposed to a parliamentary system, the decision to use a presidential system poses 
several risks. To begin with, both the president and the legislature have a rival source of power, 
the people, which can make it difficult to resolve deadlocks and disputes.23 The fixed term 
lengths of a presidential system are less flexible, whereas an unpopular prime minister can be 
much more easily removed from power and replaced without destabilizing the entire 
government. Presidential executives can also be a slippery slope for fledgling democracies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which have led to authoritarianism in the past.24 Additionally, presidential 
systems are more unstable and thus more susceptible to regime collapse, while the winner­
takes-all outcomes of presidential elections simultaneously raise the stakes and make it less 
likely that the loser will accept the outcome. To add to this, the combination of the roles of both 
the head of state and head of government reduces the checks and balances on the executive.25 
Presidential systems also lack in representativeness and legitimacy, both of which are crucial to 
democracy. 
Presidential systems are often criticized and seldom defended. However, Shugart and 
Carey offer four areas in which presidential systems are superior to parliamentary systems. 
These areas are accountability, identifiability, mutual checks, and an arbiter.26 Presidential 
systems are superior when it comes to the principle of maximizing direct accountability 
between voters and elected officials. Presidents, being directly elected by voters, cannot be 
removed due to shifting coalitions or unpopularity in the assembly. Voters can also more easily 
identify who they are voting for in a presidential race. Under parliamentary systems, especially 
those using PR, voting on party lists might be the only way voters can influence the executive. 
The mutual checks created by presidential systems also ensure that the executive can check the 
legislature and vice versa. In parliamentary systems the executive is not in a position to resist or 
check assembly initiative.27 Finally, the distance between the president and the assembly means 
the president cannot threaten the legislature by declaring a measure before the assembly a vote 
of confidence. Instead, a president can act as an arbiter or moderator of disputes to secure 
legislative agreement. 
22 Norris 2008, 141. 
23 Ibid., 132. 
24 Shugart and Carey 1992. 
25 Lijphart 2008. 
26 Shugart and Carey 1992. 
27 Ibid. 
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FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION 
The choice of electoral system and executive type influences the horizontal checks and 
balances of power in the central institutions of the state. On the other hand, decentralization 
determines vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of the government. Political, fiscal, 
and administrative decentralization are arguably constitutional solutions to help mitigate 
conflict, consolidate peace, and protect minority communities.28 Decentralized governance has 
several advantages. First, it generates more democratic participation, representation, and 
accountability. Democratically elected local and regional bodies give voters more opportunities 
to participate in the democratic process increasing the accountability and responsiveness of 
local officials. Next, fiscal decentralization reduces corruption by increasing the transparency 
and accountability of elected officials. This point should be noted in regards to Sub-Sahara 
Africa, as many of the states in the region are some of the most corrupt in the world. Another 
advantage is the strengthening of public policy by allowing local governments to create and 
implement region specific policies. This is an important point for Sub-Saharan states, as the 
large size and diversity of the groups and regions within these states likely leads to issues 
pertinent to only a particular constituency. The flexibility of decentralization is also typically 
associated with better administrative efficiency in regards to public services and regulations, as 
these are molded to fit each community. The advantages of decentralization are of great 
relevance to highly divided societies, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they can 
assist in accommodating multiple interests. While there are many different ways to achieve 
decentralization, a study conducted by Nicholas Charron found that accomodationist forms of 
vertical power-sharing, such as ethno-federalism, outperform integrationist forms of vertical 
power-sharing in heterogeneous societies, in regards to quality of government.29 This suggests 
that accommodating interests, as theories of power-sharing argue, is more successful. 
It is worth noting that with regards to plural societies, common in Sub-Sahara Africa 
and defined as states that contain multiple groups identified by ethnicity, religion, language, 
and a multitude of other characteristics, federalism and decentralization are important 
strategies for protecting the interests of spatially concentrated groups, especially if the 
administrative boundaries reflect the distribution of these groups. As Norris and Lijphart 
indicate, if the boundaries of sub-national governments are based on real social boundaries, the 
plural communities within these boundaries can become homogeneous within their region and 
thereby reduce communal violence and accommodate a multitude of interests within a single 
state.3° Even in plural societies where ethnic groups are dispersed, decentralization can be used 
to facilitate the representation of local minorities. Locally elected officials and local decision 
making can assist in managing conflict by including leaders drawn from minorities and manage 
sensitive cultural or educational matters. Decentralization as a means of power-sharing allows 
the diverse groups within plural societies to protect their rights and defend their interests. 
28 Norris 2008, 157. 
29 Charron 2009. 
30 Norris 2008, 162; Lijphart 1999. 
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While the case for decentralization is strong, critics often charge that decentralized 
governance is overly complex and leads to slow response times. By adding another layer of 
government bureaucracy, decentralization may increase costs, decrease efficiency, and result in 
poor services.31 The proponents of centralized governance argue centralization enhances 
integration, leads to more decisive action, and is more cost effective. The claim that 
decentralization increases representation and accountability has also met criticism. With 
numerous levels of government it may be unclear as to who to appeal to, and the 
responsibilities of representatives at different levels may overlap. The existence of multiple 
levels of government can also lead to the rise in regional parties, which in turn may fragment 
the party system at the national level. Decentralized governance also increases the possibility of 
clientelistic relationships forming between politicians and private citizens. Under such 
circumstances corruption may actually expand, not contract. The persistent conflict in Nigeria 
and Sudan indicates that federalism has had a less than perfect record in Africa. There are 
critics, as Norris indicates, that argue when multiethnic communities are intermingled, 
territorial autonomy is ineffective at managing conflict.32 The creation of sub-national structures 
may break up the state, while increased demands for autonomy may lead to conflict and even 
secession. In decentralized states where boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines it may lead to 
the rise in ethnically based parties or encourage politicians to use the I ethnic card' as a means of 
attracting votes. This reinforces ethnic identities, generates competition and conflict among 
groups, and destabilizes democratic institutions.33 Institutional arrangements that facilitate 
territorial autonomy may also provide ethnic leaders with access to the media and legislature 
where they can promote an agenda of intolerance and discrimination. 
TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE? 
Substantial evidence exists for both supporting or decrying power-sharing. Since power­
sharing draws on both electoral and federal institutions as well as a system's executive 
structure, it is unlikely that there will soon be a consensus on the effects of power-sharing. 
Either power-sharing institutions do as theorized or they are flawed, but this question must not 
be understudied. Previous studies have either drawn on a broader sample or an altogether 
different part of the world. With supporters of power-sharing designating it a source of 
democracy and peace, the obvious place it needs to be tested is where democracy and peace are 
often absent: Sub-Saharan Africa. With the preceding literature in mind and the focus on Sub­
Saharan Africa, this leads to two hypotheses. 
31 Prudhomme 1995. 
32 Norris 2008, 164. 
33 Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999. 
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These two hypotheses suggest that power-sharing institutions do provide more democracy and 
stability, and this study attempts to either support or disprove them. 
Hl: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater levels of democracy. 
H2: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater state instability. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sub-Saharan African is a region where attempts at democratic rule have resulted in 
mixed success. The states within this region have implemented a variety of institutions, some 
with greater degrees of power-sharing than others. The wide variety of cases in Sub-Saharan 
Africa allows for the examination of levels of democracy and state stability from cases with 
relatively little or no power-sharing, to those states with relatively high levels of power-sharing. 
This study will use a most similar case design for the Sub-Saharan region. Using this design is 
intuitive because it will determine whether power-sharing can explain the increased presence of 
democracy and stability. Since the study is examining only Sub-Saharan Africa there are a 
number of variables that need to be controlled. These factors include low levels of development, 
recent transitions to democracy, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and former colonization. 
In order to study the effects of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will 
examine all 48 states that comprise this region, according to the State Department's Bureau of 
African Affairs.34 The institutions and measures of democracy and stability will only be 
examined as to where they stand as of 2010. While studying the changes in democracy and 
stability over a period of time would be insightful, this study does not attempt to accomplish 
this due to the relatively fluid and dynamic nature of political institutions in Africa. 
Determining a time frame in which a majority of the Sub-Saharan states' political institutions 
remained stable would be near impossible. To assess the relationship between the variables, a 
bivariate analysis will be used to determine correlation between three variables: Power-Sharing 
Index Score, Freedom House Score, and Failed States Index Score. 
The four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa - Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern­
will also be included as control variables. The regions are defined using the UN's definitions of 
regions with three exceptions. First, Sudan is considered part of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet under 
the UN's classification is part of Northern Africa. For this study Sudan is grouped with Eastern 
Africa because of its location and proximity to other East African states. The next two 
exceptions are Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Both of these states are defined as being part of 
Eastern Africa. However, upon further review and consultation these states were included as 
part of Southern Africa. This is due to their geographic location and because without these two 
cases Southern Africa would have been comprised of a mere five states. 
34 See appendix for full list of states and their scores. 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The independent variable in this study is institutional power-sharing. It is measured by the 
extent to which the formal institutions of a country allow for the inclusion of all major political 
actors in the decision making process. In determining the levels of institutional power-sharing, I 
will look at the three major institutions related to power-sharing: the electoral system, type of 
executive, and state decentralization. Decentralization in this study refers to political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization. These three institutions are the most critical to 
power-sharing and ensuring the consolidation of democracy. 
Those states that use PR, a parliamentary executive, and federalism have higher levels of 
power-sharing. States that utilize a majoritarian electoral system, presidential executive, and are 
highly centralized constitute systems, that according to the literature, allow for very little 
power-sharing. To quantify levels of power-sharing I have developed a 10 point index ranging 
from 0-9 that rates countries levels of power-sharing based on the aforementioned factors of 
electoral system type, executive type, and degree of decentralization. All three factors will be 
based on a 4-point scale, from 0-3, with higher scores indicating more power-sharing. 
For the electoral system the scale goes as follows: Proportional representation = 3pts; 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) = 2pts; SMD or Plurality = 1 pt; appointed legislature or 
non-existence of the national legislature = Opts. For the electoral system variable, only the type 
of electoral system used for the lower house is considered in this index. The use of PR is 
associated with higher levels of power-sharing due to the low barriers it presents to parties 
trying to gain representation in the legislature. Such low barriers allow a multitude of parties to 
attain seats in the national legislature. MMP is a compromise in that it is neither PR nor 
majoritarian, but represents a middle ground between the two. While not as inclusive as PR, it 
is a step above majoritarian systems in terms of power-sharing. The problem with MMP is that 
often the threshold for the PR part of the system is as high as 5% or more. This means that 
groups dispersed throughout the country may not be able to attain representation. Majoritarian 
systems using SMD are seen as the least conducive to power-sharing as it is often much more 
difficult for minor parties to gain representation. The United States and United Kingdom are 
commonly cited examples of how such systems often lead to either a two party state or a one 
party system. There are cases in which the national legislature is either wholly appointed or 
non-existent. As this runs contrary to the purpose of power-sharing, which is to promote 
democracy, such institutions are regarded as allowing no degree of power-sharing. 
The next institution considered is the executive branch, coded as follows: Parliamentary 
system= 3pts; Semi-Presidential= 2pts; Presidential= lpt; appointed executive or monarchy 
=Opts. A parliamentary executive is associated with higher levels of power-sharing because the 
executive is often drawn from a coalition of parties that make up the majority in the lower 
house. Parliamentary systems also allow for the changing of the executive in a much more 
stable manner without the need for another national election. Systems that divide executive 
power, typically between a president and prime minister, are referred to as semi-presidential. 
While such systems do allow for the election of a prime minister and president these two 
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officials typically come from the same party. Semi-presidentialism can also be dangerous if the 
prime minister and president are from different political parties as this can result in executive 
deadlock and competition for power. Established democracies like France might be able to 
survive these situations, but in less stable states this could be a catalyst for conflict. Presidential 
systems invest all executive power into a single person and in addition to being less 
representative, elections to this position can be seen as a zero-sum game in highly divided 
societies. This gives the losing parties less incentive to accept defeat, as recent elections in 
Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire have shown. The appointment of the executive, such as by an 
occupying force, or a monarchy like Swaziland represent an executive in which no power­
sharing can take place as the institution is utterly undemocratic. It should be noted that in this 
index those countries that have a president and prime minister are only considered semi­
presidential or parliamentary if the prime minister is chosen from the lower house or directly 
elected. If the president appoints the prime minister as part of his cabinet the system is 
considered presidential because the president is still effectively considered the head of state and 
head of government. 
The final factor, decentralization, can be broken down into three categories and goes as 
follows: Federations = 3pts; Decentralized Unions = 2pts; Unitary States = 1pt. 35 States with no 
central government or little to no control over territory =Opts. Federal institutions create another 
level of democratic representation in which minor or local parties can gain representation. This 
additional level of government also grants a degree of autonomy to these locales and allows 
them manage local affairs. Decentralized hybrids, similar to Tanzania, have devolved powers 
down to local levels of government and represent a step in the right direction in terms of 
power-sharing. However in these systems nearly all important decision making and real power 
still rests with the central government, especially in fiscal matters. A majority of Sub-Saharan 
states represent a highly centralized unitary structure. Under such systems, there is little, if any, 
devolution of power and nearly all decisions come from the central authority. If a state is failed, 
like Somalia, any form of devolution of powers is impossible. The state cannot even consider 
local or regional issues, let alone address them. With no place for representation from the local 
to national level, it is impossible for groups to share power.36 
Not all states will fit perfectly within these definitions. Even two states that are 
presidential republics may have nuanced differences that set them apart. Levels of 
centralization and electoral systems can be especially complicated. States are often simply 
identified as federal or unitary.37 For others though decentralization may be viewed as much 
more subtle process that involves incremental steps.38 The study of electoral systems usually 
involves identifying the rules of the system in place. For example, it is often important to 
distinguish between open and closed list PR. The inability of the index to include such detail is 
a limitation. However, nearly all state institutions can be classified under one of the three sub-
35 Norris 2008, 173. 
36 See Appendix for Power-sharing Index (PSI) Table. 
3? Lijphart 1999. 
38 Norris 2008, 170. 
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categories. The index considers the most relevant institutions and system types, which allows it 
to accurately rank states based on their levels of institutional power-sharing. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The first dependent variable is democracy. Democracy will be measured using the 
composite score of a country on the Freedom House Liberal Democracy Index. Freedom House 
uses the Gastil Index, a 7-point scale for measuring political rights and civil liberties. While 
other measures of democracy were considered, Freedom House was the only one with scores 
for the year 2010. Changes in a states' ranking are also explained along with any relevant 
political changes that took place. The index also does not favor any particular type of 
democratic institution. In other words, by default it does not consider a parliamentary executive 
any more democratic than a presidential executive. 
Freedom House, an independent think tank based in the United States began assessing 
political trends in the 1950s. In 1972 it switched to the Gastil Index which assigns ratings of the 
political rights and civil liberties for each state and then categorizes them as free, partially free, 
or not free. The index tracks the existence of political rights by looking at the electoral processes, 
political pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties are measured in terms of 
the existence of freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights. The 
classifications are based on a checklist of questions, which includes ten separate items that relate 
to the existence of political rights and fifteen items concerning civil liberties. These items assess 
the institutional checks and balances of power on the executive by the legislature, an 
independent judiciary, and the existence of political rights and civil liberties. These also include 
self-determination and participation by minorities, and free and fair elections laws. Each item is 
given a score from 0-4 and all are equal when combined. The raw scores of a country are then 
converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. These two 
scores are then combined to determine the average rating of a state and whether it is free, partly 
free, or not free.39 
Although it provides scores for nearly all states and independent territories as well as 
being a long running time-series of observations, there are several flaws and biases. First the 
process used by Freedom House suffers from lack of transparency, so it is impossible to check 
the reliability and consistency of coding decisions. The items used to measure political rights 
and civil liberties also cover a wide range of issues, some of which might not necessarily be 
indicative of democracy. Since no breakdown of the composite scores is made available it is 
impossible to test which of the items correlate most with democracy. While it is biased in the 
sense that it measures only liberal democracy, it is widely used and trusted as providing an 
accurate representation of a states' level of democracy.4o 
The second dependent variable is state stability. To measure this I utilized the Failed 
States Index from ForeignPolicy.com and the Fund for Peace. The Failed State Index defines a 
39 Freedom House. 
40 Norris 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; See Appendix for Freedom House Scores. 
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state as failing when it loses physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force. The erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and 
inability interact with other states are also characteristics. The index includes 177 states and the 
Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology 
developed over the past decade. The CAST model employs a four step trend-line analysis, (1) 
consisting of rating twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the 
capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) 
identifying idiosyncratic variables or factors; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that 
shows the conflict history of the states being analyzed. The twelve indicators used are: 
Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven 
Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, 
Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.41 
The ranking a state receives is based on the total combined scores of these twelve 
indicators. Each indicator is measured on a scale from 0-10, with zero being the most stable and 
ten being the most unstable. These indicators are then combined to form a scale from 0-120 in 
which higher scores indicate more instability. The CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed 
over the past decade by independent scholars, educational, government, and private 
institutions (Fund for Peace). Since the ratings are meant to measure the vulnerability of a state 
they cannot predict when a state might collapse or experience violence. Although the trend lines 
that these scores produce may be used as a means of determining the future direction of a state. 
Unfortunately the raw data used in creating these rankings is not readily available due to it 
being drawn from millions of news articles and reports. However the index values are readily 
available to the public.42 
REGION 
Region is factored in due to the potential effects it may have on stability and democracy. 
As has happened before in Africa, a result of civil war is often human flight. A massive influx of 
refugees can place a great strain on the recipient country. The violence that drove these refugees 
might not only follow them, but their sudden presence in a foreign state has the possibility of 
inciting a xenophobic backlash among the native population. Another dangerous possibility is 
the chance rebel groups may use neighboring states as a launching point for attacks. Regional 
conflict has the potential to destabilize all surrounding states and maintaining stability is 
undoubtedly easier if neighboring states are not imploding due to civil war. Region is also 
important when considering democracy because of the idea of regional diffusion. In other 
words, democracy in one state has the potential to influence and spread to surrounding states. 
The ideas and institutions adopted by one state can impact those of another. If all states within a 
particular region had adopted democratic institutions, while states outside of this region had 
failed to do so, one could conclude that regional factors played a role in spreading democracy. 
41 Foreign Policy. 
42 See Appendix for Failed States Index Scores. 
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
As the data test the two competing bodies of literature on power-sharing institutions 
and the possible effects of region, there are several expected outcomes. If the data support the 
hypotheses that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing have higher levels 
of democracy and stability, then there should be a positive correlation between the Power­
Sharing Index Score (PSI) and Freedom House Score (FH). There should also be a negative 
relationship between the PSI Score and Failed States Index Score (FSI). If the data do not 
support the hypotheses, the opposite will be seen in the results. A third outcome in this case is 
possible. The results may support none of the stated hypotheses and there simply might not be 
a significant relationship in either direction. This would truly be disappointing as it would 
imply that no set of institutions is likely to be any more effective in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
If region does have any significant affect on democracy and stability we should see this 
in the form of significant positive correlations between the individual regions and FH Scores 
and FSI Scores. The absence of such significant correlations means we can rule out region as 
have any meaningful impact on a state's measured level of democracy or stability. However, the 
presence of any significant findings would indicate that there are regional factors that are 
influencing how stable and democratic a state is. The number of cases used in this study, 48, 
while relatively large for a comparative study, also means each individual case can have a 
larger effect on the overall results. While this small number may justify the use of a ninety 
percent confidence level, statistical significance will only be given to results achieving a ninety­
five percent confidence leveL 
Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate correlation between the FSI Score, PSI Score, 
FH Score, and region. The first notable result can be seen in the strength and significance of the 
correlation between democracy and stability. While this association may seem obvious, it 
indicates that these two characteristics are not simply two random and unrelated concepts. 
Instead, it points to the fact that these are two characteristics of a state that are strongly 
associated with each other. Since power-sharing institutions are theorized to improve these two 
aspects of a state, it is crucial they actually be related. The next significant result is the strong 
correlation between institutional power-sharing and democracy. This indicates that those states 
with higher levels of institutional power-sharing also have correspondingly higher levels of 
democracy. This supports the hypothesis that a higher level of institutional power-sharing is 
associated with more democracy. The correlation between power-sharing and stability also 
turns out to be significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence and moderately strong. 
The negative correlation is expected here as it shows that higher levels of power-sharing 
correlate negatively with instability. This supports the second hypothesis that higher levels of 
institutional power-sharing will be associated with more stability. As we see with these results, 
region has no significant relationship to either of the dependent variables. Thus the findings 
exclude region as being strongly associated with stability or democratization. 
RES PUBLICA 
Table 1: Correlation between power-sharing (PSI), stability (FSI), democracy (FH) and Region 
Dependent Variables: FSI Score and FH Score 
FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Eastern Western Central 
FH Score 
FSI Score .703** 
(.000) 
PSI Score .455** -.318* 
(.001) (.028) 
Eastern -.114 .028 -.233 
(.438) (.852) (.111) 
Western .167 -.011 .117 .574** 
(.257) (.939) (.427) (.000) 
Central -.255 .181 -.090 .316* .331* 
(.080) (.218) (.545) (.029) (.021) 
Southern .196 -.213 .247 .292* .306* .185 
(.182) (.147) (.091) (.044) (.034) (.209) 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
**p<O.Ol, *p<0.05 
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The other significant findings reveal that the regions correlate with each other, in all but 
one instance, because they all share the similar characteristics of high instability and lower 
levels of democracy. The one instance in which the regions do not correlate with each other is in 
the case of Central and Southern Africa. This is most likely because Southern Africa is arguably 
the most stable and democratic region of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Central Africa is the worst 
in these regards. 43 
CONCLUSIONS 
Theories of power-sharing suggest that institutions that allow for the inclusion of all 
major actors will produce more democracy and greater stability. These consociational systems 
have been studied extensively over the past several decades by scholars such as Norris and 
43 If Zimbabwe and Mozambique are grouped in with Eastern Africa the results of the correlation differ greatly for 
Southern Africa and alter the conclusions that can be drawn. When this is done, Southern Africa has a correlation 
with stability of -.319 that is significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. This is almost exactly the same 
strength of the correlation between power-sharing and stability. This indicates that the stability of a region plays a 
role in state stability. The relationship between democracy and Southern Africa also improves to .261 with a 
significance of .073. The correlation with power-sharing also increases to .277 with a significance of .056. What these 
alternate results point towards is that Southern Africa has adopted institutions with more power-sharing. In doing so 
the result has been higher levels of democracy and stability. 
114 RES PUBLICA 
Lipjhart, producing a debate about their effects. This study has attempted to contribute to that 
debate by testing the relationship between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and 
democracy and conflict in the tumultuous region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that 
those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing are associated with greater 
democracy and stability. While these findings by no means conclude the debate, the results 
clearly support proponents of power-sharing. There has been very little work done to study the 
effects of power-sharing institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical literature predicts 
two sets of competing hypotheses on the expected outcomes of increased power-sharing. 
However, previous studies have not focused on the part of the world where these institutions 
may be needed most. This study takes the first step in determining whether or not power­
sharing institutions do work Sub-Saharan Africa. 
With many African states deeply divided and under duress, studies of this kind can 
assist policymakers in determining the correct institutions to implement. Looking to cases to 
like South Africa, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, other states can see how power­
sharing institutions have assisted in creating free and stable states. This study should not be 
viewed as the final word on power-sharing institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples exist 
within Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ethiopia and Niger, where states have moved to institutions 
allowing for greater degrees of power-sharing and yet their levels of democracy and stability 
remain dangerously low. It is important for scholars to continue studying the precise reasons as 
to why power-sharing has been more effective in some states than others. 
The aforementioned cases of failure point towards factors affecting power-sharing not 
covered in this study. It is possible that corruption or lack of funds has prevented such 
institutions from functioning as they are theoretically designed to function. The literature also 
makes an important distinction between those states that are highly divided or post-conflict. 
This difference is important because past conflict can make it more difficult to bring all major 
actors to the table, while cleaved societies may simply be seeking a means of fairer 
representation. Deeply divided societies with a high degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
may also affect the duration of such institutions as the possibility of conflict can be greater. As 
mentioned in the design section of this study, institutional duration was something that 
unfortunately had to be omitted for logistical reasons. However, examining the duration of 
power-sharing institutions would go far in disproving the critics that power-sharing institutions 
do not last, or vindicate their theories about the fragility of such institutions. 
The purpose of this study was not to try and account for every possible factor 
influencing the success or failure of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it was meant 
to act as a starting point for future research. To gain a better perspective on what conditions are 
conducive to the success of these institutions and what may lead to their failure requires a more 
in depth look into the regions and individual cases. In doing so it can also be more fully 
understood how power-sharing institutions affect regime change and the formation of political 
parties. With that being said it is critical that we determine which set of institutions are most 
likely to provide democracy and stability for the states of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Appendix 
List of Sub-Saharan States, Scores, System Type, and Region 
Country FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Electoral Executive Decentralization Region 
Svstem 
Angola 5.5 83.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Central 
Benin 2 76.8 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Botswana 2.5 68.6 5 Maj. Par. Unitary Southern 
Burkina Faso 4 90.7 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Burundi 4.5 96.7 5 PR Pres Unitary Eastern 
Cameroon 6 95.4 5 Maj. Semi Decentralized Central 
Cape Verde 1 77.2 7 PR Par. Unitary Western 
CAR 5 106.4 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Chad 6.5 113.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Comoros 3.5 85.1 5 Maj. Pres. Federal Eastern 
DRC 6 109.9 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Central 
RofC 5.5 92.5 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Cote d'Ivoire 5.5 101.2 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Djibouti 5 81.9 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Equatorial 7 88.5 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Guinea 
Eritrea 7 93.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Ethiopia 5 98.8 7 Maj. Par. Federal Eastern 
Gabon 5.5 75.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Gambia 5 80.2 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Ghana 1.5 67.1 4 Maj. Pres. Decentralized Western 
TTninn 
Guinea 6.5 105 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Western 
Guinea-Bissau 4 97.2 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Kenya 4 100.7 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Lesotho 3 82.2 6 MMP Par. Unitary Southern 
Liberia 3.5 91.7 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Madagascar 5 82.6 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Malawi 3.5 93.6 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
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Country FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Electoral Executive Decentralization Region 
System 
Mali 2.5 79.3 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Mauritania 5.5 89.1 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Mauritius 2 44.4 5 Maj. Par. Unitary Eastern 
Mozambique 3.5 81.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Namibia 2 74.5 6 PR Pres. Decentralized Southern 
TTnion 
Niger 4.5 97.8 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Nigeria 4.5 100.2 5 Maj. Pres. Federal Western 
Rwanda 5.5 88.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Sao Tome & 2 75.8 7 PR Par. Unitary Central 
Principe 
Senegal 3 74.6 5 MMP Semi Unitary Western 
Seychelles 3 67.9 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Sierra Leone 3 93.6 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Somalia 7 114.3 0 N/A N/A N/A Eastern 
South Africa 2 67.9 9 PR Par. Federal Southern 
Sudan 7 111.8 4 N/A Pres. Federal Eastern 
Swaziland 6 82.8 2 Maj. N/A Unitary Southern 
Tanzania 3.5 81.2 4 Maj. Pres. Decentralized Eastern 
Bnion 
Togo 4.5 88.1 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Uganda 4.5 97.5 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Zambia 3.5 83.9 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Zimbabwe 6 110.2 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Sub-Saharan States, Freedom House Scores, Failed States Index Scores, System Types, and Region. 
Source(s); State Department Bureau of African Affairs; Freedom House 2010; Failed States Index 2010; 
CIA World Factbook; UN Definition of Regions; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007. www.state.gov; 
www.freedomhouse.org; www.foreignpolicy.com; www.cia.gov; www.un.org. 
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Power-sharing Index Table (PSI) 
Score Electoral System Executive Decentralization 
3 Proportional Parliamentary Federal 
Representation 
2 Mixed Member Semi-Presidential Decentralized Union 
Proportional 
1 Majoritarian Presidential Unitary 
(Plurality /FPTP w / 
SMD) 
0 Appointed or non- Monarchy or Appointed Failed State 
existent 
Power-sharing Index (PSI) . Source(s) : CIA World Factbook; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007. 
www.cia.gov. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE CLASSICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT ESSAYS 
These essays were selected by Professor Simeone as the three best essays for one of the 
assignments in last fall's theory class. Students in the theory classes work on their persuasive 
essay writing skills. The claim-objection-rejoinder format requires students to state their views 
with economy and precision. Students vote for the best essay; the winner receives the coveted 
"Certificate of Merit." The majority in the fall section chose Sara Ghadiri's essay. Which would 
you choose? 
The full title of the class is Classical Political Thought: Democracy in Athens and America. The 
class has multiple goals; it fulfills both the department's theory requirement and an "intellectual 
traditions" general education category. On the political science side, this class needs to 
introduce students to the important debate over the drivers of state behavior among realists, 
constructivists, and liberal institutionalists. On the general education side, the class is intended 
to introduce students to the great texts of classical political thought and the key questions that 
prompted those texts. These goals are addressed in part by reading Thucydides' masterwork, 
History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides forces students to consider whether just wars exist 
and the role of rhetoric in democratic societies. 
The class also reads Sophocles, Plato, Aristophanes, and Aristotle. Plato's Crito provides the 
essay contest question: under what conditions are democratic dissenters, i.e., those who disobey 
the law of a limited government, justified? 
Socrates makes at least three arguments in the Crito for why he ought to obey the jury sentence 
against him: (1) because one ought "to fulfill all one's agreements, provided they are just" (4ge); 
(2) because disobedience destroys "the Laws, and the whole state as well" (SOb); and (3) because 
one is "even more bound to respect . . .  your country" than one's father (SIb). 
Richard Kraut believes that despite these arguments, Socrates' view does allow for a measure of 
civil disobedience such as the philosopher displayed in the Apology. This is because Socrates 
also argues that "you must do what your city and your country commands, or else persuade it 
that justice is on your side" (SIc). The addition of the persuasion option creates an opening for 
dialogue and civil disobedience. But how wide is this opening for civil disobedience, and what 
principles justify it? 
To provide more specificity, we turn to the different answers to this question offered by 
Americans Abe Fortas and Howard Zinno For Fortas the opening is very narrow because only 
invalid and unconstitutional laws should be disobeyed, proper dissent is limited to breaking 
only these laws, and dissenters must accept the punishment that comes even with breaking 
unjust laws. Kimberley Brownlee calls this a "deference to the law" approach. Zinn argues that 
both parts of Fortas' deference view-the limit on proper disobedience and the requirement of 
accepting state punishment- are fallacious. 
Students were asked to write an essay giving reasons for holding that either Fortas or Zinn has 
the more defensible position. 
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Abe Fortas describes himself as a man of the law, saying that " each of us owes a duty of 
obedience to law," claiming that it is "a moral as well as a legal imperative."l Fortas has great 
reverence for the United States' system of government and law and its constitutional 
framework, but admits that if he had been a "Negro" in the Deep South, he would have 
disobeyed the state segregation laws.2 In his essay on Civil Disobedience, he groups 
"trespassing on private and official premises" with " assaults upon recruiters for munitions 
firms and for the armed services; breaking windows in the Pentagon and in private stores and 
homes; and occupying academic offices."3 He dismisses excuses for this kind of conduct as 
"nonsense." Fortas reconciles his belief in the rule of law and his belief in disobeying unjust 
laws by insisting that only unjust and unconstitutional laws be disobeyed. Furthermore, he 
believes that law breakers must accept their punishment, in what he describes as the " great 
tradition" of civil disobedience.4 But when Dr. Martin Luther King ignored an injunction by the 
state and led a protest in Birmingham that the Supreme Court later upheld as illegal, Fortas was 
one of the dissenters, saying that he had "no moral criticism to make of Dr. King's action in this 
incident, even though it turned out to be legally unjustified."5 How can one insist that a law 
breaker is morally justified and at the same time believe that there is a moral imperative that the 
law breaker owes a duty of obedience to the law? 
Howard Zinn asserts that even Fortas himself cannot reconcile the two. Zinn claims that 
Fortas' overall argument is inconsistent because " more and more, Fortas' definition of what is 
moral coincides almost exactly with what is constitutional, and what is constitutional is what 
the Supreme Court decides".6 Thus Zinn argues that Fortas' belief reduces morality to law, 
which leaves little room for the sometimes extraordinary exceptions in which civil disobedience 
is needed to change unjust laws and situations. Arguing in line with Henry David Thoreau and 
other famed civil dissenters, Zinn says that "if political science does not include a moral 
philosophy and the idea of civil disobedience, it becomes merely a register of whatever 
regulations the politicians of the time have ordered."7 Referring back to Fortas' example of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Zinn asks "why was it right for Dr. King to accept an unjust verdict 
corroborating an unjust injunction, resulting in an unjust jail sentence?"8 Zinn regards these 
acts as oppressive, and insists that a law breaker should not be willing to admit wrongness and 
fault just because the Supreme Court or any other court decided the other way. He writes that 
"when unjust decisions are accepted, injustice is sanctioned and perpetuated."9 
1 Fortas, Abe. 1968. Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience. New York: Signet, 18. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 34. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 35. 
6 Zinn, Howard. 2002. Disobedience and Democracy: Nine Fallacies on Law and Order. Cambridge: South End 
Press, 32. 
7 Ibid., 34. 
8 Ibid., 29. 
9 Ibid. 
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Fortas vehemently disagrees, contending that an individual cannot " pick and choose" 
which laws to obey and accept the consequences. His regard for the rule of law falls under the 
fair play theory, in which he says that " a citizen cannot demand of his government or of other 
people obedience to the law, and at the same time claim a right in himself to break it by lawless 
conduct, free of punishment or penalty."lO Fortas also goes on to condemn the use of violence 
in protest, claiming that there are plenty of forums for civil discourse that allow dissenters to 
persuade their government peacefully. Fortas notes that it is a city's duty to provide these 
forums, and that " an enormous degree of self-control and discipline are required on both 
sides".l1 If this fair play theory works as Fortas asserts it does, then civil dissenters have a duty 
to follow laws or accept punishment for the laws they break in protest. 
Unfortunately for Fortas, fair play is a theory and not a real world application. The 
example that he cites with Dr. King in Birmingham reveals his inconsistencies. The government 
does not always provide adequate forums for discourse, and specifically denied the venue for 
Dr. King. Zinn notes that "if we check Fortas' language carefully, we note that the government 
being bound by law is an expectation, while the citizen's being bound by law is a fact."12 Fortas 
admits that "it is a deplorable truth that because [police] are officers of the state they frequently 
escape the penalty for their lawlessness."13 Zinn further insists that Fortas' reliance on the 
Supreme Court has not only failed in specific circumstances (like that of Dr. King and Dred 
Scott), but is also inherently unfair because "the Court is still a branch of government . . .  and in 
the never-ending contest between authority and liberty that goes on in every society, the 
agencies of government, at their best, are still on the side of authority."14 Additionally, the 
government does pick and choose which laws it enforces, so the idea that a citizen cannot pick 
and choose as a form of discourse contradicts the notion of fair play. 
A system of government that allows for effective political discourse in all situations would 
have no need for civil disobedience, but it is fallacious to assume that such a government exists 
in the United States. History has proven that civil disobedience is sometimes a last resort 
option to effect change in policies. Should the protest of unjust laws, whether in speech or in 
action, be punished because of the theoretical implications of fair play? Violence and other 
harmful actions certainly deserve stricter scrutiny than other forms of protest, but the idea that 
Dr. King and Dred Scott were wrong because the Supreme Court declared it so is inconceivable, 
yet that is what Fortas' logic requires. The laws in question for Dred Scott and Dr. Martin 
Luther King violated the notion of what it means to be human, and there are no theories of law 
that can justify the punishment afflicted on them. Moreover, there is no validity in arguing that 
the justice system has eventually worked out these past atrocities. The individuals affected by 
unjust laws will not be comforted by the assurance that it will all work out in the end. Thus, the 
only theories of law that can account for true and effective civil discourse are those that provide 
exceptions for one of the most valuable forms of speech in our nation's history, civil 
disobedience. 
10 Fortas 1968, 33. 
11 Ibid., 36. 
12 Zinn 2002, 23. 
13 Fortas 1968, 33. 
14 Zinn 2002, 8 .  
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The opportunities for civil disobedience to occur within democratic institutions are 
abundant. However, the extent to which persons can exercise civil disobedience is the subject of 
great debate among scholars. To be clear, the term civil disobedience "has been used to apply 
to a person's refusal to obey a law which the person believes to be immoral or 
unconstitutional."l Some believe, as does Howard Zinn, that this practice should entail certain 
excitable actions that are more extreme and blatantly unlawful in their execution.2 Others, like 
Supreme Court Justice Fortas, believe civil disobedience should ultimately acquiesce to the rule 
of law within a democratic institution.3 Overall, Fortas' argument is more defensible because 
"the motive of civil disobedience does not confer immunity for law violation."4 A democratic 
government provides alternative methods for countering unjust or unconstitutional laws. 
Civil disobedience should not supersede the rule of law because in the American 
constitutional system, the rule of law is dually prescribed to both citizens and the government. 
The actions and consequences are limited and equal to both the population and the government 
that is in power. Fortas defends this claim when he states, "Just as our form of life depends 
upon the government's subordination to law under the constitution, so it also depends upon the 
individual's subservience to the laws duly prescribed. liS Individuals who practice civil 
disobedience should be bound by the laws, for if they are not, then the social compact between 
the citizen and government is broken. Fortas furthers this notion when he claims, " A citizen 
cannot demand of his government or of other people obedience to the law, and at the same time 
claim a right in himself to break it by lawless conduct, free of punishment or penalty."6 A 
mutual acceptance of the Constitution and laws is necessary to preserve democratic institutions 
and ensure continued success. Socrates ponders this proposal when he asks Crito, "Do you 
imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be turned upside down, if the legal judgments 
which are pronounced in it have no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons?"7 
Even Howard Zinn, who is in disagreement with this position, recognizes the importance of the 
state when he explains, "surely the state is an instrument . . .  for the achievement of human 
values."B However, if the rule of law is to be determined and enforced on a biased and 
individual basis, then the state cannot exist to further any human values. Therefore, the rule of 
law should be enforced, even in light of civil disobedience, so that democratic institutions can 
ensure order and continuation of furthering the human values in pursuance. 
Despite the position posited by Fortas, numerous objections can be made to the contrary. 
The utilization of more extreme measures within civil disobedience is necessary to continually 
aid the growth of democracy. Also, these forms of disobedience create a quicker avenue for 
change within the democratic system. Zinn supports these claims when he suggests that civil 
1 Fortas 1968, 30. 
2 Zinn 2002, 18. 
3 Fortas 1968, 30. 
4 Ibid., 32. 
5 Ibid., 33. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Plato. Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant, trans. 1993. The Last Days of Socrates. New York, 90. 
B Zinn 2002, 10. 
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disobedience should "resist the government's actions against the lives and liberties of its 
citizens; to pressure, even to shock the government into change; to organize people to replace 
the holders of power . . .  "9 Regardless of the speed of change this strategy suggests, this form of 
civil disobedience is misapplied for the success and continuation of human values and 
democracy. Fortas expounds on this point when he states, "Civil disobedience, even in its 
broadest sense, does not apply to efforts to overthrow the government or to seize control of 
areas or parts of it by force . . .  These are programs of revolution."lo These forms are inferior to 
peaceful demonstrations of civil disobedience because they undermine the democratic 
institutions and demand unlawful practices to alter the nature of government. 
Although these ' exciting' and confrontational forms of disobedience may produce quick 
and rapid results, they merely perpetuate the extreme measures for all future forms of 
disobedience. Fortas explains this claim more eloquently when he declares, "Unremitting 
pressure . . .  will undoubtedly expedite response . . .  but the reaction to repeated acts of violence 
may be repression instead of remedy."ll The extreme measures of civil disobedience will be 
met by more extreme measures to suppress the unlawful and insubordinate actions of the 
participants. Furthermore, "Violence is never defensible - and it has never succeeded in 
securing massive reform in an open society where there were alternative methods of winning 
the minds of others to one's cause and securing changes in the government or its policies."12 If 
extreme measures are continually utilized to "overthrow the government," then there will be no 
peaceful transitions from one ruling party to the next. As a direct and dire result, the legitimacy 
of a democratic institution is undermined for the violent and coercive forms of majority or 
minority revolution. Instead, "it is basically conscience, justice, and a long and entirely justified 
view of national interest that impel the . . .  majority to rectify an intolerable situation."13 This 
mirrors Socrates' belief, which states that "you must do whatever your city and your country 
commands, or else persuade it that justice is on your side; but violence against mother or father 
is an unholy act, and it is a far greater sin against your country."14 Ultimately, a democratic 
government is an arena for debate, contemplation, and compromise in which the conflicting 
ideologies and beliefs of a diverse citizenry are negotiated to further human values and justice. 
9 Ibid., 7. 
10 Fortas 1968, 30. 
11 Ibid., 38. 
12 Ibid., 40. 
13 Ibid., 39. 
14 Plato 1993, 91. 
RES PUBLICA 
ZINN AND FORTAS: FAIR PLAY AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
Sara Ghadiri 
125 
Abe Fortas and Howard Zinn both present arguments defending civil disobedience, but 
Zinn has the more defensible position. Both of them argue within the framework of the fair play 
theory of obligation, where obligation is derived from the expectation that both parties will 
follow the rules of the game. Zinn, however, argues that the individual ought to be able to 
negotiate their side of the rules. 
Fortas states that we owe a duty of obedience to law as a "moral and legal imperative."ls 
Zinn counters, stating that the Fortas is inconsistent. According to Zinn, Fortas is actually 
arguing that obedience to the law supersedes obedience to morality. To that point, Zinn argues, 
"there can be no moral imperative to obey an immoral law, unless the very idea of obedience 
has an overriding moral value."16 We cannot, therefore, obey immoral laws. The rule of law as 
described by Fortas is a necessary condition for justice. Without the rule of law, we would have 
no justice, and justice is paramount. 
Zinn debunks the necessity of Fortas' rule of law, however. He has four claims: that the 
idea that disobedience is wrong because it fosters a general disrespect for all laws, including 
good ones, is false; it is empirically false that disobedience of bad laws creates disrespect for all 
laws; while civil disobedience can have a proliferating effect, it does not lead to a general 
breakdown of order; and the idea that civil disobedience will not lead to "bad" groups using 
civil disobedience. These claims all entail that the rule of law is not necessary for justice. 
It is from the rule of law, though, Fortas claims, that we derive order. The rule of law 
means that individuals must accept rulings of the court and serve what punishment they are 
dealt regardless of their immorality. We risk losing any semblance of that order and the stability 
of the law would be undermined if we do not accept the punishments given to us. Order, he 
argues, is just because it allows for change by the ballot box, or by peaceful means of protest. 
Fortas seems to place order before justice. 
Zinn argues contrarily that order and justice ought to be on the same footing. Were that 
the case, he says, everything would be fine and no protest or civil disobedience would be 
necessary. It is actually because the rule of law hides injustices, that civil disobedience is 
necessary. The rule of law does not create order, but rather pretends to keep the peace in order 
to perpetuate a false social conception of order. Individuals protest because the rule of law does 
preserve justice. Thus, the rule of law should not be preserved by acquiescing to unjust 
punishment. It is to this point that Zinn argues that those who commit acts of civil disobedience 
should not be compelled to serve punishment for disobeying an immoral law. "When unjust 
decisions are accepted, injustice is sanctioned and perpetuated."17 If we do not require the rule 
of law for a sense of order, and we do not wish to sanction injustice, it is best that we commit 
acts of civil disobedience. If justice and order are not held in equal esteem, justice ought to be 
above order. 
15 Fortas 1968, 18. 
16 Zinn 2002, 13. 
17 Ibid., 29. 
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Conversely, Fortas states that the system and the structure thereof allow full 
opportunity for both the state and the individual to bring their claims before a court, thereby 
limiting the amount of injustice that should occur. He also claims that the system promotes 
lawfulness for all, and states, "just as we expect the government to be bound by all laws, so each 
individual is bound by all laws."18 Furthermore, Fortas argues that a citizen cannot demand that 
others obey a law while he does not follow it and is free of punishment. 
Zinn rejoins that the language indicates that the government being bound by law is 
expected, while the citizen's being bound is a fact. Thus, Fortas' claim that the law seeks to 
equalize the citizen and the state in manners to present contention is inconsistent. Zinn argues 
that the government picks and chooses what laws it chooses to follow, citing the inconsistent 
adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that if that is the case, citizens should be 
allowed to pick and choose what laws they follow based on their individual concept of 
morality? It is for this reason that Zinn argues that if there is to be obligation from the fair play 
conception, both sides ought to be able to decide the rules. 
18 Fortas 1968, 33. 
